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# A PEACE CONGRESS OF INTRIGUE

AN INTIMATE ACCOUNT OF THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA,  
1815, BASED ON MEMOIRS OF PARTICIPANTS THERE.

Compiled by **FREDERICK FREKSA;**  
Translated, and with an Introduction and Notes,  
by **HARRY HANSEN.**

This astonishing book should be of extraordinary interest in this year of our own Peace Conference, which the whole world hopes will be in direct contrast to the Congress of Vienna. It is a story of social and political intrigue, a narrative of that shameless bartering of small nationalities by kings and diplomats about which President Wilson has spoken in eloquent and indignant language.

Before the reader there pass in review Wellington, Marie Louise and Napoleon's ill-fated son the little King of Rome, Talleyrand, Metternich, Frederick William of Prussia, Hardenberg, the fascinating Countess Zichy, Gentz, Dalberg and many another crafty statesman of an age whose influence lasted to the present time.

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New York

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The genesis of the war of 1914-1918 goes back to the Congress of Vienna, for here Prussia laid the foundation for the military domination of Germany which made it possible for her to disturb the peace of the world. Here the rulers turned a deaf ear to the misery of Poland; crushed the rising tide of liberalism in the German Confederacy; strengthened Bourbonism in France and set Hapsburg rule over Italian States that had to bleed half a century longer before they achieved unity.

In this book the author has drawn upon the wonderful story of social and political intrigue told by the participants themselves in their memoirs; and here pass in review such figures as Hardenberg, Wellington, Admiral Sir Sidney Smith, Gentz, Dalberg, the Prince de Ligne, Count de la Garde, Frederick William of Prussia, Francis of Austria, Marie Louise and Napoleon's son, the young King of Rome, the fascinating Countess Zichy, Archduke John of Austria and most of the princes and princesses, dukes and barons and crafty statesmen of an age the influence of which survived even down to our own time.

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**THE CENTURY CO.**

**353 Fourth Avenue New York City**









**A PEACE CONGRESS  
OF INTRIGUE  
(VIENNA, 1815)**



# A PEACE CONGRESS OF INTRIGUE

(VIENNA, 1815)

A VIVID, INTIMATE ACCOUNT  
OF THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA  
COMPOSED OF THE PERSONAL MEMOIRS  
OF ITS IMPORTANT PARTICIPANTS

COMPILED BY  
FREDERICK FREKSA

TRANSLATED  
AND WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND NOTES  
By HARRY HANSEN



NEW YORK  
THE CENTURY CO.  
1919



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*Published January, 1919*

. . . . "Statesmen must by this time have learned that the opinion of the world is everywhere wide-awake and fully comprehends the issues involved. No representative of any self-governed nation will dare disregard it by attempting any such covenants of selfishness and compromise as were entered into at the Congress of Vienna. The thought of the plain people here and everywhere throughout the world, the people who enjoy no privilege and have very simple and unsophisticated standards of right and wrong, is the air all governments must henceforth breathe if they would live. It is in the full disclosing light of that thought that all policies must be conceived and executed in this midday hour of the world's life. German rulers have been able to upset the peace of the world only because the German people were not suffered under their tutelage to share the comradeship of the other peoples of the world either in thought or in purpose. They were allowed to have no opinion of their own which might be set up as a rule of conduct for those who exercised authority over them. But the Congress that concludes this war will feel the full strength of the tides that run now in the hearts and consciences of free men everywhere. Its conclusions will run with those tides."

WOODROW WILSON.

*In his address to the Congress of the United States, December 4, 1917.*





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## FOREWORD

### THE LEGACY OF VIENNA AT VERSAILLES

Milestones—The Congress of Vienna and the Peace Conference of Versailles! Exactly 104 years of human history lies between them; and what a history!

The Peace Conference at Versailles is before our eyes; we are all of us more or less participants. Before it met we had visualized its task. That it will decide matters for good and all no one believes or wishes to believe. That it will alleviate human suffering and right some of the wrongs that have oppressed mankind is the fervent hope of the millions who look toward it for freedom. It is also their hope and belief that the men who make up this conference are animated by the spirit of service—of adjusting affairs so that they will serve the interests of the many and not the few. It is a conference the decisions of which will not be worth the paper they are written on if they do not have the consent of the governed.

In this lies the strong contrast between the Congress of Vienna and the Peace Conference at



Versailles. Vienna was a congress of princes and arbitrary rulers. The hereditary overlords decided according to their aims and ambitions, in a spirit of greed and selfishness. Its story need not be told by those of us who view its results in the perspective of one hundred years. It has been set down in no uncertain fashion by the men and women who took part in its negotiations and in its gay social life—in diaries and memoirs that disclose only too well their belief that the people existed only to be trafficked in.

The significant thing about the Congress of Vienna is that the kings and ministers met to prove the accuracy of this belief. It was like a diet that assembled to reaffirm the articles of a creed that had been under fire. The right of the princes to the bodies and souls of their people was being questioned. The French Revolution had caused many hereditary rulers to fear that even the anointed were not safe without proper guaranties. The Napoleonic régime had swept many petty lords aside and created new ones overnight; so that it was apparent even to the humblest Russian *muzhik* that royalty was often a most human institution. Moreover, the common people heard from the sailors and the merchant classes that across the seas a new nation was growing up without kings or privileged rulers of any kind. It was exactly the logical moment for reaction to

reassert itself, and the argument of Talleyrand for "legitimacy," in which he set forth that only a legitimate ruler insured a stable government, was the logical result of circumstances, even though he advanced it with the selfish motive of putting the Bourbons securely back into power.

The Congress of Vienna was called into being by an article in the treaty signed at Paris, May 30, 1814, after Napoleon had been crushed by a coalition composed of England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, and had abdicated at Fontainebleau. It was to begin October 1, 1814, and credentials were to be presented November 1, 1814. About ninety persons actually took part in the Congress, but the number of those present on various missions was much larger. Virtually all the sovereigns of Europe whose fortunes had been affected by the Napoleonic Wars were there. In addition a great many political groups that sought recognition from the powers were represented by lobbyists. Every salon was a political camp.

When the Congress assembled, Czar Alexander of Russia was its dominating figure. His arms had been overwhelmingly victorious, and he stood ready to profit by their success. Early in his career he had shown the most liberal tendencies. To many he was known as "the dream prince." When the Congress closed, it was found that Talleyrand had been its most influential

figure. As the plenipotentiary of Louis XVIII he had split the allies, driven a wedge between Austria and Prussia, and formed an alliance of defense against Russia and Prussia with Austria, England, and Bavaria.

England's spokesman was Lord Castlereagh (later Marquis of Londonderry), and for a short time the Duke of Wellington. Prussia was represented by its chancellor, Hardenberg, and to a great degree by Wilhelm von Humboldt. Austria was represented by Metternich.

By a secret article in the Treaty of Paris the four powers that had been allied against Napoleon agreed that they alone should decide on the division of territory, and that France and Spain should later be called into consultation. Talleyrand broke up this plan by playing on the prejudices of the allies. He found that Austria's weak spot was the fear of Prussia's growing military power. Therefore he seconded Austria's opposition to the seizing of the whole of Saxony by Prussia.

Prussia demanded Saxony because Russia demanded the Slav districts of southern Prussia. Saxony was regarded as an outlaw state because its king had supported Napoleon to the end. Other German states, notably Bavaria, had supported Napoleon at one time or another, but they had joined the cause of the allies before Napoleon



was defeated. Russia supported the claims of Prussia against Saxony; Prussia supported the claims of Russia against Poland.

Austria demanded a share of Saxony, Italy, and Poland. It was willing to relinquish its holdings in the Netherlands, which were becoming burdensome. Russia objected to appeasing Austria by giving up Polish territory, and Prussia did not want to strengthen Austria by giving up any part of Saxony.

Some of the minor German princes, realizing their inability to cope with the larger powers, had reverted to the idea of a German empire. A number of able men had toyed with the plan, but the animosities of Austria, Prussia, and Bavaria made united action impossible. The chief exponent of this idea was Baron von Stein, who looked forward to an empire with a liberal constitution. Austria supported the project half-heartedly, refusing to enter into it as long as it appeared that Prussia might be an effective antagonist. Prussia was on the other side of the argument, and hoped eventually to be so strong in Germany that Austria could be disregarded and Prussia could acquire the kaiserdom. It was not until 1871 that Bismarck was able to arrogate the imperial crown to Prussia by means of the Franco-Prussian War.

The smaller nations had various aims. Wür-

temberg opposed the growth of Prussia, but could not hinder it. The Crown Prince of Würtemberg, who seems to have been more self-assertive than his father, leaned toward Russia and sought Alexander's support for the restoration of the German empire, using his projected marriage with the sister of the czar as his bid for support, and hoping eventually to become commander-in-chief of the army of the German Confederation. Before the Congress ended, both Würtemberg and Bavaria gave constitutions to their people.

The Scandinavian nations were also represented at the Congress, but for the most part went empty-handed. The Russian power, which had its genesis in Björko, in Lake Mälär, and was still regarded as barbarian when the Congress of Utrecht met one hundred years before, rounded out the work of conquest begun with the defeat of Charles XII of Sweden at Pultowa, and held fast to Finland. Pultowa is in the Ukraine, which to-day is knocking at the gates of Versailles for freedom from the yoke of Petrograd. Finland, still the battle-ground of Russo-German intrigue, is looking to Versailles for guidance to realize its national aspirations.

In the readjustments that were effected when the return of Napoleon from Elba forced the sovereigns to drop their animosities and unite once

more, Russia retained the greater part of Poland and Bessarabia, and allowed Prussia to keep Posen and Austria to effect a slight rectification of its frontier. Austria gave Belgium to the house of Orange, which made it a part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Austria gained Lombardy, Venetia, Illyria, Tyrol, and Salzburg. Prussia grudgingly took two fifths of Saxony and certain provinces on the Rhine that were so badly gerrymandered that general opprobrium was visited on the Prussian delegates when they returned to Berlin. Pomerania, which had been Swedish, also went to Prussia. Lauenburg was given to Denmark, but this failed to compensate for the loss of Norway to Sweden. The Saxon King retained his throne and a small fraction of his kingdom, including his best cities, Leipsic and Dresden. It was the Congress of Vienna that gave Helgoland to England, as well as Malta and the Ionian Isles. In its haste it forgot about the little strip of land at the point where Holland, Germany, and Belgium unite, called Moresnet, which for a hundred years has had no ruler and no flag.

Versailles is dominated by the idea of a league of nations to enforce peace; Vienna was dominated by the man who years before had dreamed of a similar league of nations—Alexander of Russia. But, when the Congress met, Alexander

had forgotten his dream. The league was first broached in Alexander's instructions to his envoy in London in 1801. It professed to form a bond between the nations of Europe on the basis of the existing international situation, each nation giving aid to another in case of need. In phraseology it expressed many noble virtues, but it was distinctly meant to be a creation of princes to maintain their power. It was the forerunner of the "holy" alliance formed between Austria, Prussia, and Russia after Waterloo.

In the final act of Vienna in 1820 the idea of an international court took expression in a clause which provided that "the confederated states engage not to make war against one another on any pretext, nor to pursue their differences by force of arms, but to submit them to the diet, which shall attempt to mediate by means of a commission. If this should not succeed, and a judicial sentence becomes necessary, recourse shall be had to a well organized court, to the decision of which the contending parties will submit without appeal." The court was never organized, or provided with means of enforcing its decisions.

A peace conference is sometimes spoken of as a high court which shall judge good and evil among the nations. It is scarcely that so long as it represents only one group of litigants. There is hope among many students of political affairs

in the United States and England that the conference of Versailles may grow into such a court. The development is logical, and would almost seem to have a parallel in the development of our civil courts.

A congress of nations like that at Vienna, or a peace conference like that at Versailles, is based first of all on force. The men who gathered at Vienna disposed of their world according to terms that they could enforce. Alexander could speak with decision because a great Russian army stood on Russia's western boundaries. The allies and the United States are able to dictate terms of peace because they can enforce that peace. But there is this difference: At Vienna force served the outworn institution of the nobility and divine right; at Versailles force is in the hands of men who are directly representative of the actual ruling element in their political group.

In this regard their position is analogous to that of the Vigilantes of frontier days, who organized to run down the horse-thief, and, when they caught him, strung him up. Their rule also was based on force. It was a force that was approved by the best interests of the community, the group that approved law and order; in other words, security of life and property. It was done by consent of the governed, and objected to only by the small minority of disturbers, who soon



mended their ways. The Vigilantes went back to their every-day tasks when the legitimate work of the courts was made possible.

It is therefore not out of place to hope that the peace conference, which has seen an international horse-thief caught and punished, and has now assembled to restore stolen property, may grow into an international court of justice. There is one difficulty in the way. The Vigilantes were sufficiently close to the horse-thief and his gang to hang the ringleader and convert his accomplices. The work of converting a criminal nation that is powerful enough to maintain its own point of view within its own borders, and is not easily susceptible to pressure other than force from without, presents a problem vastly more difficult of solution. But it can and must be solved.

It is highly significant that virtually all of the men who kept diaries at the time of the Congress of Vienna or who wrote memoirs twenty years after estimated the Congress at its true value. They knew exactly why they had come and what they might expect. Restoration—a return to conditions of pre-Napoleonic times—was their watchword, at least the watchword of the greater princes. The fact that some of the petty princes had lost their thrones and their privileges in the upheaval did not disturb them. They were willing to profit by the situation and

to remove these sources of bickering and discontent. Political entities were becoming larger and more powerful; the day of strongly nationalized groups was at hand.

In the past nationalism had not even been a determining factor in the choice of diplomats by the different European courts. It is true that England's foreign policy was conducted by Englishmen who had the welfare of their own nation at heart, and to this may be ascribed not a little of England's success in foreign fields. The political affairs of France had remained almost exclusively in the hands of Frenchmen, but at other Continental courts foreigners often decided on the most vital questions that could affect the nations' future. So many nationalities were represented in the entourage of Czar Alexander at the Congress of Vienna—and at other diplomatic conferences—that it is proper to ask whether there was anything left for the Russian people to do except support the foreign administration and bleed for their country. Capo d'Istria was born on the island of Corfu, and received his title from the Duke of Savoy; the cause of the Greek republic lay close to his heart. Later he became Russian minister of foreign affairs jointly with Nesselrode. The Nesselrodes hailed from Livonia, but the migration of the family from Westphalia was comparatively recent, and Nes-

selrode himself received a thoroughgoing German education. Baron von Stein was a German. Pozzo di Borgo was a Corsican who was at first intimately associated with the fortunes of France, but was later exiled by Napoleon. Czartoryski was a Pole. The conglomerate character of Austrian ministries is a matter of history. Even Prussia, which set great store by nationality, was not averse to taking brilliant men into its service from other countries. It was Hardenberg, it will be remembered, who found a place in Prussia for the Danish delegate at the Congress, Bernstorff.

There is no cloud on the origin and nationality of the men who represent the various nations at the peace conference at Versailles.' Indeed, so sharply have the lines been drawn that no people to-day will permit its fortunes to be put into the hands of a stranger, or of any man whose nationality is not the same as their own.

In attempting to adjust affairs for the future, Vienna erred in not being guided by the lessons of the past. It took for granted that human affairs had remained in a cataleptic state, despite the fact that Europe had just passed through a cataclysm. It failed to interpret aright the spirit that was born with the French Revolution. It attributed the upheaval that followed to the personal influence of one man, Napoleon, by whom it imagined the people had been misled. It failed

to realize that Napoleon was wholly as much a product of his time as the wars were a product of his ambition. Fifty years before he might have been another Zacharias Werner, shouting and gesticulating from the political pulpit to an amused, interested, but non-responsive congregation.

In attempting to adjust affairs in order that there will be a measure of security in Europe in the future, the men who meet at Versailles have before them the lessons of the last hundred years of progress toward democratic government. Since the Congress of Vienna history has been written with an eye to movements and tendencies among the people. At Vienna the princes looked down with contempt on the common herd; at Versailles the delegates prefer to call themselves spokesmen of the popular will. Their success will depend entirely on how well they interpret that will.

HARRY HANSEN.

*Versailles, France, December, 1918.*





**THE LIGHTER SIDE OF  
THE CONGRESS**



# A PEACE CONGRESS OF INTRIGUE

## CHAPTER I

### THOSE WHO DANCED AT THE CONGRESS

FROM THE REMINISCENCES OF THE COUNTESS  
BERNSTORFF

“The Congress dances but accomplishes nothing,” said that old wit, the Prince de Ligne, and his mot became traditional. If later generations came to think of the Congress of Vienna as a gay, colorful assembly of royal merrymakers, it was largely due to reminiscences such as these which Elise von Dernath, Countess Bernstorff, wrote for her children twenty-three years after the event. The social position of the countess was unapproachable. Her husband, Christian Günther von Bernstorff, was so beloved in Vienna that he was enabled to reside there during a period when Austria was nominally at war with Denmark. He was Danish ambassador at Vienna and delegate for Denmark to the Congress with his brother Joachim. The name comes down to our own day, for the Schleswig-Holstein

question, which this Bernstorff tried, and failed to solve, may come up again for settlement before the peace conference at Versailles; it is significant also that it was a member of this family who represented Germany as ambassador to the United States immediately before America entered the war. Countess Bernstorff was the daughter of the Count of Dernath, and calls herself German on the ground of her Holstein nativity. It is not unlikely that when Prince Hardenberg, the Prussian chancellor, asked Count Bernstorff to enter the Prussian diplomatic service in 1818, his wife's predilections for Prussia may have been a determining factor in placing the Bernstorff family in the Prussian service.

#### THOSE WHO DANCED AT THE CONGRESS

WHEN I let this wonderful time pass in review before my mind's eye, so many different pictures suggest themselves that I do not know how to unite them; the less so because, unhappily, not all the facts are at my command. Although the Congress had called together the exalted heads of the greatest empires, because it was to decide the most important interests of the nations, that had put the long rule of oppression behind them, and to order anew their political relations, yet the task was so tremendous, so difficult, and the interests of those engaged were often so diametrically opposed to one another,

that it seemed at first to all observers as if they would not be able to agree.

It seemed as if the mutual friendly relations were used only for the purpose of investigation, and there was the atmosphere of a thunder-storm and a weight on the spirits. In order to get rid of this and to obtain composure, we entered heartily into diversions, and it appeared as if the great lords, with their numerous followings, had come to Vienna solely for the purpose of allowing themselves to be entertained to the fullest extent by their imperial host and to enjoy new festivities daily.

Tremendous arrangements had been made in the Burg [Hofburg, the place of the Hapsburgs in Vienna] for this hospitality; it cost daily, as it was said, 500,000 gulden [\$240,000]. Coffee was cooked in nothing less than enormous brewing-kettles. Innumerable cooks were in action; above all, the royal stables used up enormous sums, as a carriage was kept ready for use for every one of the big and little lords. It is probable that hospitality has never been practised on a greater scale than at that time by the Emperor of Austria. Every sovereign found himself placed so that he could not miss any of the comforts of his own court. Quarters, attendance, equipage—everything was imperial; everything was of that solid pomp such as appertains to

the princes of the house of Austria and was possible only through the extraordinary wealth not only of the royal house, but of that of a large number of private persons. The Congress is said to have cost the court of Vienna nearly 30,000,000 gulden. It was at that time that the old Prince de Ligne spoke the mot that has become famous, "*Le Congrès danse, mais il ne marche pas.*"

So long as the Congress was so idle and engaged solely in celebrating and in dancing, could any one think ill of us women if we thought of ourselves as the principal characters? There was festival after festival, and apparently only the most prominent, elegant, and youngest men and women were the regular participants; whereas all the others seemingly played the rôle of supernumeraries.

Especially amusing was the mixture of all sorts of persons who thought that they had business at the Congress, and some of whom actually had been sent there with a purpose, if not to transact business, at least to observe.

We saw here nobles and learned men who never before had been on a business errand, but who now considered themselves highly important, and in this belief adopted a patronizing attitude. There were professors who imagined that the Congress, at which they were merely spectators,



was grouped about their academic chairs; but they soon went about at a loss, complaining that they could not find out what was actually going on. Others, naturally, could appear only as private persons because they hoped to act in secret. Many a philanthropist carried a completed constitution in his pocket; but, sad to relate, it did not see the light of day.

In addition to this, picture to yourself the numerous following of the high and highest personages,—the swarm of German high nobility, the crowd of strangers who had been attracted by the great drama,—and you will be able to get an idea of the scene in Vienna at the beginning of October.

When I call back my memory of the crowned heads, I see in the foreground the Russian Czar, whose story has always attracted me, and whose tragic death in the year 1825 affected me severely. His splendid, handsome, knightly appearance, the graciousness of his actions, would have won him even more conquests if at the same time there had not been a sort of enigmatic reserve, something gloomy and depressed, in his manner. It was not until later that I learned that at that time he was under the influence of Madame von Krudener [a religious enthusiast] and believed himself the liberator and benefactor

of mankind, and therefore found himself involved in a world full of contradictions.

Beside him appeared King Frederick William III, also a heroic figure, but as simple and manly and unassuming as his imperial friend was dazzling and proud. He impressed by his earnest military attitude, and the stiffness and strength in his expression were attributed to his mourning for his deceased queen [Queen Louise of Prussia].

From these two I turn to the prince who stood first in our hearts, the good King of the Danes, Frederick VI. With some apprehension we looked forward to his appearance. This man, who was such an excellent monarch, suffered from the reputation, not wholly unfounded, of having been to blame for the misfortune which followed him during his long rule; in addition to that he had come into general disfavor by his alliance with France. Then there was his somewhat repulsive exterior, but the modest friendliness of his bearing, his gracious, unpretentious attitude, soon won him all hearts and assured him honorable recognition.

There remain but two kings, two grand dukes, and three dukes for me to describe. I have but little to say of any of them. King Max Joseph of Bavaria seemed to me a jovial, good-hearted man; the King of Würtemberg, Frederick, a

very stout, comical man; and Grand Duke Karl of Baden appeared unprepossessing and was uncommunicative. The Duke of Weimar, Karl August, was by reputation most accomplished and a patron of all the arts and sciences, and soon proved himself a most liberal-minded prince. Duke Frederick William of Brunswick-Oels appeared crowned with laurel, but in a not very prepossessing person, with a somewhat diffident manner that was not at all taking. Duke Ernst of Coburg, on the other hand, made a vain pretense to good looks. The prejudice that he was still secretly a friend of the French was held against Duke Frederick William of Nassau-Weilburg, a most cultivated and agreeable man. The heir apparent, Leopold of Dessau, and his brother George were youthful spectators in Vienna.

The two crown princes of Bavaria and Würtemberg were almost enemies. The crown prince of Würtemberg was married to Charlotte, second daughter of the King of Bavaria, and was now engaged in obtaining a divorce in order to marry his first love, the Grand Duchess Katherine Pavlovna, who since 1812 had been the widowed Duchess George of Oldenberg. This led to a sort of personal rivalry between the two in Vienna.

The Princes William [youngest brother of the

King of Prussia] and August [brother of Prince Louis Ferdinand] of Prussia conducted themselves well and in a dignified manner. Prince William of Holstein-Beck, nephew of the King of Denmark, was an attractive, pleasing, quiet man who longed too much to be back at the cradle of his children. Prince Leopold of Sicily, later always called Prince of Salerno [the youngest son of the King of the Two Sicilies, Ferdinand I], whose good-heartedness shone through an ugly countenance, and who had the reputation of being very learned, was nevertheless the terror of all the women because of his bear-like dancing. The archdukes appeared not only with the greatest modesty, but, because of natural diffidence, kept as much as possible in the background. I made no sort of acquaintance with most of them. Of the many brothers of Emperor Francis [of Austria] I call to mind only Archduke John and Archduke Karl, the victor of Aspern, whom we regarded with a great deal of interest despite his ugliness; at different times he exchanged a few friendly words with me.

Archduke Ferdinand of Este, the youngest brother of the third consort of Emperor Francis, Marie Louise Beatrice of Modena, was the only dancer among the archdukes, a most polite and agreeable man. He was a grandson of the Empress Maria Theresa; his father, Ferdinand, had

married the heiress of the house of Este, Beatrice, and was the first Duke of Modena in the house of Austria. Of the archduke heir apparent, Ferdinand, all sorts of interesting stories were told.

A member of the Berlin court, the gracious Prince Anthony Radziwill, I will not omit mentioning here. Even if he had no part in the transactions of the Congress, yet he contributed in great measure to the entertainment, and I will have much to tell about him later on. His relative, the charming Prince Adam Czartoryski, friend of Czar Alexander, had an entirely different place at the Congress. Quiet, and keeping to himself, he appeared but little at the festivities, but tried all the more energetically to act for the best interests of his people. His physiognomy, his whole being, drew me toward him, and with interest and sorrow I followed his career. Pozzo di Borgo, St. Marsan, Anstetten, Palmella, Dalberg—these all are names of the great diplomats whom I saw with interest in these times.

Baron von Stein played an important part at the Congress by the force of his personality, even if he was not actively attached to it. He stood as a colossus of the firmest will and immovable self-sufficiency, and many eyes regarded him thankfully and hopefully. Baron Hans von

Gagern, the representative of the Netherlands, was a character of an entirely different sort.

It was at the home of Prince Metternich, the chief of the statesmen, that we first had our view of this colorful world. It was on October 2, even before the arrival of the sovereigns, that we found assembled there every one who had been called hither by the Congress. Our host gave up trying to make every one in the crowd known to one another, and tired of asking questions, I awaited time and opportunity to make me acquainted with these new guests. The remarkably confiding address of a young German became most annoying to me; his impolite advance drove me more and more into a corner, until I found myself between a console and the aggressive stranger.

Finally I gave an answer that made him ponder, and which freed me from his unwelcome presence. He had expressed his astonishment that I spoke German so well and did not prefer Hungarian; but upon learning that I could not speak Hungarian and was not a Hungarian, he hurriedly left me in order to ask my name. As I did the same, I learned that the man who was returning to me was the Crown Prince of Bavaria. This knowledge, however, could not lead me to forgive his conduct, no matter how great



the compliment when he told me that he had taken me for Julia Zichy [a famous beauty of the Congress]. He now expressed his astonishment at my German speech, since he considered me Danish, and no matter how I fought this view, for as a native of Holstein I could and wished to think of myself as German, he did not desist from the idea he had formed, and afterward twitted me again and again with the peculiarities of the Danish women, their reserve, etc.

But why do I tarry to describe such unimportant things before telling about the actual opening of this great epoch, the entry of the monarchs? We saw them from the windows of a house that the court chamberlain had leased adjoining the Burg for the prince of Holstein-Beck, who accompanied our king. At first Czar Alexander and King Frederick William [of Prussia] entered on horseback, and between them rode Emperor Francis, who had gone out to greet them. This procession was led by the richly caparisoned noble guard of the Hungarians, with Prince Esterhazy at their head, attired in the uniform of a magnate, the value of which was said to be several million gulden. The pearl pendants on his boots and the aigrette of gems in his head-gear are famous. The impression which the prince and princess made on the popu-

lace was far different from what had been expected.

The noble, refined bearing of King Frederick William and his manly earnestness won him general applause, which he neither sought nor desired. Alexander, on the other hand, was unable to win the Viennese public away from him [Frederick William] either at this time or later, and even to me there was something about his overfriendly attitude and solicitous greeting that did not please me. The King of Prussia appeared altogether too serious, but the natural and easy bearing and well-intentioned friendliness of my own Emperor Francis pleased me best of all.

A few days later Emperor Francis also went out to meet our good King Frederick [of Denmark] and this time in a carriage. I was concerned not a little when I found that the unattractiveness of our monarch was increased by a rash, which was due to the heat experienced on the journey; nevertheless the good Viennese public here expressed that favor which it always demonstrated toward the Danish King.

The September sun shone down on this spectacle. On October 1 a splendid concert opened the great festivities at the Burg. In the riding-school, which had been converted into an auditorium, five hundred voices sang Händel's great oratorio "Samson." Later his "Festival of Alex-

ander" was performed in the same manner. A few days later the same riding-school was the scene of a *bal paré*, of which the extraordinary feature was not only a great number of beautifully attired women and men bedecked with orders, but especially the tremendous dimensions of that hall.

After strolling through the ball-rooms, one perceived a truly magnificent spectacle on the landing of a large staircase. From this galleries extended around the upper part of the hall, where the concerts had been given. In the place of windows were seen enormous mirrors in which sparkled the reflection from a hundred thousand lights. The staircase, dividing to two sides, led down to the splendid parquet of the lower hall along the walls of which were rows of seats as in an amphitheater. Blinded, almost dizzy, I remained a few moments above, and then viewed from below the dazzling procession which, comprising the numerous court of Vienna united with all the foreign courts, descended the stairs. There was dancing, but for the most part the time was passed in gazing about this new, strange world and in asking about this or that striking personage. At this affair I saw the Prince Wittgenstein for the first time.

After eight or fourteen days a new festival was given in this hall, a masked ball, which, however,

## 16 A PEACE CONGRESS OF INTRIGUE

most of the participants, including myself, attended without costume. I recall with pleasure a beautiful group of twenty-four attractive Viennese women. They represented the four elements in groups of six each. The youngest and most delicate figures had been chosen to represent the air; they were dressed in the filmiest veiling. The nymphs of the sea were richly decorated with pearls and corals, and the spectator missed none of their charms. For fire scrupulous care with regard to age had been taken, and therefore our friend, the Princess Kaunitz, had a place among the sextet that she filled most worthily. Her eyes seemed to burn in competition with the costume, which was the color of fire, and I seemed to become heated when this salamander brood passed by. Behind them, with heavy tread, came six well-proportioned matrons, bedecked with jewels and gold and other costly products of the earth, each of these worthily representing Mother Earth. On their heads they wore little gold baskets laden so heavily with the fruit of autumn that the forehead of one of them bled under the bandeau to which the baskets were fastened. It seemed to me that the joy of the moment was too dearly bought by this drop of blood.

We had been cautious enough to remain away from an enormous popular festival in the Augar-

ten. We were told no end of things about the crowd that had gathered there; it had been so unusual that many of the most prominent women came home with torn clothes, and later missed many of their gems. The Princess Colloredo, who is inclined to be stout, not only had her skirt torn from her in the crowd, but even her sleeves.<sup>1</sup>

In a large hall built of boards for this occasion, and which adjoined the pavilion erected by Emperor Joseph II, the famous, and at that time already aged, Admiral Sidney Smith [born 1764; died 1840] later gave an affair for the benefit of the negro slaves, and invited all sovereigns, with their following, and the mightiest and the least powerful of the princes to a dinner. It was known in advance that he was prepared to give tremendous speeches in which he would plead in behalf of the slaves, and would propose to have the Congress unanimously adopt a resolution to abolish the slave-trade. I do not recall whether he started a collection for them at table or whether the ball that followed, to which every invited gentleman had been asked to bring a partner, was a picnic or paid for from the purse of Sidney Smith.

It is thoroughly impressed on my memory, however, that with the Russian delegate, the

<sup>1</sup> Another version of this public festival in the Augarten is told by the Count de la Garde, who ostensibly suffered no such disability.

Countess Stackelberg, born Countess Ludolf, with whom I had made an appointment, I overlooked the correct hour, and arrived while the men were still dining. We had ourselves directed quickly into the vacant ball-room, and pleaded that our premature arrival be not announced. Czar Alexander, however, learned of it, and glad, perhaps, of an opportunity to avoid the endless speeches of his host, and perhaps also in order to enjoy our embarrassment, persuaded the King of Denmark to pay his respects to his partner—who was myself—at once. The czar arose from dinner, and the retinue of both monarchs did the same. Shrinking in a corner behind a pillar, we heard the approaching steps and the clatter of sabers, and to our horror saw the king, led by the czar, enter our large hall, look sharply for us, and then hasten toward us. We heard the czar joke about the impatience of his royal brother, who wished to thank the woman of his choice for the alacrity with which she had responded to his call. Then he grasped my hand with a great display of courtesy, and kissed the large spot where unhappily a tear in my glove exposed my hand.

This intimacy almost confounded me, as it was wholly unexpected, coming from him. I was not present at the first reception, at which all the Viennese women were presented to him, and



therefore had remained a stranger to him until now. This awkward omission had left him and me both ill at ease, and until this time he had not known how to make my acquaintance. At a ball of the Countess Zichy it happened that I danced opposite him in a "tempête" known as "Figaro," and at every posture he gave me the compliment that belonged to the dance, but was no longer used, and probably forty times I had to acknowledge his unusually low and respectful bow. At another time—the great crowds found at all private functions excused it—it happened that I brushed the round back of this great lord somewhat roughly, and my glance asking for forgiveness—interrupted shortly after by those coming between us—won a most friendly greeting from him. After such pantomimic greetings my first humorous conversation was doubly painful, and my mischievous husband, who came in the retinue of the king [of Denmark] and stood near by, hugely enjoyed my discomfiture.

Happily this little scene was soon terminated by the arrival of a number of women and by the request of the host that the great lords respectfully return to the table. This host was conspicuously active. He was a little man, slightly deformed, whose rather generous proportions proved an advantage, since it meant much for

him to bedeck himself with his innumerable orders. He did not wear them with the ribbons, as is ordinarily done, but suspended by their chains, of which it is customary to wear only one on great occasions. In order to wear a great many at one time, he had hung them on white silk sashes fastened at the shoulder. As, however, this method did not suffice, and he did not wish to offend any of those present who had given him decorations, he varied his display hourly until all had been exhibited. This and many another idiosyncrasy of the good Sidney Smith caused a jolly air to pervade the assembly, and as the spacious halls easily accommodated the crowd, the dancing gave real novel pleasure. For the first time the crowd enjoyed the polonaise; we marched up and down the stairs and through the galleries, and altogether this made a charming spectacle.

On October 18, in commemoration of the battle of the nations, the great new hall of wood on the speedway, adjoining the country home of Prince Metternich, was dedicated. It had been built in the summer, for the opening of the Congress had been expected earlier, and Count Fuchs, husband of the gracious Laura, had asked at that time where he might procure tickets for the loges from which he meant to view this spectacle. This event, the outcome of which was

feared by those who recalled the terrible fire at the Schwarzberger fête in Paris on July 1, 1810, was wholly successful.

The strictest precautions against fire had been taken. All draperies had been omitted from the large decorations of a noble sort. A row of pillars that encircled the hall formed a series of anterooms in which we could refresh ourselves. Along these pillars, inside the dance-hall, were rows with comfortable seats for the women, and countless lamps made the night like day. From the anterooms broad steps, which were heated, led to the large halls below ground, where a bounteous supper was served. The heat was hardly needed, for pleasant, summer-like weather favored the festival so much that when, like all good things on earth, it reached its close, and the crush for carriages was so tremendous that we had to wait hours for them, the wait on the steps of the landing did not have the discomforts of a cool night.

I shall never forget the original and beautiful appearance of this scene. Think of a stairway, almost as high as a house, covered with red cloth, canopied with Turkish tents, and lighted by bright pitch torches, on which camped a large part of the company, wrapped in cloaks, with chairs placed on the upper steps for the women, among whom I was included. Thus I waited

until early dawn for the arrival of my carriage. My husband, who felt indisposed, had left early for home, and had entrusted me to the care of his brother, Joachim.

A number of weeks later Prince Metternich issued invitations to a costume ball in order to utilize the splendid building once more before the breaking-up of the Congress. No one cared to think that it was going to close soon. In honor of the exalted host and his royal master, the guests agreed to appear in the folk costume of the various countries and provinces that were united under the scepter of Austria. It was necessary not only to choose a costume, but to join a quadrille or to form one. I decided in favor of the latter method, and was pleased when my dear Henriette Schladen, her friend, the beautiful Therese Wrba, and the attractive Marie Huegel joined me. We all had figures that were very much alike and appeared in most colorful Transylvanian costumes, which fitted our partners even better than us. Baron Karl von Huegel, later the famous traveler, was one of these men; I had chosen Baron William Hammerstein for my dancing partner; the others I do not recall. I well remember the impatience with which I, attired long before, awaited the coming of the ladies, who were to call for me and who were to be accompanied by the carriage

containing our escorts. At last, at the stroke of nine, they were at my door, and it was eleven before we neared the scene of so much splendor, of which much was lost to us by this long trip. The road to our destination, which usually could be traversed in a quarter of an hour at most, was blocked by so many carriages that we might well be thankful for having arrived without injury.

A dazzling carousal in the imperial riding-academy closed the series of the great fêtes of the Congress before the coming of advent. In private homes, however, many social affairs and theatrical performances still took place. Very pleasing comedies were played at the home of the Princess Bagration, and she herself danced the national dance of her fatherland in Russian costume with a grace and naturalness that is rarely seen in a woman of society. In the Arnstein home we viewed an exhibit of wax figures, performed by living persons, some of them very handsome.

The houses of the Jewish bankers Arnstein and Eskeles were the meeting-places of many friends, mainly Prussians. New faces were continually seen there, partly because travelers came and went without interruption, and also because it proved impossible to become acquainted with all members of the Congress and not even with the retinues of the sovereigns in their entirety.

We women learned to know only such as were enabled by their position and rank to take part in the polonaise.

The Russians obtruded their presence everywhere with their characteristic boldness; especially General Tschernitscheff placed emphasis upon playing an important rôle, and he succeeded ably. The French, on the contrary, kept in the background. The Prussians had tact enough to mingle but sparingly amid so-called elegant society. Even if they were not actually clumsy, they were still too good and too matter of fact for society. I remember that I frequently danced a polonaise with Col. Count Schwerin, who died only too soon afterward at Ligny, and with whose widow I became well acquainted later. I was greatly pleased at his simple German good-heartedness. I waltzed with the Prince of Hohenzollern and also with Brauchitsch, who even at that time seemed to regard me as almost a compatriot of his.

There were many hosts in the city; Prince Metternich and Prince Trautmannsdorff were the most active entertainers. Even the ambassadors and delegates to the Congress did not allow a dearth of invitations. My old patron and uncle on my father's side, the chancellor, Prince Hardenberg [of Prussia], usually arranged things so that I sat beside him, and knew how



to make the time fly for me by his charming conversation. He succeeded more or less in making me forget what I had heard about his present affairs in Berlin and about his past. He spoke often and gladly about himself, his longing for a comfortable domesticity, and lamented the fate that had always deprived him of it. Humboldt was true to his old practice, and offered me his arm whenever an occasion presented itself. Sometimes it happened that I was escorted by total strangers and was seated beside total strangers. Then I asked the names of my neighbors, first to the right and then to the left. This happened in the first days, when I was placed between Lord Aberdeen and Prince Radziwill, with whom I began at that time an acquaintance that was to be greatly strengthened in Berlin. His cheerful disposition and Polish grace, his German true-heartedness and Polish versatility, appeared to such advantage that his whole being must please in the world outside and charm in his home. He seemed to be a kindly father. Everything—even his making a noise with the skin of the grape, which he could not keep from doing below the table—reminded him of the dear little ones to whom he introduced me in his stories.

Gentz, the famous statesman and Metternich's right hand and pen, also invited us often to the most exclusive little dinners, made exclusive by

the society with which he knew how to surround himself, and exclusive also by the delicacies which he caused to be gathered from east, west, north, and south. The entrance to his house was in a horrible condition: the entrance to the court seemed likely to break one's neck; the house door was so low that it threatened to destroy my head-dress; the stairs, steep and dark, did not disclose to what quarters in the house they led. In these little rooms was heaped up everything that riches, taste, and the most refined elegance knew how to discover. The senses of sight and smell and the desire for comfort were all flattered. The host on this occasion exhibited his graciousness, and I rarely attended gatherings in which cheerfulness and wit, common sense and culture were mingled in such an absorbing manner and where every one amused himself and the company in such an unusual way.

Once the number of guests surpassed the number of places that he had ready for them. Therefore the table was enlarged to such an extent that the servants could no longer go around it, making it necessary for the serving to take place through three double doors, which had been removed.

I recall that on another occasion I was prepared in advance for a meeting with an old Berlin acquaintance of my husband at the dinner of

Gentz, namely, Rahel Varnhagen, at that time still called the "little Levy." I recall that I greeted her with condescension, and then paid no more attention to this person, who was not especially favored by nature; for I found more pleasure in listening to the ghost-stories that were being told at the table at this moment. Imagine my astonishment in the summer of 1833 when I found this dinner mentioned in the book "Rahel," and discovered that I had been invited principally to meet her. The reference was to this effect:

"VIENNA, *December 7, 1814.*

"Gentz wrote me to postpone the engagement, as the ladies that he had invited on my behalf had to participate in tableaux at court. He left me to choose whether I wished to dine with him without the Countesses Bernstorff and Fuchs, or on Monday with them. I chose the latter because I wanted to see both as matadores of graciousness. Gentz discovered this. Countess Fuchs is the sister of the Countess Plettenberg, and all my men folk are in love with her. Countess Bernstorff is the wife of Count Christian, and I have seen a most charmingly innocent letter of hers, so absolutely discreet that she seems singular to me."

It intrigued me a great deal to learn which of my letters might have come to her knowledge,

and my dear husband enjoyed the expression, "absolutely discreet."

As I have gone into the subject of the dinners, I will tell about those that I remember most vividly. One took place at the home of the newly married Count and Countess Münster [Count Münster, delegate representing the English-Hanoverian interests, was married in 1814 to Wilhelmine, Countess of Schaumburg-Lippe]. Joachim also had been invited. We had been well received, and during the dinner we listened to the half-humorous, half-serious observations of Pozzo di Borgo, the interesting Corsican, who was already a famous statesman in the Russian service at that time.

At the second of these dinners I was not so much at home, for our host, Talleyrand, received me alone in place of a hostess. I remained the sole woman present because his niece, the lovely Dorothea [Princess of Courland, whose husband was the Prince Edmond Talleyrand-Périgord], had suddenly become ill. I could not get to feel comfortable; I have no praise for the world-famous graciousness of the host, perhaps because he speaks very softly, and I can hear his words only with great difficulty. His external appearance antagonizes me; his stern features, from which sparks of understanding flash almost against his will, and in which one seeks vainly for

any sign of feeling or of pleasure and complacency, are horrible to me, and when my affrighted glance measures him, I become repulsed at the sight of his club-foot, which reminds me of my godfather. It was once said of Talleyrand that he was actually kindly, and that if the characteristics which resulted from contact with the world and the contradictions of his being were not taken into account, he was not bad; whereupon "R." remarked: "I believe it. He does not need to be bad; nature has done this for him."

It is time that I bring my narrative of the dinners to a close with the remark that we also found it appropriate to entertain our king. He showed us the favor of dining with us three times, and you may well believe that we did everything our household would allow to give these dinners a festive appearance, though in these efforts lay many discomforts and petty and larger sacrifices. A number of cooks were added, the table service was augmented, largely from Count Schulenburg, my husband's colleague, servants were hired, and, worst of all, I had to clear my bedroom each time; for this, decorated in red damask, became the reception-room. High personages were invited as guests, but what I regret most is that no women were invited. And yet the good king seemed glad to be with us.

A slight cold, which made my wish for the quiet

of my household more acute, had kept me in the house for several weeks. Out of my windows in the meantime I observed a ceremony which was unique of its kind, and intended by the wit of the Congress as the last and newest drama for its members. It was the funeral of a field marshal, that of the wit himself, the old Prince de Ligne, who closed his career on December 17, 1814—an active and eventful career full of achievements, the manifestations of which we followed through several generations. A gentle death closed with a friendly hand his long and happy life. Surrounded by the numerous members of his family,—children, grandchildren, and adult great-grandchildren,—he died a pious Catholic. His wit remained faithful to him until the last moment, for when he saw his wife weeping in a corner of the room he said in a moved voice: “Ah, voilà le perroquet qui pleure! Pauvre perroquet!” [“Ah, there is a parrot that weeps! Poor parrot!”] A kindly father and grandfather and a careless husband, it must be confessed, he had always been. He and his wife, who really resembled a parrot, had led a married life like innumerable other lives in the world: they had gone through a long life together without hate and without love for each other. Despite all that, I liked the old hero; I realized this when I beheld his shabby old hat in the middle of all



the pomp of his funeral. That moved me truly, for one will not soon meet a more spirited and harmlessly witty character than this noble, splendid old man. This I said to myself with sincere feeling.

I speak here of the Prince de Ligne as the wit of the exalted gathering, and it was his wit which amused all, but Lord Stewart amused them often, even if in an entirely different manner and always unconsciously and in a way rather unworthy of him. The reputation of being a hero, which was well deserved, had preceded him. Even his appearance was taking, for he was attractive, and made a stately appearance in his red uniform of the hussars, and the one eye that was continually moist gave him a rather sentimental, but not disfiguring, look. This favorable impression was soon obliterated by his aversion, which was disclosed more and more. Stewart's elder brother, the prime minister, Lord Castle-reagh, possessed a natural urbanity which stood in favorable contrast to the unscrupulousness of his brother. He was often accused of deception, but did not deserve this accusation; his character was one of frank true-heartedness and uprightness.

His lack of firmness, his too great readiness to make concessions, often gave his political methods the appearance of deceit. I have found that

only too often weakness is regarded as deception. In the world of elegance he was not forgiven the youthfulness and the cheerfulness with which he personally opened the ball after dinner at his soirées. But I, however, danced gladly with the happy statesman, because I was glad not to find the lassitude and boredom which usually distinguishes men of the world, and which unhappily has come to be the fashion among many young men in our own day.

The love of amusement and dancing was manifest with renewed energy at the beginning of the carnival. It was as if we had just returned from the country and longed for the diversion that we had long missed. The opening of the carnival consisted, curiously enough, of three or four balls for children; after a few hours the little guests departed to make room for the grown-ups. My husband declared himself unreservedly against this unchildlike amusement. Only in the case of the children's ball given by the Stackelbergs was an exception unavoidable. Henriette still holds a lively memory of this early look into the great world. She remembers with pleasure her little experiences at this ball, and with horror that she nearly stepped on the toes of the King of Prussia. I tried to keep my eye on my little treasures as much as possible in the crowd of this colorful world of children and

princely personages, of attentive mothers and young women busy with themselves; I observed with pleasure her natural, childlike manner, which stood so favorably in contrast to that of her playmates, who for the most part were resplendent in most unchildlike decorations. Their high coiffures were adorned with artificial flowers, they wore gowns of silk and tulle; the bouquet on the left side and the little fan completed their woman's finery. Most of them were very pretty; they formed a pleasing group of children, among which my own dear ones had a deserved place.

Despite the apparent unanimity and agreement with which the princes and their ministers associated, this attitude in general was misleading, for exactly in this month of January the Congress was almost disrupted by the increasing enmity.

On January 16, King Frederick told me that Czar Alexander had replied to Metternich's invitation to a ball with a negative and the added remark that he would rather fight him with pistols. Others declared that the czar had informed Emperor Francis that so long as Metternich remained no results could be attained, for he spoiled everything.

Even before unity had been restored the sovereigns appeared together in public once more;

it was when they met to commemorate with feelings born of the most painful memories the requiem mass for Louis XVI on January 21.

The ceremony itself was most dignified, and enhanced by the beautiful music. Little could be heard of the sermon, which Talleyrand himself had written, and the cold affected all more than anything else. My dear husband returned chilled. I had, however, limited myself to visiting the beautiful Stephan's church after the ceremony to view its memorial decorations, which were not at all appropriate. I had made an appointment for this purpose with the Countess Caroline zur Lippe-Bückeburg. If I must tell why I did not attend this great ceremony, I shall have to confess that I did not have the necessary rich winter wardrobe. This circumstance had already caused me to miss promenades on the glacis, and yet I did not think for a moment of procuring a second winter hat when the old one was in good condition and elegant enough for other events.

If luxuries continue to increase in the same measure in the next twenty-three years as they have in the last twenty-three years, my children and grandchildren, who once will read this, will be astounded principally at the simplicity of my wardrobe. They would be mistaken if they believed that I procured many new costumes for

the never-ending festivities of the Congress. No, I do not recall having had any other expenses, outside of the unavoidable ones for white gloves and white shoes, for the hair-dresser, who came daily, for the two costumes for the carousal and the masquerade, and beyond the little trousseau which my husband had brought for me from Paris, which included several rich and one or two ball costumes. In order to give an indication of the simplicity of the modes of that time I might remark that a small tulle cap with rose-colored decorations had to serve me even at the great soirées where there was dancing. Up to that time caps for young women had been unheard of, and the mode had just arrived. The richest Viennese women were distinguished for their simplicity, and appeared covered with their jewels only at the great festivities; they never looked down with scorn upon those who were more simply attired than they.

During a dinner at the home of the Princess Bagration I was amused to hear the wager which Czar Alexander made with the Countess Flora Wrzna [born Countess Kageneck, wife of Count Eugen Wrzna] as to which one could dress most quickly for a formal occasion. I was not present when the wager was carried out a few days later, but I heard a great deal about it. The czar and Flora arrived at Zichy's at the stroke

of nine, and showed themselves to the assembled guests in ordinary attire, without a cloak or any other covering. Then both were led aside by witnesses who had been chosen with great solemnity. The czar appeared in five minutes in full uniform, with silk hose, etc., and found Flora also ready, attired in a complete French court costume of the *ancien régime*, which appeared most comical. She had even found time to add beauty-spots and to powder her hair; neither the shoes with high heels nor the bouquet had been forgotten, and she wore small gauntlets. Enough; nothing was lacking. For winning the wager she received a gracious note from the Czar of All the Russians and almost a library.

As the winter festivities went on, early spring arrived, mild breezes blew, and seemed about to bring the buds of life. We went on a pleasure drive, which in contrast to sleighing we called a "Pirutschade." I had been named the partner of the Archduke John. It was most opportune that on the evening before I met our Oriental singer, the famous Hammer, during a visit at the home of my friends, the Beroldingens. Hammer was in the confidence of the Archduke John. I did not hide the fact that I was a bit apprehensive because of the long hours that I was to pass in such close company with a man whom I did not know and at best had hardly seen,



although I had heard nothing but the best reports of him, in addition to knowing about the originality of his people and of his province, Styria. Hammer thereupon amused us by declaring that the embarrassment of the noble man was no less than mine, and that he was worried about the manner in which he should entertain me. "You know her," he had told Hammer, "so please inform me how I can amuse her and with what I can win her interest. That she is a competent woman I know, but what else she is I don't know."

And thereupon the archduke had asked whether he might interest me by talking about music. "Oh, no!" our friend had replied. "Of all things in the world, but not music." I promised the gleeful group that I would return on the day following the drive to make a report on the turn that this greatly feared adventure had taken, and I kept my word; for I assured them all triumphantly that the archduke and I had been greatly pleased with each other, and that while together time had gone with lightning-like rapidity. And this was actually true, for my guide had so much common sense and tact and such learning, and I was so interested in what he told me in his pure German speech, that his conversation, so strongly in contrast to that usually carried on in the great world,

caused me so much pleasure that I gladly overlooked what it lacked in brightness and grace.

At two o'clock I was ready for the drive in the carriage. I found most of the members of the company already assembled in the strongly heated halls of the Burg; nevertheless we had to remain there attired in heavy furs in order to wait for a few late-comers. Finally the line started. We passed through the principal streets of Vienna, through the avenues of the Prater, even the most distant, and so by means of all sorts of imaginable detours to our destination, the Augarten. This goal was too near for most of the participants, and this also was my case, for my partner was just describing the years of the war and oppression in the most interesting manner. Before that he expressed pleasure because the populace showed more enthusiasm for my King of the Danes than for any other of the great lords who drove by. We had the opportunity to observe this well, because he drove ahead of us with the Grand Duchess Marie Pavlovna of Weimar, sister of Czar Alexander. Not only in one street or at one spot; no, everywhere the incessant cheering of the people greeted him. But my archduke also was greeted with demonstrations of the unusual regard that he enjoys.

Upon arriving at the pavilion of the Augarten

we disposed of our furs and then proceeded to dinner, during which the old Prince Albert of Saxe-Tesche, a son-in-law of the Empress Maria Theresa, sat beside me, and I was placed opposite the empresses. On a stage that had been constructed for this event we saw Caroline Seidler appear for the first time in the rôle of *Agnes Sorel*. I had seen her in the summer of 1812, when, almost a child, she played the part of *Susanna* in "The Wedding of Figaro" at the birthday celebration of the old Prince von Labkowitz. She had been for a long time absent from the stage, and in the meantime had developed her voice to its fullest proficiency. After the theater we drove back under the light of torches, and when I returned late that night, tired out, but most happy, I found my family still at tea awaiting me.

This was the last care-free event of what seemed to be an endless line of festivals of the Congress. A few days later the report that the prisoner of Elba had flown spread through the assembly of care-free merry-makers, and fear dampened our spirits. But the daily activities of the pleasure-seekers went on, nor would any one of them confess the extent of their perturbation.

I shall never forget the day when the first report of the landing of Napoleon in the Gulf

of Juan, between Cannes and Antibes, reached Vienna. It was on a Saturday, I think the fifth or the sixth of March, toward evening, when my husband first received this news at the Burg, where an audience was gathering for a theatrical performance, and whispered it to me; for one dared not yet mention aloud the name of the vanquished enemy, even if up to that day it had been hoped that he was banned forever.

Although the politicians were accustomed to control themselves, this terrible news could be clearly read on their features. It was written most deeply on those of Talleyrand; it was expressed most loudly by Stewardt, and Alexander's paleness, his earnest physiognomy, showed clearly what he would not have confessed at any costs. His usual triumphant look was already gone. Yet it was hoped that the European prisoner, who had been so poorly guarded, would be caught before he could set the world afire anew. In this hope they tried to make the best of a bad bargain, and on March 13 issued the proclamation declaring Napoleon an outlaw, which has been so often criticized.

Eight days after that ominous evening we were again invited to the Burg. It was thought that the suspense of waiting for further news might be overcome by diversions; comedies and tableaux were to hold the interest of the gather-

ing. But in vain. All were more or less downcast; for the post had just brought news of the worst sort. Napoleon had entered Lyons amid the enthusiasm of the populace; the troops that had been sent against him had for the most part joined him. It was now felt that the act of outlawry was not sufficient and that war would be unavoidable, had not Talleyrand said at once: "Il faut courir lui comme sur un chien enragé." ["It is necessary to fall upon him as on a mad dog."]

The Congress appeared like a theatrical performance while the house was burning. The artists were dismissed before the last act. All thought only of momentary salvation. I myself was deeply moved; my health suffered, and I believed for a moment that I would be down with jaundice. I saw the color daily in Koss, and Minister Rosencranz also suffered severely from it; luckily, this calamity did not come to me. After all the sacrifices of the previous campaigns we now looked forward to a new war, which would be destructive enough in all its forms and results even if the outcome were successful, which no one doubted. And would the good allies again commit a foolhardy act and place an inefficient watch over Napoleon? Would they allow themselves again to be robbed of the fruits of victory?

I cannot refrain from mentioning a trick which was not only inopportune at this earnest moment, but rather unworthy of the statesman who perpetrated it. No matter how important the moment appeared to Prince Metternich, nor how irksome and depressing the events must have been to him, his mood for a practical joke prevailed so far over the seriousness of the situation that he did not desist from giving his secretary, Herr von Gentz, the keeper of the minutes of the Congress, a scare that was almost fatal in its consequences. He prepared a manifesto in which Napoleon was represented as offering a reward of many thousands of ducats to the person who would deliver Gentz dead or alive to him, or who would simply produce proofs of his murder. This manifesto was placed in a newspaper copy that had been specially printed for the occasion, and then delivered to the bedside of this faint-hearted man with his morning's coffee. To the great joy of his superior, this almost paralyzed the unfortunate secretary.

Every one spoke of leaving. The Empress Elizabeth of Russia, born Princess of Baden, gave the signal for departure. We had a farewell audience with her together with a large number of others at her home; it was a most imposing circle. The empress called my husband to her and said many flattering things to him in



a gracious and yet extremely sincere manner. This scene has left so lively an impression on my memory that I could paint it. The sweet dignity of this noble, unhappy princess cannot be praised too much. I will mention an unimportant event in this connection solely in order to speak of her for a moment longer. Her attire was always simple, and enhanced by the beauty of her diamonds or pearls. A theatrical performance was about to be given at court; we had just seated ourselves before the lowered curtain when the bands of a costly collar of pearls worn by the empress parted, and these beautiful pearls rolled down, disappearing under the seats. We wished to pick them up, but she stopped the movement with her kindly commanding request that we do not bother; it is not worth the trouble.

From now on only farewell dinners and suppers interrupted the daily life of the household, for with the preparations for war came also the preparations for the devotion which every one more or less determined to observe at Easter.

I had long wished to hear a sermon by Zacharias Werner, the famous poet and convert, who while still a Protestant wrote the play "The Consecration of Might," in which he glorified Luther. I had been deterred during advent not only by the cold, but also because I feared the enormous crowd in the various little churches

where he preached, and from the pulpit of which he thundered especially against the frivolity of the Congress of Vienna. He had also given much attention to the levity of the Viennese women, and assured them that he respected their cooks more than themselves, addressing them as "Meine gnädigen, doch nun vielleicht ungnädigen Damen" ["My gracious, but now perhaps ungracious, ladies"]. On another occasion he made an improper and scandalous confession of his own sins; then again he spoke of horses and horse-breeding. At another time he stepped from the pulpit with the words: "You believe that the kings and lords have made peace? Foolishness! Amen!"

Now in holy week I found two opportunities to hear him. Joachim accompanied me to church, but each time I found all seats taken, and had to be satisfied with sitting on a balustrade opposite the pulpit. I found in Werner a zealot who often said very trivial and again very elevated things, accompanied by vulgar and excessive gesticulations; so that I might call him the Jean Paul of the pulpit. Sometimes he sat, sometimes he stood, and often he knelt, and frequently tears interrupted his discourse.

On holy Thursday, March 23, we partook of holy communion with Oberconsistorialrat Waechter. On Sunday, the twenty-sixth, I

found our king with his entire suite in the Danish chapel. Up to that time I had always avoided such a meeting. Now I sat there beside the king, Henriette at my side, quiet and reverent; but sad to relate, during the sermon she dropped a little collection of kreuzer that she carried for us. They rolled about the floor with a great deal of noise, and his majesty himself picked up most of them.

In the middle of February I went to the last soirée given by the Castlereaghs before their departure. We said to ourselves that the farewell was for life, even if we did not suspect what a tragic destiny lay in store for this man of honor. A few years later he ended, by cutting his throat, a busy and what appeared to be a happy life. His successor, the hero, the Duke of Wellington, viewed the world of women especially with askance. Finally this honorable, good-looking man appeared, decorated with orders, covered with renown. Was it for this that the women crowded around him and begged a kiss from him upon being presented? Was it North German custom that kept me in the background or perhaps an ardor dampened somewhat through my acquaintance with other heroes or a surviving diffidence that caused me to keep aloof? Enough; I did not rush toward him, so that I had to seek an opportunity later of being

presented to him, for this belonged to the etiquette which was observed by an ambassador. Regarding his sociability in Vienna I will merely say that he did not follow the example of his predecessor of receiving every evening, but set apart one or two days a week for this purpose, on which society crowded into his home. Once, in the early days of March, his doors were open, and his reception-rooms were filled with his following, with Lady Radcliffe present to do the honors. He himself, however, had departed on an excursion to Pressburg. His dupes included not only many of most respected persons, but also the King of Prussia. Conduct such as this won nothing for the ambassador of Great Britain.

Despite this—that is to say, in the latter part of May, April, and most of May—Czar Alexander took walks continually with his bosom friend, Prince Eugène de Beauharnais, former Viceroy of Italy. The Viennese, who had looked at this friendship with askance from the start, were now furious at it. It is generally believed that this stepson of Napoleon meant to betray his new friends and his patron, and it is thought that his humbled and, since the appearance of Napoleon, tearful mien is only a mask.

Alexander does not permit himself to be

warned, at least not by words. The warning, therefore, becomes more pointed, for at a street corner a female fruit-vendor throws rotten apples at the pair, so that they have to take refuge in the first house at hand.

## CHAPTER II

### A FAMOUS WIT AT THE CONGRESS

FROM THE REMINISCENCES OF THE COUNT DE  
LA GARDE

To the statesmen and generals at the Congress of Vienna Charles-Joseph, Prince de Ligne, was a link with the past. When the Congress met, he was already in his eightieth year, and yet his mind was as active as when he entered the Austrian Army over sixty years before. He had friends in every court in Europe, and was sought out by such men as Rousseau, Voltaire, Schlegel, Goethe, and Frederick the Great. He was born in Brussels of Belgian parentage, and passed most of his military life with the Austrian Army. His title of field marshal came from Catharine II of Russia, to whom he refers in his talk with Count de la Garde. The latter was a gallant of the time of the Congress. He was born in 1783 of French parentage, and through the death of his parents entered the house of his kinsman, the Marquis de Chambonas, who was related by marriage to the Prince de Ligne. De la Garde escaped the Terror with his patron, and then entered upon a career of light-hearted vagabondage, tasting the gay social life at the European courts, a friend of Mme.



Récamier and Queen Hortense, the latter writing music for some of his poems.

#### A FAMOUS WIT AT THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA

ON the day after my arrival I made haste to pay my respects to the Prince de Ligne.

"You have come at the proper time to behold great events," he said to me. "Europe is in Vienna. The web of politics is shot through with festivities."

Thereupon with youthful vivacity he asked me a number of questions—about Paris, my family, my travels, and my plans, until we were interrupted by the announcement that his carriage was ready.

"I shall expect you at dinner to-morrow," he said, "and thence we will attend the masked ball. In a few moments I will point out to you the sights of this great scene."

At nine o'clock we reached the imperial palace, called the Burg. In this ancient palace a mummers' show was taking place; character masks appeared, and often under the immobility of the domino they concealed political combinations, masterpieces of intrigue or plans. The principal hall was splendidly lighted, and was surrounded by a circular gallery that opened into spacious rooms in which arrangements for supper

had been made. Upon the rows of seats that were built like an amphitheater sat a group of women, a number of them in domino costumes, but the majority in character costumes. One can think of nothing more imposing than this assemblage of young and beautiful women, each adorned particularly to suit her charms; all the centuries, all the countries, seemed to have met as if by design in this circle.

At regular intervals the orchestras played successively the polonaise and the waltz; in the adjoining halls minuets were danced with German earnestness, and this was in no wise the least amusing part of the picture.

The prince was right, Vienna at that time was a cross-section of Europe, and this ball a cross-section of Vienna. Nothing was more bizarre than these masked and unmasked persons, among whom without distinction moved all the sovereigns attending the Congress.

"Observe," said the Prince de Ligne to me, "this pleasing figure of elegant and military bearing. That is Czar Alexander. He offers his arm to Prince Eugène de Beauharnais, for whom he has developed a sincere liking. Upon Eugène's arrival here with his father-in-law, the King of Bavaria, the Austrian court was in doubt what rank to give him. The Czar of Russia, however, spoke so favorably of him that he was

given a reception in keeping with his noble character. The czar, as you know, inspires friendship and has a feeling for friendship.

“Do you know that man with the tall, noble figure, whom the beautiful Neapolitan holds captive with her rounded arms? It is the King of Prussia, whose earnest face, nevertheless, remains immobile. And this mischievous masked figure is perhaps an empress and perhaps only a grisette.

“This frank countenance, on which good-heartedness is pictured, is Maximilian, King of Bavaria, who, although he occupies a throne, has not forgotten his place as colonel in the French service and who holds for his subjects the love that once he gave his regiment.

“That short, pale man yonder with the Roman nose and the white-blond hair is the King of Denmark. Political considerations had caused an unfavorable feeling toward him on the part of the sovereigns, but the charm of his conduct, the frankness and magnanimity of his character, soon won him all hearts. His animated and cheerful disposition and his happy sallies are the joy of the royal assemblies; he is known here as the jester of the sovereign’s brigade. When you observe the simplicity of his manners and know what good fortune his little kingdom enjoys, you

will hardly come to the conclusion that he is the most absolute monarch of Europe.

“This gigantic figure, whose proportions the black domino can neither conceal nor diminish, is the King of Würtemberg. Beside him stands his son, the crown prince, whose love for the Grand Duchess of Oldenburg, sister of Czar Alexander, draws him to the Congress and probably occupies him even more than the important interests that one day will be his. We shall soon be able to watch this romance unfold.

“The two young men who have just passed by are the crown prince of Bavaria and his brother, Prince Karl. The head of the prince may well be compared to that of Antinous. This great surging crowd of human beings of varied appearance and costumes are ruling princes or archdukes or exalted personages of the various kingdoms; for outside of a number of Englishmen, who may be recognized by their well-chosen attire, there is surely not a single person here who does not have a title added to his name. Now I have initiated you fairly well; you may now go your own way.”

After the prince left me, I continued my wanderings through the hall, and as if called together by a general rendezvous, I met, one after another, all the persons with whom I had become acquainted from Naples to St. Petersburg and

from Stockholm to Constantinople. What a motley of costumes and tongues! This fête appeared to me like a bazaar of all the nations of the world. As if for the first time I felt the enchantment of a masked ball. The uninterrupted music, the secrecy surrounding the disguises, the intrigues by which I was surrounded, the general incognito, the merry-making without measure or restraint, the wealth of seductive opportunities,—in a word, the magic of this great social picture confused my mind, and even older and stronger natures were overcome by it.

I was soon surrounded by friends, so that at a moment when the Prince de Ligne was occupied with only a few persons, I asked him to go to no more pains on my account for this evening. I plunged myself into the tumult of joy, of care-free feeling and happiness, which everywhere seemed to dominate the whirl of this extraordinary gathering. I met a few more friends, in whose company I cheerfully passed the two hours that remained before supper; then about twenty of us sat down at table to see the end of this jolly evening together.

Toward the end of the soirée I was lucky enough to meet my excellent friend General Tettenborn. Upon parting, General Tettenborn said to me:

“Until to-morrow; I will be at your house at

ten o'clock. We will then proceed to the great military festival that is being held to celebrate peace. Before we lay down our arms the monarchs wish to thank Providence for the extraordinary favor shown them."

At the appointed hour Tettenborn presented himself with the punctuality of an Austrian captain of cavalry. It was a mild and clear October morning. Soon we trotted upon the glacis between the Neue Tor and the Burg Tor. On the way we were joined by several friends who also were led on by curiosity. Tettenborn wore his resplendent military uniform; the great number of military orders that decorated his breast demonstrated that he had proved himself worthy of the protection of the Goddess of Fortune.

Hardly had we arrived in the Prater when he had to leave us in order to join the suite of Czar Alexander; I, however, remained surrounded by friends, and soon we found a favorable place where we could observe all the details of this beautiful festival. Although one could attend events of this kind frequently enough in that soldierly time, I do not think that any ever equaled this in splendor and majesty. The war, which had terrified the world by its bitterness and length, was over. The giant of renown had not been conquered, but crushed by weight of numbers; and the cheering and enthusiasm called



forth by this success demonstrated sufficiently well the power of the antagonist and the unexpectedness of the triumph.

Numerous battalions of infantry and regiments of cavalry, among them the Schwarzenberg Uhlan Regiment and the cuirassiers of Grand Duke Constantine, had gathered on an enormous meadow. All of these troops were in most dazzling array.

The sovereigns arrived on horseback. The troops formed a double square, in the center of which a great tent, or, rather, a temple in honor of the general peace, had been erected. The pillars which supported the tent were decorated with trophies of weapons, and standards that fluttered in the breeze. Everywhere the ground was bedecked with leaves and flowers. In the middle of the tent stood an altar richly adorned with draperies of gold and silver and all the pomp of the Catholic faith. Countless candles shed their light, which was dimmed by the rays that the sun sent down in all its glory. The steps of the altar were covered with carpets of red damask.

Soon the royal carriages, drawn by four horses, arrived with the empresses, queens, and duchesses, who seated themselves upon the velvet-upholstered arm-chairs. Finally, when this dazzling assembly, this crowd of military men, courtiers,

masters of the horse, and pages had taken the places set aside for them, the honored Archbishop of Vienna, surrounded by his clergy, began the mass, a function that he had reserved for himself despite his advanced age. The entire population of Vienna and its environs had streamed in to attend this solemn service.

At the moment of the consecration of the host a salvo of artillery greeted the presence of the God of Battles. At the same moment, as if by a sign, all these warriors, kings, princes, generals, and soldiers fell upon their knees and bowed down before the One Whose hands held the decision of victory or defeat. The tremendous crowd of spectators seemed to be seized by the same feeling; with one accord they bared their heads and knelt in the dust. The cannon became silent, and a solemn stillness followed the thunder of the guns. Finally the priest of the Lord raised aloft the symbol of redemption and turned toward the army to give the blessing. The service was concluded, the bowed figures rose, and the clatter of weapons again filled the air.

A chorus of voices began a hymn to peace in German, and a large band of wind instruments played an accompaniment. Suddenly the whole army and all the countless spectators joined in the singing. No, never before has the human ear heard anything more affecting than when

those thousands of voices melted together as one in praising the beneficence of peace and the glory of the Almighty.

After the religious ceremony the rulers and all the princesses placed themselves on a rise of ground near the Burg Tor. The troops paraded before them; Grand Duke Constantine and other princes marched at the head of the regiments that had been presented to them. From all sides came cheers and appeals for the preservation of peace, the first need of the peoples.

The inventive faculty was not too tired to propose new festivities daily, banquets, concerts, hunting-parties, masked balls, carousals. Following the example of the head of their exalted family, all the princes of the Austrian house had divided the duties of hospitality between them in order to extend to their distinguished guests the entertainment of Vienna. It was considered so undesirable to interrupt this succession of amusements that the court did not even put on mourning for Queen Marie Caroline of Naples, and this despite the fact that this one surviving daughter of Maria Theresa had ended her eventful life before the entry of the monarchs into Vienna. Any effort to announce her death publicly was scrupulously avoided; this assembly, dedicated only to insouciance and pleasure, was not to be given a mournful tinge.

Nothing equaled the mutual confidence with which these monarchs lived together. They studied how to perform little acts of friendship and good-will. They met daily, and yet this did not detract from the sincerity of their frank demeanor, which was worthy of the times of chivalry. Did they propose by means of this honorable conduct to wipe out all the reported misunderstandings, the selfish scheming, the play for personal advantage, usual at the congresses of kings? Or were they astonished and entranced at a life and a fraternal relation which stood in such strong contrast to the stiff formalities of their courts?

In order to avoid the embarrassments of formalities and disputes over precedence in rank, it was unanimously decided to abide by the rule of seniority upon entering and leaving a room and on the horseback-rides and pleasure-drives. The suggestion for this decision is credited to Czar Alexander. The rank according to age was placed as follows:

- |                         |                  |      |
|-------------------------|------------------|------|
| 1. King of Württemberg, | born in the year | 1754 |
| 2. King of Bavaria,     | " " " "          | 1756 |
| 3. King of Denmark,     | " " " "          | 1768 |
| 4. Emperor of Austria,  | " " " "          | 1768 |
| 5. King of Prussia,     | " " " "          | 1770 |
| 6. Emperor of Russia,   | " " " "          | 1777 |

This order of precedence, however, was in force only at the festivities; at the official sessions of the Congress the monarchs did not appear in person.

One of the first courtesies exchanged between the monarchs was the bestowal upon one another of the great cross of their orders. It was difficult to distinguish between these decorations of all forms and names, ranging from the names in the calendar of the saints to the most unusual titles, such as the elephant, the phoenix, the black, red, and white eagle, the fleece, and so on. This exchange was only a preliminary to something more important—to the presentation of kingdoms, provinces, or aggregations of souls.

The ceremony specially discussed among all others of this kind was that at which Lord Castlereagh, in the name of his king, bestowed the Order of the Garter on the Emperor of Austria. The Prince de Ligne, who attended this ceremony, described to me the dignity and splendor with which it was carried out. Sir Isaac Hart, the foremost herald of the order, had been sent specially from London for this purpose. He himself invested the emperor with the separate articles of the costume of the order, and placed on him the garter that is so greatly desired; Lord Castlereagh then presented the statutes of the order to the emperor. In gratitude for this cour-

tesy, the emperor gave the title of field-marshal to the English prince regent and to his brother, the Duke of York.

When the rulers had no more orders to give, they began to present to each other regiments of their armies; and so it became a point of honor for the princes to appear at once in the uniform of the regiment that had been given to them.

In this manner the Emperor of Austria gave the Hiller Regiment to Czar Alexander, and the Blackenstein Hussars to the crown prince of Würtemberg. Alexander acknowledged this by bestowing one of his regiments of the emperor's guard. In order to demonstrate the value he placed upon this gift, he determined to present the regimental colors to his new soldiers in person. This standard had been tastefully embroidered by the Empress of Austria and bore the device, "Unauflöslicher Bund zwischen den Kaisern Alexander und Franz" ["Indissoluble tie between the Emperors Alexander and Francis"]. The regiment was drawn up in order of battle on one of the greens of the Prater. A tremendous crowd assembled. Alexander approached with the flag, which he had received from the hands of the Empress of Austria, and gave it to the soldiers with the words, "Soldiers, remember that you are ready to die in the defense



of this flag and in the defense of your emperor and your colonel, Alexander of Russia."

The monarchs paid calls upon one another, and surprised one another like good old friends. In a word, it was royal camaraderie. For instance, Czar Alexander and the King of Prussia agreed to surprise Emperor Francis on his birthday while dressing. One presented to him a lounging-robe padded with marten sable; the other gave him a wash-bowl and a pitcher of the finest Berlin workmanship. Reports of these scenes of domestic confidences were soon in everybody's mouth, and became the subject of all conversations.

The stranger is well received in Vienna; civilians welcome him with hearty hospitality, and the authorities show him affability. In return they make only one request, that their guests do not speak or act against the Government. "May you enjoy," they say, "all the pleasant diversions that surround you; become acquainted with our rich and beautiful environs; visit the theaters, the casinos, and the ball-rooms; but do not cast a shadow on our merry-making by political comment. Refrain from all criticism, which would not add to your comfort and might affect our own."

These were the conditions for a cheerful welcome; but woe to the stranger who sinned against

these wise laws! On the day of his error he received a short communication which asked him most politely to appear on the following day before the police judge. In the most friendly manner he was informed that his passports were not in order and that his business was at an end. He protested in vain, might refer to his connection with various governments, and reiterate that he was there only for pleasure; it was all of no avail; he had to leave.

Two events differing greatly in character occupied the minds of all at that time, the fate of the Kingdom of Saxony and the announcement of a carousal, or tournament, which had been discussed since the opening of the Congress, and was to be held in the imperial riding-academy. A few words were devoted to Saxony, and the plan of giving it to Prussia as reparation was touched on; the preparations for the tournament, however, were discussed down to the smallest detail. Of all the festivities at the court it was to be one of the most beautiful. We steeped ourselves in descriptions and representations of the tournaments under Louis XIV, and became confident that they would be surpassed in splendor.

The colors of the various quadrilles and the supposed dexterity of the individual champions were the subject of gossip. Various devices, the meaning of which the women tried to solve, were

cited. The excellent King of Saxony and his state were entirely forgotten; his case had to give way before one more important.

Prince Talleyrand received me with that characteristic cordiality that is his, took my hand with a friendliness that reminded me of other times, and said:

“So I have to come to Vienna, Monsieur, and invite you formally, in order to get you to visit me?”

I may be mistaken, but at this moment he seemed to give the lie to the maxim that was so long ascribed to him, “Speech is given man so that he may hide his thoughts.” Noting by my embarrassment that I had not hit upon a happy reply, he immediately presented the Duke of Dalberg, and accompanied this introduction with a few polite and flattering words.

Karl von Dalberg of Hesse was prince-primate of the Confederation of the Rhine from 1806 to 1813, and the last archbishop-elect of Mayence.

I had not seen Talleyrand since the year 1806. His look still reflected refinement, his features showed his imperturbable calm, the bearing of a self-possessed man, who was admired throughout all Europe at that moment as the foremost diplomat of all times. He still possessed the same

deep, melodious voice, the same free and natural manners, the same cosmopolitanism, the reflection of a social order that had passed away and of which he was the last representative.

Standing face to face with the man in this salon, it was not easy to avoid an irrepressible feeling of diffidence and fear.

The renown of the French plenipotentiaries at the Congress preceded them; but Talleyrand seemed to dominate specially through his assurance and the force of his spirit. Always the same, he practised diplomacy as he had practised it in other days in his salons at Paris or Neuilly after a victorious battle, and this despite the fact that the task of France was now as arduous on account of outward conditions as because of internal embarrassments. Surrounded by many handicaps, the result of the new organization and the faulty harmony within, French diplomacy could take no effective strides. It was well known that it was neither the desire nor in the power of the Government to do this.

The great powers that acted as arbiters of the Congress stepped forward with a unanimity without precedent in diplomatic annals. Nothing in the world seemed powerful enough to loosen a link in this closed chain. The representatives of France, therefore, were compelled to draw upon their genius or talents in order to

overcome the obstacles which a quadruple alliance placed in their way with the whole weight of its momentary prestige and unity.

The power, however, that Talleyrand did not get from his Government he created himself; for one might well say that no matter what the achievements and the personal influence of its other members, the French embassay at the Congress was concentrated in him. With that wonderful comprehension that seemed to anticipate and to decide beforehand on events, he soon knew how to regain a fitting place for France.

He wholly repudiated all points of view and intentions of the guiding committee composed of the four great powers. "I bring you more than you possess," he said to them, "the idea of legitimacy." He disrupted the powers, which up to that time had been so much in agreement; he hinted at the danger embodied in a Russia inordinately enlarged and dominating the rest of Europe, and pointed to the necessity of damming its progress in the north. He understood how to win England and Austria to this view. In this manner Czar Alexander, who six months before had determined upon the restoration of the Bourbon house in the salon of Talleyrand and under his influence, now beheld with disgust his plans disarranged by the representative of a state that had to thank Alexander for its exist-

ence. In a disagreeable mood he often remarked, "M. de Talleyrand here plays the part of the minister of Louis XIV."

It has been said, and certainly with justice, that Prince Talleyrand was never greater than at the moment when France lay crushed by the disaster of 1814. I had seen him eight years before as minister of the French Empire, at that time the all-powerful lawmaker of Europe. In Vienna, as the ambassador of a vanquished people, he was exactly the same, his power just as firm. It was the same cultivated dignity, perhaps with just an added nuance of pride; the same poise, worthy of a country that had been conquered, but was nevertheless necessary to the balance of power in Europe, and which could draw new strength even from catastrophe. His attitude, a word from him, was the best expression of the greatness of our fatherland. When one saw this look, which no ill fortune could darken, this assurance, which nothing could disturb, one felt that this man had a strong and powerful nation behind him.

As he was in politics, so he was also in private life, in his salon. He had adhered to his Parisian habits in Vienna. He received visits daily while dressing, and the most earnest discussions often ensued while his valet attended him. I have often seen him sitting in his salon beside the beautiful



Countess Edmond de Périgord, with all the diplomatic notabilities around him, all the ministers of the victorious powers engaged in a discussion with him while standing and listening as pupils would to a teacher. In our century M. de Talleyrand is perhaps the only person who has lastingly celebrated such triumphs.

The Duke of Dalberg was worthy to stand at the side of the Prince de Talleyrand. As the scion of one of the oldest and most noble of German families, he contributed a great deal on March 31 to the resolutions that returned the Bourbon family to the throne. At the same time he also interested himself in the application of constitutional measures that were adopted to overcoming divergent views and to reunite France.

Before departing for Vienna, M. de Talleyrand had prepared his own instructions; it was contended that he had remained faithful to his task and had foreseen and predetermined with a wonderful perspicacity the various phases through which the negotiations would pass. It is not generally known that the French ambassador carried on two lines of correspondence with Paris. One, compiled by M. de Besnadière, was exclusively anecdotal and sent to King Louis XVIII. In this M. de Talleyrand sprinkled the original, piquant impressions, the delicate and

comprehensive comment which characterize him. The other correspondence, which was wholly political in character and was prepared principally by the Duke of Dalberg, was sent direct to the ministry of foreign affairs.

I was often tempted at that time to draw a comparison between the two men who in such a remarkable society drew the attention of all persons upon themselves, the Prince de Ligne and M. de Talleyrand. Both had lived with the notable men of the eighteenth century, and seemed to have been bequeathed as models and ornaments to the new generation. Both were representatives of this cultivated society, but in a different manner. The one shared its frivolous and restless spirit, the other its naturalness and the nobility of its conduct. Both understood how to please by the magic of their spirit; the one in a more resplendent, the other in a deeper, manner. M. Talleyrand was born in order to ravish men through the force of his sharp and brilliant understanding; the Prince de Ligne pleased and dazzled by the magical charm of the inexhaustible power of his imagination. This one brought to literature the refinement, agreeableness, and splendor of a courtier; the other dominated the most important affairs with the calm ease of a cultivated man and the unmovable moderation of

a well-poised man. The one, as the other, was rich in pertinent thoughts, witty, original, and piquant; those of the statesman were more characteristic, those of the warrior more unexpected, spontaneous. In both, finally, this kindly disposition was ingrained,—it is always the legacy of a man from birth,—and in the one it disclosed itself in a quiet, in the other a more communicative, manner.

Happy the man, I often said to myself, who can pass the morning with the Prince de Ligne and the evening with M. de Talleyrand! Where the one enriches the spirit with lessons drawn from a wide experience, with true and beautiful descriptions, the other encourages good taste by his sure tact, penetrating observations, and the magic of his conversation, which captures every one.

I went to the Prince de Ligne in order to pay him my daily visit. He was still in bed, and I entered the library, which at the same time was his bedroom. The place where a famous man lives is always interesting. Everywhere one finds traces of his inclinations, and the special character of his genius stands forth in the smallest details; everything here awakens curiosity or commands attention. Surrounded by his books and scattered manuscripts, the Prince de Ligne

seemed like a general in his tent among his weapons and trophies.

The license of considering a pleasing disorder artistic, which is permitted to poets, was misused to some extent by the prince, who allowed a general topsy-turvydom that was not without charm to exist all about him. Here lay Montesquieu, there Rousseau, opened beside an amorous correspondence; there little verses beside military writings of the Archduke Karl; letters half begun, poems, and outlines of strategic writings. A remarkable mixture of the characteristics of a cultivated man, a soldier, a man of intellectual attainments belonged to the Prince de Ligne, representative of a type of men such as is no longer found. He held the most excellent women enthralled by his seductive, dazzling entertainment; he astonished the most prominent generals by the depth of his plans, and held all spellbound by the pointedness and accuracy of his comment.

He had a desk before him, on which he was writing.

"I am going to Schönbrunn to-day," he said to me. "You will accompany me, will you not? I have the honor of presenting my respects to the little duke, the born king. Permit me to finish this chapter, in which I am describing an event of this time; then I will be at your service."

"I am putting my ideas on paper in any sort

of way," he added, "in order not to forget them. This great picture makes me enthusiastic; in the middle of these intoxicating joys comes a thought that may one day have a good or pleasing effect. Drawn into this circle of chimeras, I cannot desist being an observer. Despite the fact that I am a participant in this drama, I consider everything that takes place about me about as important as stepping on an ant-hill."

He resumed his writing. Suddenly he turned to me, for he had to look up something.

"Do me the favor and give me yonder volume of manuscript that you see lying on the third book-shelf."

I rose and began to hunt the place he indicated, but as I hesitated for a moment, he jumped from the bed, climbed up the ladder, seized the book, and lay down again with a speed too fast for words. I expressed my astonishment at this mobility, so unusual for one of his age.

"It is true," he said to me, "I have always been light of foot, often to my advantage. On that wonderful trip on which I accompanied Catharine the Great to Taurus, the imperial yacht sailed around the Parthian foot-hills, where the temple of Iphigenia is said to have stood. We were disputing over the plausibility of this tradition when Catharine stretched her hand out to the shore and said:

“ ‘Prince de Ligne, I present the disputed ground to you.’ In a moment I sprang into the sea, clad in my uniform and wearing my hat, and swam ashore. I drew my sword and cried out: ‘Your Majesty, I take possession of this country.’ The cliff bears my name since that time, and I am its possessor. You see, my child, mobility often has happy consequences, and in life you must know how to make quick decisions.

“A few years before the Revolution I was sojourning in Paris. In the enjoyment of the moment and with the abandon of youth I had not thought of the condition of my purse; it was unhappily as empty of money as my heart was full of happiness and my head full of hopes. But I had to be in Brussels within a day or two in order to dine with the archduchess, Regent of the Netherlands. I was unacquainted in this great Paris, and therefore in the direst embarrassment. I was honorably bound by ties of friendship to Prince Max, at that time a colonel in the French service and to-day King of Bavaria. You know his nobility, his wonderful unselfishness; everything that he possessed was at all times at the disposal of his friends. I turned to him. However, the excellent Max was not yet a king and had no minister of finance at his side to administer his income. As chance would have it, his purse was just as light as my own.



“What was I to do? The postilion is the most irreconcilable of men, and at every station approaches with hat in hand to demand payment. I learned that my cousin, the Duke of Arenberg, was to travel that very evening to Brussels by extra post. My decision was made in a moment. ‘You will be there before him,’ I said to myself. Booted and spurred as a courier, I went to the post, had a horse given me, and rode forth to order relays for the duke at the next station. In this manner I hurried from Paris to Brussels, always a few minutes ahead of him, and so kept him supplied with post-horses on the whole journey. My cousin, who had sent forward no courier, could not explain what unseen agency he had to thank for this punctuality, which increased the speed of his journey by a great deal. Upon his arrival I related the story of my trickery, at which we laughed heartily, and which enabled me to keep my dinner engagement with the arch-duchess.”

While chatting thus the Prince de Ligne attired himself. When he had put on his resplendent uniform of a colonel of the body-guard and had decorated himself with half a dozen orders, he said to me:

“If the Goddess of Fortune came to me to-day with her crystal, how gladly would I exchange this pomp for the simple uniform of a

color-sergeant in the regiment of my father! I was not yet sixteen years old when I wore it for the first time, and I thought then that thirty was old age. Everything changes with time. Now, as an octogenarian, I still feel young, although many mockers try to hint that I am too young. What does it matter? I do everything I can to prove to them that I am young enough. Taken as a whole, my career was a happy one. Neither remorse, nor ambition nor jealousy hemmed my path; I have piloted my boat fairly well, and until I step into the boat of Charon, I shall not desist considering myself young, to the great discomfiture of all those who insist that I am old."

Even in this joking he gave a grace to all his words that cannot be described. I repeated that age had passed him by without touching him, and that time did him the honor of forgetting him. He believed me, and an expression of genuine pleasure brightened his pleasing countenance.

As we descended the stairs we found several of the importunate persons who steadily besieged him. His face darkened. He freed himself from these onerous callers with a few polite words and left.

"Oh," he said, "these wordmongers, wit-chasers, these variable lexicons, who in place of talent

have only memory! The best book to learn from is the world, but this book will always remain sealed for them."

Soon we were rolling forward on the way to Schönbrunn. Unhappily, the carriage of the prince did not deserve the compliment that I had just passed on the prince himself. It was impossible to believe that it had ever been young, and its springs demanded in a loud voice to be exchanged for the more elastic ones of our time. I still see it before me, this old, gray vehicle drawn by two lean, white horses. On the doors of the carriage was painted the broad coat of arms and above it could be read the motto of the house of Egmont, from which the line of the prince was descended:

*"Quo res cumque cadunt, semper stat linea recta."*

On the rear of this peculiar vehicle stood a Heyduc, six feet tall, an old Turk whom Prince Potemkin had given the prince at the siege of Ismail, and who bore the name of the conquered town. But the marshal knew how to shorten the long route, just as he understood how to enrich his not too luxurious meals by his entertaining manner. The ride of nearly one hour seemed short, and soon we had reached the gates of the palace.

In the anteroom we were received by a French attendant who still wore the livery of Napoleon. He recognized the marshal, and hastened to announce us to Mme. de Montesquieu [governess of Napoleon's son].

"I hope we shall not have to wait," the prince remarked to me, "for, as I already have told you, I am a Count de Ségur at Schönbrunn."

The prince referred to the post of grand master of the ceremonies, which M. de Ségur occupied with Napoleon; the Prince de Ligne had become acquainted with the count at the court of Catharine of Russia.

A few moments later Mme. de Montesquieu appeared and excused herself most politely for not being able to admit us at once.

"The young prince," she said, "is just sitting for a portrait that Isabey is making of him, and which is intended for the empress, Marie Louise. As he is greatly attached to M. le Maréchal, his visit will without doubt be a welcome diversion for him. I will attempt to bring the sitting to an early close."

"It will interest you to know what happened to me on my first visit to this place," said the prince when Mme. de Montesquieu had taken leave. "When the child was informed that the Marshal Prince de Ligne desired to visit him he cried out:

“ ‘Is that one of the marshals who betrayed my father? He shall not enter!’

“It cost a great effort to make the child comprehend that France was not the only land in which there are marshals.”

Soon thereafter Mme. de Montesquieu led the way to the prince. When the young Napoleon spied the prince he sprang from his chair and threw himself into his arms. He was really the prettiest child one could imagine. His resemblance to his grandmother, Maria Theresa [Empress of Austria], was astonishing. The angelic lines of his face, the dazzling whiteness of his skin, the fire in his eyes, the beautiful blond hair, which fell upon his shoulders in thick locks, provided a most charming subject for the brush of Isabey. He wore the Legion of Honor upon his dolman.

“A Frenchman, my Prince,” said the marshal to him and pointed to me.

“Good day, Monsieur,” said the child to me. “I like Frenchmen very much.”

I recalled an expression of Rousseau, “No one cares to be interrogated, and children the least of all,” therefore I bent silently down to him and embraced him.

We then approached Isabey, who was working to complete the portrait of the young prince. It had a surprising effect and was charming, as are

all the productions of this great artist. It is the picture that Isabey presented to Napoleon in the year 1815 upon his return from the Island of Elba.

"What pleases me most in this portrait," said the Prince de Ligne, "is its extraordinary similarity to a youthful picture of Joseph II [of Austria] that I received from the Empress Maria Theresa."

In the meantime the young Napoleon had gone to a corner of the salon to get a wooden regiment of Uhlans which his great-uncle, the Archduke Karl, had presented to him a few days before. By the action of a simple mechanism each of the horsemen, who were fastened to movable bars, imitated all the military evolutions; broke ranks, formed columns, etc.

"To drill, my Prince!" cried the Prince de Ligne in a loud voice.

The regiment was immediately taken out of its box and placed in the order of battle.

"Attention!" commanded the old marshal, who had drawn his sword and adopted the bearing of a general on parade.

Immovable and attentive, as grave as a Russian grenadier, the young prince took his place at the left wing of his troops, his hand on the handle of the bars. A command was given; its execution followed immediately. A second, the



same compliance; on both sides the same earnestness. In fact, when one saw the pleasant face of this child brighten at this game of battle and beheld the features of the famous old warrior come to life, one might well have said: the one has inherited his lively passion for the art of war from his father, and the other, younger by forty years, wishes to live again his glorious campaigns. A charming contrast, and a picture worthy of inspiring the genius of our painters.

These great manœuvres were interrupted as the empress was announced. As she preferred to be alone with her son, whose education she personally directed, we withdrew. Isabey remained, as he wished to show her his work.

When we were again seated in the carriage, the Prince de Ligne, still greatly moved by the visit, said to me:

“Oh, when Napoleon received the submission of Vienna at Schönbrunn, when he here planned the memorable Battle of Wagram, when he caused his victorious phalanges to parade before the astonished Viennese in these broad courts, he was far from foreseeing that he whose fate lay wholly in his hands would one day hold back the son of the victor and the daughter of the vanquished as hostages. In my long career I have seen a great deal of glory and misfortune, but

nothing compares to the story of which a chapter has just been unfolded before us."

As we rode across the glacis between the suburbs and the city we observed a broad, open, and extraordinary low carriage, filled by a person of generous girth.

"Halt!" said the prince to me. "We must salute. That is his Majesty by grace of God and Robinson Crusoe, the King of Würtemberg. Until now," continued the prince, "we have attended only the festivities of kings; to-morrow I will call for you for a festival of the people.

This public festival is one of the most imposing events of the city of Vienna, and had long been the subject of general expectation.

I had therefore gladly accepted the invitation of my famous guide, the Prince de Ligne. I visited him before noon, and we started out for the Augarten, where the event was to be celebrated.

An enormous assembly of people crowded the beautiful spot. The weather was magnificent. The tribunes erected for the monarchs and the personages of the Congress were occupied by men and women spectators attired in brilliant finery. The prince preferred to mingle among the people. This pleased me a great deal, for I hoped that opportunities would offer for me to hear his spirited comment.

Four thousand Austrian veterans had been invited to attend this festival. They defiled before the tribunes of the sovereigns to military music, and then took their places under the big tents provided for them. Thereupon events of all kinds were presented, which lasted the entire day.

The end of the program was marked by the ascension of a balloon of enormous dimensions; the aëronaut who went up with it, a rival of Garnerin and Blanchard, called himself Kraskowitz. Soon he was seen suspended majestically over the crowd, and a great number of banners with the colors of the nations represented in Vienna were unfurled.

"Truly," said the Prince de Ligne to me, "if this aëronaut is somewhat of a skeptic, he has an opportunity for composing a philosophic treatise from his windy height on human vanity and the drama that he sees below. All these prominent persons, who appear so little when viewed from above with an untrammelled eye, must lose a great deal of their importance. If suddenly there came a gust of wind that carried him still higher, all these majesties, these celebrities, and all these immortal human beings would disappear from his view and mingle with the dust that is raised by their feet and their horses' shoes. Soon his gaze is able to distinguish nothing more than indefinite masses, a chaos without names."

One hour later the aëronaut had landed gently on the Island of Lobau.

In the meantime the monarchs moved about in the crowd without attendants, viewed everything, gossiped condescendingly with the old battle-scarred soldiers. There was something patriarchal about the way in which they went about in the midst of the people, who crowded about them.

When evening came innumerable lamps brought the light of day to the Augarten. A splendid pyrotechnical display now took place before the palace; the most beautiful of the pictures represented famous buildings of Milan, Berlin, and St. Petersburg. An enormous crowd surged back and forth in the avenues of the Augarten, and yet the most remarkable order reigned everywhere. There was something calm and studied in this merry-making, such as is peculiar only to the German.

In the hostelry "Zur Kaiserin von Oesterreich" congregated most of the strangers whose expenses were not provided by the court or who gladly evaded the demands of etiquette. This society, at first little taken notice of, soon became an advisory power, and even if it had no voice at the Congress, it at least had influence.

We seated ourselves at a table at which at least twenty persons of different nationalities already

sat. One of my neighbors directed my attention to a young woman whose blue eyes, clear complexion, and adornment cast a radiance on everything about her.

"This young woman," he said to me, "is being spoiled like a favorite child, thanks to a happy accident."

"You seem to know her. Tell me about her, if you will."

"Eight days ago, with a few friends I left the Baths of Diana, where we had dined, and proceeded to Caroline,—that is the name of this woman,—and ordered punch. This soon put us in a merry mood, and the result of this was an uproar, which annoyed the neighborhood and caused considerable property damage, which I forgot to pay for upon my departure. Two days later I returned in order to recompense my hostess for the indiscretion and to apologize for the foolhardiness of my comrades. I climbed the stairs with the unrestrained manner of one who possessed the freedom of the house, entered, and who do I see in the reception-room but a chamberlain in court costume, who wears a golden key on his coat-lapel and who makes it his duty to bar my way.

"‘My dear sir,’ he says to me, ‘you may not enter here.’

“‘That command, sir, cannot refer to me. I have but to say the word, and will do so speedily.’

“‘Pardon, sir, but the king may wish to speak before you. His Majesty is within, and I am here on duty.’

“‘I understand, sir. I came with regard to several broken pieces of furniture; I will leave the field to one who knows better than I how to repair an injury.’

“Thereupon I withdrew. But that does not end the matter. His Majesty, it seems, was not an extensive conversationalist, and his entertainment was soon at an end. Just as he was preparing to take his leave from the pretty child, a police agent entered with a neatly folded paper which was not exactly a love-letter, but the significance of which would leave no one in doubt for a moment. It came from Councilor Siber, director of the police of Vienna.

“‘Ma’m’selle,’ said the police agent to Caroline, ‘your neighbors have complained to the police director regarding the uproar which occurred in your home the day before yesterday. I have received the order to conduct you to his headquarters, so that you may justify your conduct.’

“‘You must know that the police of Vienna, as faithful adherents to ancient customs and manners, have retained a certain practice that affects



persons of the sex and position of Mademoiselle Caroline. When these are to be punished for an infraction of this sort, the police mete out a punishment in a paternal manner, much as an irate father might punish his ill-tempered child. Everything is done in perfect good form; a woman administers the punishment in a remote room of the house of the director of police. The only means of obtaining a mitigation of punishment is a more or less large number of gulden, which the guilty one may place in the hand of the one who administers punishment.

"The poor Caroline knew all these details. When she saw the police agent and heard his command she grew pale; a cold shudder ran through her limbs, and she pictured the avenging fury armed with the shameful instrument of degradation; therefore she threw herself in tears at the feet of her royal admirer and cried with all the power that fear gave her:

" 'Sire, you are king; protect me! save me!'

"The appearance of the royal master confused the police official; he explained the incident to the king. The monarch, moved by the pleading of his ward, raised the beautiful weeping girl with one hand and with the other dismissed the messenger, to whom he said:

" 'You may withdraw. Madame belongs to

my household, and she is responsible to me alone for her conduct.'

"The unexpected pleases kings as well as women; out of this incident, which was meant to be only a passing mood, has developed a real, lasting protection. At this Congress of amusements everything was arranged satisfactorily without any other plenipotentiary than love. Since that time the young favorite has been loaded with presents of all kinds; his Majesty even appeared recently with her at a masked ball and gave his arm to the girl, who was disguised only in a light domino, an occurrence which caused the Prince de Ligne to remark:

"'That is the Danish Du Barry; I wish her nothing more than a little witness to the joys of the Congress; then good fortune will have placed a golden spoke in her wheel.'"

The salon of the Russians was primarily that of the Princess Bagration. This woman, the wife of the field-marshal, in a certain sense represented her countrymen in Vienna.

At one of the soirées given by the princess I sat beside the Prince Koslovski and the Baron Ompteda, and felt certain that both would find a wide field for their biting remarks in this numerous circle.

"Observe," said the baron, "there behind the chair of Czar Alexander stands his brother the

Grand Duke Constantine, the third in rank in the empire and probably heir to the throne. What a servile attitude he assumes toward the czar! With what affectation he exhibits himself as the first of his subjects! One might actually regard him as enthusiastically for servitude as others are for freedom."

"Have you heard," said the Prince Koslovski to me, "of an incident which brought all the political salons in uproar? The Baron von St—— [probably Stein] standing yonder, beside M. von Hardenberg, plays the leading rôle. Naturally violent and easily excitable, this statesman, despite his contact with the diplomatic world in which he lives, has never been able to moderate his temper. A great many of his colleagues have already complained of him. Eight days ago the business agent of a petty German prince had himself announced to the baron. The latter was exceedingly busy and wished to be alone. The visitor entered modestly and wished to speak with that respect which he was expected to show the representative of a great power. The baron looked up, and, without asking the visitor for his name, fell suddenly upon him, took him by the collar, and threw him out of the room. All this occurred with lightning-like rapidity. As a result, explanations were demanded by the insulted man. The violent-tempered diplomat had to ex-

cuse his discourteous action, but the impression it caused had not yet been obliterated. One must admit that it stands in tragic contrast to the calmness and patience which the arbiters of our fates show in their relations with one another."

I had promised the Prince Ypsilanti that I would call for him and visit the Princess Suwarov with him. I went to him in great haste. Ypsilanti at this time was actually besieged by those frivolous love affairs that are so well designed to turn a young head. His noble military form, his tall, lean figure, were not in the least affected by the loss of his arm.

" 'Just look,' he said to me, and held out a packet of letters. 'There are six that have arrived since yesterday and in all kinds of languages, Italian, French, yes, even Greek. My faith! I have rendezvous in all the churches of Vienna. Come, my friends,' he continued, 'more weighty matters occupy my time; let us talk of Greece.' "

The *déjeuner* at the Princess Suwarov's was most lively. Among the women of high Russian society no one united better the advantages of intelligence with the charms of a mild and gracious soul. We amused ourselves by discussing the interesting events that had taken place in St. Petersburg since my departure and all sorts

of subjects affecting our friends. One anecdote followed another.

Ypsilanti listened to us in silence, yet that exultation, the germ of which he had carried in his soul from his earliest youth, betrayed itself in the brightness of his eyes, the expression of his face. Through the death of his father he had become heir to an enormous fortune. Despite the fame that he had won in war, despite the seductiveness of amusements and of love, he centered all his thoughts, all his dreams for the future, on Greece, his fatherland, whose serfdom he lamented, and everywhere he sought avengers for it.

I soon observed that the Princess Suwarov encouraged him in these hopes for freedom; the whole of polite Russian society was pleased to occupy itself with this idea, which had been handed down from generation to generation for a century like a pious humanitarian legacy.

"The great European war," said Prince Ypsilanti, with heat, "has ended; the era of Greece has arrived. Its cause will become that of the whole Congress; the signal for its independence must be given from Vienna."

"Well, then," said the princess, "why be inactive? What a task to be the liberator of an oppressed people at the age of three and twenty! Our century is the century of youth; youth overcomes all obstacles.

“The Congress cannot be deaf to the voice of religion and humanity. Already Greece may count on many avengers in the Peloponnesus, the two principalities, the archipelago, and also at other localities. Only a drop more and the measure is full.”

I was to pass the next day with the Prince de Ligne in his country house on the Kahlenberg. Upon arriving there I found M. de Nowosiltzov, a statesman of real merit who possessed the confidence of the Czar of Russia to a great degree. At that time, as was said, the czar took a lively interest in the future of Poland. As an imperial counselor, member of the provisional government at Warsaw, M. de Nowosiltzov was just engaged in preparing a constitution, which the Czar of Russia wished to present to the new kingdom.

The Prince de Ligne had a lively interest in Poland. For that reason he listened most attentively to the discussion of the plans of Alexander—plans one might still credit at that time.

“After so many remarkable efforts,” said M. de Nowosiltzov, “after so many broken hopes and vain sacrifices, Poland is again to breathe freely. The care of the czar for his new subjects cannot be called into question; cast a glance at this manuscript. It is the constitution of the Kingdom of Poland. Czar Alexander himself



improved it. You will see thereby that there is no nobler heart than his when great thoughts come from the heart. The laws and constitution of the kingdom will be the keystone of peace in Europe."

As a matter of fact, any of the extracts that he read to us from the manuscript honored the statesman as much as the friend of humanity.

We were interrupted during the commentary which the counselor gave us after his reading by the visit of the Count Arthur Potocki, a young friend of the Prince de Ligne. No matter how strongly Polish he was and how filled with noble thoughts for his country, yet his presence caused M. de Nowosiltzov to roll up his manuscript without another word; he took his leave soon after.

"I bring you, my Prince," said the young count, "the *billets* to the imperial carousal which absolutely will take place during next week. It will be one of the most imposing dramas that have ever been seen." Without tarrying longer he left us.

"You come," said the prince to me, "in order to pass a few hours with me to-day in my house on the Kahlenberg. Before we go thither do not refuse to visit Isabey with me. I must sit to him to-day for my portrait. During this hour of martyrdom you may muse through his picture-

gallery. Come. His conversation is just as full of spirit as his brush."

We soon reached the home of the artist, which was located in the Leopoldstadt. Isabey lived in splendor, as once Benvenuto Cellini had in the Louvre. The walls of his atelier were entirely covered with sketches of his paintings and outlines of paintings; it resembled a magic lantern in which could be seen, one after another, all the personages of the Congress.

M. de Talleyrand had given him the idea, as he said, of coming to Vienna, and to this trip art is indebted for his excellent historical sketch that depicts a sitting of the delegates of the Congress. The fall of Napoleon had caused the loss of all of his patronage. One day in the workroom of M. de Talleyrand, who had contributed substantially to this great catastrophe, he lamented the results of a restoration that was the cause of his ruin. Before Talleyrand's eyes at that moment lay a copper-plate engraving of the Peace of Westphalia at Münster, after the painting of Terborch. He pointed to it, and said to the artist:

"A congress is about to be opened in Vienna; go there."

These few words were a ray of hope to Isabey, and his decision was made. M. de Talleyrand

encouraged him in the most well-meaning and flattering manner.

The hour during which the prince posed seemed short to me. His portrait had progressed far enough to permit the likeness to be criticized. I paid the artist my compliments. All those who knew this marvelous aged man recognized him wholly in his portrait.

Soon thereafter we joyfully began our little journey. On the way we discussed the Viennese amusements.

"In order to describe adequately the fairy-like fêtes that follow one upon the other," said the Prince de Ligne, "should not one be a poetic magician like Ariosto? Truly, I should not be surprised if the entertainment committee shortly caused the announcement to be made in all cities and villages of the monarchy that a prize will be awarded the lucky person who succeeds in inventing a new pleasure for the monarchs assembled here."

At these words we entered the court of his modest residence. The house was small, but comfortable. The Prince de Ligne had succeeded without difficulty in fulfilling the wish of Socrates, of having none but true friends here. The side of the house that stands opposite the Danube is covered with French verses of which he is

the author; one of these clearly reflects the calm of his noble soul:

Sans remords, sans regrets, sans crainte, sans envie.

(Without remorse, without regrets, without fear, without envy.)

"I feel so greatly the emptiness of virtually everything," he repeated often, "that it cannot be credited to me as a great virtue if I am neither envious nor malicious nor desirous of fame."

Thereupon he led me into his garden.

"I should depart from the practice of every proprietor if I did not begin by showing you all the details of my principality," he said, "but as my house and its environs are small, this will not take much time. Nevertheless, here I am able at last to enjoy my own self, having escaped the tumult of festivities and the exhaustion of amusements. Here the air refreshes me, here I gain new powers, which I use up again every night in the unending intoxication of joy of the Congress."

It was three o'clock; in a small room adjoining the library were served a few bits that the prince himself had brought with him. We seated ourselves and began one of the most pleasing dinners that lives in my memory. The prince told stories freely, and he narrated well and with charm.

The Empress of Austria was in a certain sense the soul of these balls, banquets, reunions, and masquerades. Born in Italy as a member of the famous house of Este, lauded by both Ariosto and Tasso, she had inherited taste and talent for all the arts from her ancestors. She possessed extraordinary goodness. Her lively fantasy occupied itself with the details of these festivals. Two French artists, M. Isabey and M. Moreau, the latter an architect of significant gifts, assisted her in originating and arranging the fêtes. She designed and gave commands, and it was the task of the artists to realize her happy, charming ideas.

Among her favorite amusements was the giving of theatrical performances in her salons. She herself was the impresario, and spared no pains to bring together an assembly of actors from among the members of society.

This morning I called on Prince Eugène de Beauharnais. We had known each other since my youth, and on all the occasions that brought me near him in Paris, Milan, and Vienna, I, like all his friends, had access anew to his unselfish heart and his friendly spirit.

He was ailing; I remarked that his health suffered under the influence of mental sorrows. How many poignant sorrows he had to suffer! The misfortune of France, the downfall of Na-

pooleon, the loss of brilliant rank, and the death of a worshiped mother all in the course of a few months!

His position in Vienna had something forced and unreal about it. It was a source of continued discomfort to him. Diplomatic inquiries had preceded his reception; for this he thanked the influence of the King of Bavaria, his father-in-law, and the interest of Czar Alexander. But one could not forget that he was the adopted son of Napoleon, and it was known that he could never disguise his noble character, and that he surely would use his whole influence in behalf of a man who had been his patron. His position between the victorious powers who triumphed by the misfortune of France and the representatives of the government of the Bourbons seemed to leave him standing isolated in the middle of this stream of amusements.

I passed the evening in the salon of the Countess Fuchs. As always, a great many persons were present; happily, I was able to find a place beside Baron Ompteda. None understood so well as he how to sketch a portrait with a few strokes. His tongue, however, was feared as much as his sketches.

"Since your departure," he said to me, "Vienna has suffered a siege and a hostile occupation;



despite that you will observe no great changes. The ridiculous things have remained unchanged, which bespeaks the immobility of the Austrian Government. They merely strike the eye more sharply now in view of the progressive enlightenment of the century.

"Even the salons are still as you left them; this one especially is, as formerly, the gathering-place of the friends of our charming queen. No title was ever more deserved than this, and never have subjects sought to throw off her yoke.

"Nostitz is just entering there with Borel. Nostitz has only one fault; I believe he lives in a cab. At any hour, whether one is in the Graben, in the Prater, or on the bastions, he is to be seen driving by. He is half man, half vehicle, as once the centaurs were half man, half horse.

"Gentz also is present. He holds all the secrets of Europe in his hands; soon he will also be the possessor of all the European orders. He is one of the organs of that silent organism which we call the Austrian Government. Perhaps his manifests, his newspaper articles, and his proclamations have been just as disastrous to Napoleon as the ice of Russia. But honors and orders do not satisfy him as remuneration. The monarchs know that he also loves money; they give it to him in sufficiency. Bowed down by tasks and

affairs, cut off from all entertainments, he tries to find forgetfulness by plunging into the whirlpool of the world."

One of the most painful events of my life, the death of the Prince de Ligne, threw a shadow over all the festivities at the Congress, and the impression that this unexpected event made was marked and painful.

Mourning for the noble dead was not officially announced; but it was general, nevertheless, for it came from the heart. For long years the Viennese had regarded the Prince de Ligne with respect and wonder, feelings that were heightened by the enthusiasm of strangers for him. Without doubt they recalled how much Emperor Francis had loved him, what fame these men unitedly achieved in their wars, and the confidential relation that he had enjoyed with all the personages of the last century.

A few days later sincere tears were shed in memory of the Prince de Ligne. A solemn requiem was said for the marshal as Knight of the Golden Fleece in the royal chapel. All his friends, his family, and his admirers attended. This numerous and grief-stricken crowd proved clearly that the famous man had not gone to his grave forgotten.

As I passed through the Graben I found here, as always, a crowd of pedestrians and gossips. I joined one of these groups. An event given by M. von Metternich was the subject of conversation.

"The arrangements," said one, "were rich and tasteful, as always; and yet there was never a more icy company. The sovereigns were expected; all had promised to honor the event with their presence, but not a single one appeared. Every one is lost in conjecture about it."

"Then the brothers, who are otherwise so agreed, proved themselves Cains?" said another. "They had sworn to give the lie to the proverb that the kings cannot agree."

"Yes, the horizon darkens, if we may speak after the manner of our newspapers. I have heard it said that there are new disagreements in the Congress; also there is talk about the assembly of troops in Poland under the supreme command of the Grand Duke Constantine. But no eye can penetrate the veil behind which the political reports are hidden. Even the insignificant events, the visits which the monarchs pay one another, and the exchange of decorations with which they most usefully brighten their leisure hours or divert their cares—everything is in obscurity."

I proceeded in the evening to the Leopoldstadt theater with a few friends in order to attend the performance of a little play, "The Visitors in Vienna," which usually drew a full house. At seven o'clock we had procured tickets with great effort and entered the hall, which was already filled. The play deserved its success. The art of the actor Scholz, who excelled in it, as well as a number of spirited references, found much approval. All the nations of Europe, united in Vienna by amusement, played their parts therein.

"Peace, which has been banned from the considerations of the Congress, has fled to the stage," said Prince Koslovski. "Is it not a choice picture when you consider that the nations of Europe give one another the hand of friendship on the Leopoldstadt stage and dance a ballet together, while their representatives, not far from here, are ready to precipitate themselves into a hand-to-hand fight?"

In the whole city nothing was a more frequent topic of conversation than the fire that one night deprived the capital of Austria of one of its most beautiful decorations, the palace of Prince Razumowski. In the evening a mot of M. de Talleyrand was repeated everywhere. He was just about to begin his toilet when he was told of the unfortunate occurrence.

"That is a mild punishment for the good fortune of being a courtier," was his comment, and calmly he placed his coiffure in the hands of his valet.

A short time later the Countess Zichy gave a great ball which the monarchs were to honor with their presence. The assembly of the Countess Zichy was brilliant and one of the best attended that had been seen in a long time. All the monarchs had come; they had been expected with impatience. Their expressions were carefully observed, and every one sought to read their most secret thoughts. When they were seen to be in agreement pleasure was depicted on all faces. For several days the report had spread, and also seemed to be confirmed, that all the questions of the Congress, even the most difficult ones, had finally been decided, and that complete unanimity prevailed among the lords of the earth who had been in disagreement. Public announcement of certain significant decisions and general peace, it was said, would greet the new year.

In the meantime a large orchestra had begun a polonaise in a charming manner. Czar Alexander, according to his custom, was at the head of the dancing column. His partner was the Princess of Paar, just as celebrated through her charms as through the refinement of her spirit. The clock announced midnight; the new year be-

gan. It is well known that Austria has retained the honored custom of our fathers of greeting the first hour of the new year with mutual felicitations. At the stroke of the hour the princess stood still, turned to the Czar of Russia, and said:

"I am happy, Sire, to be the first to bring good wishes for the new year to so great a monarch. May your Majesty permit me to plead on behalf of all Europe for the preservation of a general peace and the agreement of all peoples?"

Wishes expressed by such a beautiful mouth could not fail to be well received. The czar received the petition and the petitioner with appreciation. He responded that all his hopes and wishes were directed toward reaching this desired goal, and that no sacrifice was too great to enable him to make a peace, which was the first need of mankind.

An enormous circle had formed. When the czar concluded, the women broke into a little hurrah, a little triumph that did not seem to displease the czar. For in addition to other characteristics of Louis Le Grand, he attempted also to combine his dignified bearing with the most refined conduct. The orchestra resumed the interrupted melody, and the polonaise was ended amid murmurs of approval and expressions of admiration.



One of the most unusual of the affairs given during the Congress of Vienna was probably the dinner, or picnic, to which Admiral Sidney Smith invited the princes, the personages, and the humanitarians who at that time sojourned within the walls of Vienna.

Sir William Sidney Smith, British admiral, had virtually closed his distinguished naval career in 1814. He entered the navy, as he expressed it, "at the beginning of the American War," when he was eleven years old. He served against the French and the Turks, and in 1799 captured Napoleon's flotilla before St. Jean d'Acre and raised the siege. He was first employed by the King of Sweden in the war with Russia in 1790-1792, and it was in the interest of Sweden that he appeared at the Congress.

Admiral Smith regarded the Congress of Vienna as an excellent opportunity to develop the activity of his spirit. He was therefore one of the first to proceed to Vienna. The admiral called himself the plenipotentiary of Gustavus Adolphus, the former King of Sweden, who under the title of the Duke of Holstein had delegated Smith to demand the return of his lost crown. This honorable commission he owed to his capacity of former officer of the Swedish marine and knight of the Order of the Swords.

Immediately after the opening of the sessions of the Congress Sir Sidney Smith hastened to place the cause of his eminent client before the highest court in Europe. The moment seemed to have been well chosen; the words "justice," "reparation," and "legitimacy" were daily acclaimed scrupulously. When the unthroned monarch placed this matter before the consciences of the princes through Sir Sidney Smith, he was attempting to fight them with their own weapons. But in politics the most logical grounds are not always the most successful. Days and months passed without the slightest reference to a restoration of the scepter to the dethroned king.

The arrangements for the picnic, however, found fewer difficulties. In the Vienna conference, which seemed to have for their motto that the little should be robbed for the benefit of the great, it was easier to bring about any sort of entertainment than to accomplish the restoration of a throne. The object of this general invitation was a subscription, at the head of which the admiral had placed his own name. The monarchs had accepted the invitation and, it was declared, subscribed with great avidity.

All had wished to express their approval of Sir Sidney Smith's humanitarian plans by their signatures and to testify to this by attendance at his picnic—all, with the exception of two, the

Emperor Francis and the King of Würtemberg. The former was kept from attending the festival through an inopportune event; he had, however, subscribed a thousand ducats. The latter had left Vienna two days before, and his defiant departure was the subject of all conversations.

Domineering and impetuous by nature, King Frederick of Würtemberg endured the tediousness of the conferences with impatience. At social functions he appeared virtually always with either an apprehensive or a discontented look. There was soon an occasion at which the full impetuosity of his character stood revealed. Among the many demands for reparation which were submitted for the decision of the Congress, was also that of the nobility of Germany, which had sent its deputies to obtain the restoration of its former position and its former rights. At a conference which his Majesty the King of Würtemberg attended these demands were discussed and the restoration of the Holy Roman Empire was touched upon. The king controlled himself only with effort. When the delegates began to speak of the measures that they considered expedient in order to limit the prerogatives of the sovereigns, he jumped from his chair as if beside himself. Before him stood a table that unfortunately lacked the curved opening which had been provided at the imperial table in order to

accommodate his unusual girth. As the monarch rose, his rotund proportions caused the table to upset with a loud crash. The angry mood of the king was only heightened thereby; without delay he departed, hastened to his house, and on the same night left the capital of Austria, after having insisted to his plenipotentiaries that all demands of the nobility must be repudiated without reservation.

Who has not already tried to describe M. von Metternich? As in the case of M. de Talleyrand, his contemporaries concede him all the glory that history gives him. Although more accomplished hands than mine already have drawn his portrait, I am not able to withstand the impulse to describe him according to the judgment which I formed of him in the midst of the dazzling power and the diplomatic reserve in which he had moved since youth.

It was still possible at that time to take M. von Metternich for a young man. His features were pleasing and entirely regular; his smile was seductive; his face expressed shrewdness and a kindly disposition. He was of middling stature, well built, and his stride had something noble and elegant about it. At the first glance one was pleasantly surprised to find in him one of those men whom nature has richly endowed in order

to insure them success in society. If, however, his physiognomy was carefully scrutinized, a certain malleability and yet firmness became noticeable; and upon observing his penetrating glance, no one could have any doubt of his extraordinary political talents. In him was recognized the statesman who was used to leading men and affairs of the greatest import.

In the course of the thirty years that M. von Metternich has participated in the gigantic upheavals which have stirred all Europe he has preserved the unusual versatility of his spirit, his extraordinary penetration, and his comprehensive understanding, which foresees events and directs them. His judgment, the fruit of long reflection, is irrevocable, and his word is final, as is fitting in a statesman who has confidence in the power of his words. Above, all, M. von Metternich is one of the best raconteurs of our time. There was a tendency to discard his political methods on the ground that they followed too much the laws of immobility. Surely a spirit as cultivated as his will have understood that it is not in the destiny of men to remain always at the same level, and that standing still in our century means nothing less than retrogression. But it is likely also that he comprehends well enough that upheavals are not always steps to progress, and that in leading men it is necessary to have con-

sideration for their habits and their actual needs. Even if the moment has not come for passing final judgment on M. von Metternich, contemporary history must content itself with placing beyond doubt the peaceful and cloudless good fortune which his calm and undisturbed leadership guaranteed the hereditary states of Austria. This good fortune, which is sufficient for him, justifies his claim to renown.

Accident had again brought me together with Baron Ompteda.

"What news?" I asked him.

"Everything is concluded, or nearly ready to be concluded. Europe has to thank the departure of Lord Castlereagh for the happy outcome of the negotiations."

"My lord was, therefore, the only obstacle to peace?"

"Far from it. For four months the delegates have conferred without coming to an agreement. Suddenly Lord Castlereagh is called to England to attend the opening of Parliament. You will understand that he could not appear there without at least bringing some news from the Continent. He therefore gave the negotiations a new turn, hurried the progress of the conferences, and sped up the results. Why have not the other nations also parliaments that must be opened?"



"The Austrian court goes on most complacently," continued the baron. "The European Congress has decided the fate of Naples and its improvised king, Joachim. The throne is to be restored to the Bourbons. It is probably known to you that the imperial chancery has determined not to make an official announcement of the death of Queen Christine for the reason that it did not know what title to give her. Now that obstacle is removed.

"Prince Koslovski has just confirmed the significant news that I had received this morning from Prince Ypsilanti. Napoleon has actually left the Island of Elba. The master and prisoner of Europe, as he has been called, fled from his prison armed with his fame, and entrusted Cæsar and his fortune to a light vessel." The highly placed judges of the Congress desire that this news shall not be generally known until they have adopted measures which are called for by the seriousness of the situation.

Either the secret was kept, or the whirl of amusements won a victory over this grave news, for the city of Vienna retained its usual appearance. The walls and the Leopoldstadt, which leads to the Prater, were filled with pedestrians, who longed for the first rays of the sun. Nothing suggested that the thunder-clap had reached

here; everywhere joy and a care-free spirit reigned.

Full five long days Vienna remained without further reports. The festivities and amusements continued as before. At last it was impossible to doubt longer; the thunder-storm broke. Napoleon was in France. This adventurer, as Pozzo di Borgo dared to call him, had been received by the French people. The soldiers rushed toward their general; nothing hindered his triumphal march.

The high personages happened to be gathered at a ball of M. von Metternich when the news of Napoleon's landing in Cannes and of his first successes arrived. The news spread with the speed of an electrical spark. The waltz was interrupted; vainly the orchestra continued to play. Czar Alexander approached the Prince de Talleyrand.

"I told you that this would not last," he said.

The French ambassador bowed with unmoved countenance and without answering.

The King of Prussia beckoned to the Duke of Wellington; both left the ball-room. Immediately after them followed Czar Alexander, Emperor Francis, and M. von Metternich.

## CHAPTER III

### TALES OUT OF SCHOOL

#### FROM THE NOTES OF BARON VON NOSTITZ

Karl, Baron von Nostitz, was a man of the world whose characteristics are clearly reflected in his notes on the Congress. He was concerned principally with personality, and had a wholesome contempt for the bickerings of the princes and the intrigues of the diplomats. He was born in Dresden, but his career took him into many fields. He was known as one of the tallest men of his time, and this led in part to his appointment as adjutant to Prince Louis Ferdinand of Prussia. He fought at the latter's side at Saalfeld, and when the prince was killed attempted to recover his body from the French; but in vain. In 1812 he fought in the Austrian Army as a major, and in 1813 joined the Russo-German Legion of the Russian Army. He attended the Congress as a member of the suite of the czar. He fought in the war against the Turks in 1828 and against the Poles in 1831. He was made a lieutenant-general for his services at Ostrolenka, and was wounded in the attack on Warsaw. He died in 1838.

## TALES OUT OF SCHOOL

VIENNA, *December*, 1814.

THE princes gladly throw off the restrictive etiquette of the courts, and seek entertainment at promenades and in little circles where outward show does not prevail, something that rarely happens in the events at court. Most often the Czar of Russia and the King of Prussia meet on the bastions at noon, and also at the soirées, of which they visit most frequently that at the house of Minister Zichy, although always unannounced. For these long evening visits the beautiful daughter-in-law of the house, the Countess Zichy, seems to be the magnet which attracts even the habitual coldness and reserve of the king; and following the example of Czar Alexander, he is often observed as most devoted to the women.

Emperor Francis lives in his own way, and appears only, as is customary, in public places, or where etiquette or his courtesies as host demand his presence.

Since the last carousal, moreover, the great court events have ended, and the monarchs meet now only at small affairs, to which one attempts to give an air of greater freedom by concerts, tableaux, and stage romances presented by men and women of society.

So far as the actual work and diplomatic progress of the Congress is concerned, it has not yet produced a single significant result. Secretly, hidden behind velvet and purple robes, antagonistic spirits fight one another with the daggers of intrigue.

Politics here also appears to be a matter of partizanship and petty greed, partly because of ill-will, more often because of the great difference in opinion of the negotiators who are assembled here. This makes them ill tempered and distrustful, and the princely spectators are more and more disinclined to unite in the field of diplomacy, where rights are attacked now by this one, now by that one, in a manner that would never be permitted on another sort of field. Therefore, the presence of the princes does not seem to result in any advantage, and if by a sudden and unforeseen turn of events it does not become as healing and rich in blessings as the light of the sun, the princes will have met for no good purpose, and will part with regret and disgust, with aversion and ill will against the ministers, to get rid of their venom at the first pretext.

The men who stand highest in this sinister fight in versatility of spirit and creative strength that continually devises new methods are Czar Alexander and Prince Metternich.

Years ago public opinion united to praise the just and upright qualities of Czar Alexander; called him a *rêve chevalier*, and by this complimentary term attempted to cloak a defect in character. Within the last few years the public had more and more arrived at a different view; the Congress has now confirmed this verdict, and the czar appears as a shrewd man with a serious object, losing much of his illusory character. His plan seems to be to confuse opinion by impartiality and apparent resignation, for he always shows himself at promenades and at other public places arm in arm with the most insignificant persons, whose only qualities are appearance and a youthful deference, and, despite all their outward graciousness, are known as narrow and inexperienced. To these belong Moritz Woina, who stands highest in favor, the little Liechtenstein, and other young men.

Metternich acquired so much cunning and subtlety in England that the Russians, whose czar lost his time there with the prince regent and the ministers, regard him as a very versatile and shrewd diplomat. Mystification is one of the natural attributes of this minister, for he often carries it to a disconcerting extreme in social intercourse, and has developed it to such a state of perfection in office that with gentleness and an



easy manner it offsets Austria's weakness elsewhere.

Talleyrand is less able to make himself felt, and it seems as if in our time we shall see all the glamour fall from the French. It is remarked that his politics is no longer worth anything, as it is not reinforced by 400,000 bayonets. Actually this minister has accomplished nothing, but by much clever intrigue he keeps separated parts [lands] which France would not like to see united. "I want nothing for myself," he said. "France also demands nothing; I am here only to maintain the political principles and to prevent their being attacked."

Despite this speech it is suspected that he carries instructions for some definite purpose, but he has not yet achieved any. Is it not worth believing that Louis XVIII sets store by putting the Bourbons again on the throne of Naples? Must one not think of that old interest of France—the desire to see itself surrounded only by petty princes?

Nesselrode might play a very important part in representing the point of view of his monarch, but the presence and personal activity of the latter places the minister in the subordinate rôle of an ambassador, who is everything only because of his master, and is ruled by him even down to his diplomatic notes.

The understanding and wisdom of the Portuguese ambassadors, Lobo, Saldanha, and Palmella, are universally praised. Possessing a great deal of information about each of their special interests, they enter into the discussion only so far as it relates to their own case.

VIENNA, *December, 1814.*

If one penetrates behind the smooth, deceptive exterior to the spirit that moves this elevated drama of the great assembly of princes, one finds vicious intrigue instead of frankness, envy in place of confidence, meanness in place of liberality. It is hardly known why the monarchs have assembled here. Some assert that it is for the restoration of the royalistic principle, and the resulting reintroduction into their countries of the lords who were unjustly forced out. This principle is to put Frederick August [King of Saxony] back on the throne. Russia, on the other hand, says, "*Que s'il y avait un malheur, il valait mieux celui de la dynastie que du pays.*" ["If there is a misfortune, better that of the dynasty than of the country."] The Prussians declare that it is not merely a case of the ruler, but also that of the country, and that the situation Saxony is in demands union with Prussia as soon as the loss of southern Prussia robs the country of its topographical center, on which the

basis of security both against the north and the west had been strongly built. Humboldt announced this military-political reason openly, Hardenberg and the king likewise had no other idea, and the Prussian people asserted their right to possess Saxony with such a display of pride and strength that in a recent memorial the king had the whole power of the country placed at his disposal for the acquisition of Saxony.

The Russian czar, following his own peculiar will, stands firm at the side of Prussia, which will not give up a single village. Prussia depends upon its own army of 260,000 men and a Russian army in Poland under Barklai, which is reported to reach 360,000 men, without the guards in St. Petersburg, and with the southern army of from 60,000 to 80,000 men under Bennigsen, and without the Cossacks.

In his naïveté Emperor Francis comments on all this political activity: "It is, after all, a pretty hard task to remove one regent from his throne."

Just as lively a controversy, and so far without result, is being waged over Poland. Many would like to let Prussia take the millions that it wishes from this land in order to remove the pressure of Prussia on Germany, and that of Russia on the west. Metternich has not only not reached his peculiar and secret diplomatic aim through the coalition, but Prussia and Rus-

sia have allied themselves in powerful opposition, and insist on the demand that will assure Saxony to Prussia and Poland to Russia.

"What a great rôle the Czar of Russia could play, what an immortal place could he make for himself in history, if he would complete the great equalization without looking at a few measures of land!" cries Austria; that is to say, if he would do everything that it asks.

Nothing has yet been done about Germany and its forthcoming federative constitution. A number of projects have been submitted, among others also one from Metternich for a confederation, which looks rather muddled. His basic principles are general representation under the condition of relinquishment of individual rights, in order to build up strength for the whole and a constitution of the states. Würtemberg and Bavaria, which egotistically believed that they would retain everything and add to it, protested strenuously against this interference with their sovereignty.

The king of Würtemberg departed on December 27, and bestowed thousands of ducats on cuisine, stable, and cellar; the snuffboxes also are rich without and mostly full within. "*Le plus gueux est le plus genereux*" ["The biggest scoundrel is the most generous"], says the maxim. If the other princes do this only by one

half, the Congress will end like those great gaming parties at which the servants alone are winners. To this group probably belong also the French dancers, among whom Mlle. Bigottini as *Nina* and Mlle. Aime excelled. They have departed; the former took with her 40,000 gulden in Viennese coin and a child, which Franz Palfy acknowledges, who guarantees the brat 100,000 Viennese gulden, and the mother a yearly income of 6000 francs. If any one does not find this sum sufficient, let him add the thirty-six years of Bigottini.

There are no more great festivals.

*January, 1815.*

It appears that things are going on in Italy in peace-time just as they did during the late war; every messenger who arrived from the Rhine with new laurels was met at the Burg by news of disaster in Italy. The ill-omened despatches have not yet ceased to come; inadaptability, formality, heterogeneousness, pretensions, and poverty are causes which are working against the new Government. Field-Marshal Bellegarde finally came to the belief that he could get security only by using force, and during the latter part of last year the troops were kept under arms for days. A conspiracy of General Lecchi, a political free-lance, caused the most recent ap-

prehensions, and it is also said that King Joachim [Murat] was concerned in it. All who come from Italy speak of the aversion of that country toward the Germans [Austrians] and of the agitation and striving toward independence. The discontented people would soon break their bonds if Austria was involved in a war, and then Murat would certainly make use of his advantageous military position.

*January 7, 1815.*

Nobody is satisfied here, and even the spectator wishes this existence to come to an end. Only God knows how and when that will be brought about. Daily new reports whirl through the city, heralding now war, now peace. To-day, the seventh, the olive branch is being exhibited; to-morrow, perhaps, will sound the call to arms. Russia wishes Poland, in order to pay the cost of the war; and wants to poise its iron heel in this country, in order to be ready to march westward. Prussia is disturbed by the friendship of Russia, is relieved by Russia's giving up its designs on southern Prussia, and demands Saxony on its part. It is easy to imagine how wit and dialectic cleverness support these demands, and how they are fought by Austria, whose protests are given weight and emphasis by the backing of France and England. This is the way it went on



in notes and now proceeds in oral conferences. Metternich talks about the principle of monarchical rights, Hardenberg about the welfare of the people based upon well-secured boundaries; and thus things will continue pell-mell until the sword is drawn, or, what is most likely, until a partition is made—the proof of mediocrity, miserable ally of necessity and weakness. *Plectuntur Achivi*, etc.!

I do not believe that war will result; it will not be kindled by the heated passions of the opposing groups. The tinder, however, will remain here, and will start the spark in a few years. The Prussians especially are very warlike, and Alexander does not seem to be averse to war. In the meantime clever politics is aiming for the predominating position, which Russia holds now not because it stands above the others, but among them, and therefore is able to direct the course of events by leaning one way or another, by its yes and no.

France views these manifestations with approbation and increases the difficulties, so that it can then come forward with a helping hand, which it could not do if it was foremost in the negotiations. England is wholly for Austria, and makes itself to be hated because of its politics by the opposition, and because of the inso-

lence and rudeness of its representatives by all parties.

With the others the situation remains as it was, and the Crown Prince of Würtemberg is restricting his group more and more. He also represents the point of view of another party, which would like to raise the Germans to power and itself with them, and which made such strong overtures to the people during the war.

Austria, or, rather, Metternich, who seems to have lost his way in his own labyrinth, puts much stress upon its power and its alliances; and when everything is taken into consideration, there are probably more troops distributed in the royal and imperial states than the monarchy ever had before. With all the reserve troops, its strength is nearly 500,000 men. Yet there were that many in 1809, and what part of that number was able to fight? Time and circumstances are more favorable now, but the spirit is still decayed, and the moral strength lies prostrate.

*January 15, 1815.*

The oral conferences are now attended by Wessenberg, at times Metternich himself; Humboldt, often also Hardenberg; Münster, Talleyrand, Castlereagh. This extraordinary ambassador appears limited in capability, and foreign as an Englishman. His wife, on the contrary, is

dressed entirely in costume, laughably theatrical, colossal and ungracious, plump and gossipy. She is the joke of society, and much like the hostess of the Congress.

Humboldt works with a great deal of profundity and industry; he is an excellent man to work things out, but he invents nothing, takes no great pleasure in ordinary affairs, and regards them in the ironic manner of the worldly wise man as manifestations of social intrigue, for society is his element.

Prince Repnin has returned to his more limited circle as adjutant. His ears now find the siren tones from Dresden less flattering, but he will always be assured of the affection of his friends and the recognition of his honest eagerness, even if, as a sacrifice to political enslavement, he bears the burden of being criticized as "lacking in knowledge and ability" in the most valuable year of his life.

Czar Alexander is devoting more than usual attention to his friendship with local women, so that even the Russian women appear to be displeased. He does not, however, indulge in any sultanic behavior, so that it may be said that the manners of the Viennese will not be corrupted by the Russians. The *aimables vainqueurs* have often made advances under the leadership of Czernischeff, but with little success, and many

a shout of victory has died down to nothing in the face of the invincibility of the Viennese women. The czar is probably the most easily satisfied; a word and a look seem to be sufficient for him. His gallantry has designated beauties: *la beauté coquette*, Caroline Scecheny; *la beauté triviale*, Sophie Zichy; *la beauté étonnante*, Rosine Esterhazy; *la beauté céleste*, Julie Zichy; *la beauté du diable*, Countess Sauerma; *la beauté qui inspire seul de vrai sentiment*, Gabriele Auersperg.

In addition to these women, who probably are among the most beautiful, there are others also capable of inspiring feelings according to mutual desires and needs. Among the young, blossoming, beautiful women are the Countesses Stahr-emberg, Wrzna, etc., who are lively, gentle, and as vigorous as life within the narrow walls of the city, by candle-light and with continuous dancing, will permit. The number of beautiful local women has been augmented by the new arrivals, and the older ones have by no means abdicated. Names of the most beautiful and gracious women of the capital of ten years ago are still found on the lips, even if not in the hearts, and among these are the Countess Lory Fuchs, the princesses of Courland, etc.

Poor Lory fights against growing old, and her battle would be less futile if the chests at

home were full of gold and paper, which pleases even more; but her evening salons are beginning to be attended less and less. I never cared for the princesses of Courland. Formerly they were merely women who asserted their sex with all the vivacity that their blood gave them. Youth, the love of variety, and their easy-going attitude in affairs made these pretty women interesting; for years their jolly career has been confined within the boundaries of Austria. This was due to the fact that they became thoroughly imbued with the local manner of thinking and acting, being drawn to the men first by their zest for life, then to the women by prudence; to-day it is difficult to tell just what these women are. At times they are feminine, at times masterful; then politically inclined, then sentimental; a bit bigoted, and then again frivolous; and this with such capriciousness and tediousness that one fears to go near them.

The Duchess of Sagan, regarded as the best, the cleverest, and most unaffected of the women, has been able to hold the admiration of her followers with the strongest ties. For years Prince Windischgrätz has been entrusted with her heart and her love. A liaison wholly within the sphere of exclusive society, without the allurements of a sacrifice, a contradiction; carried on in a quiet and every-day manner, which was formerly not

the custom of this determined woman. Jeanne is tiring herself with a Dutchman, Borel, who was a bright young knight eight years ago, but who has been so changed by nature, rich living, and the mustiness of the world that he has lost all courage and strength, and lies around on sofas and chairs like a masque thrown aside from yesterday's carnival. Pauline has attached herself more and more firmly to Wallmoden, after both had done a lot of looking around; he loves the woman madly with a sort of phlegmatic frenzy.

The Princess Bagration still maintains a salon where people meet on certain days. A beautiful, cultivated woman who loves life can always give her charms new brilliancy in such a manner.

The young Princess Taxis, the wife of Paul Esterhazy, is a new star in the Viennese firmament. She is a young, desiring woman with brilliant eyes and a well-built figure, often bored, because she seems to demand much. At such times she turns to the little Karl Liechtenstein, whom her eyes and her hand can always find. When the young man has recovered from the enchantment of his first surprise, she will probably find a way, and Paul will then be welcomed as a member in that great order of men for which he is now preparing with his waddling manner of body and mind.

The Countess Bernstorff rises far above the



foreign women by her very greatness. She possesses youth and brightness, but lacks grace, having been forced forward in the Danish manner.

There is a good deal of laughter at the peculiar appearance of the seven sleepers among the Englishwomen, who have come out of their mountain to the city that has grown strange to them. Lady Castlereagh is colossal and plump; her attire is always surprising, because it is so tastelessly overloaded; her manner wild and careless.

Lady Rumboldt is married to Sir Sidney Smith and has two charming daughters. It is a strange tribe, with other clothes and manners; but this country might well keep for itself the beauty of the younger daughter as a wonderful treasure. The girl has a skin like white velvet, on which glows the pink of dawn; teeth like pearls; a mouth like a rose; a foot like those in Paris; a tall and well-rounded figure as in Old England; and a pair of eyes that always say, "Come hither!" Prince August of Prussia answered their call with all the bustle and officiousness of his egotistical manner. The girl did not recognize the counterfeit coin which princes for the most part distribute, and now, when the coinage does not stand wear, she is disconsolate at the bad bargain, especially as she staked honest goods on it. This knowledge is good for the

highest bidder who now goes into the market; for with her agility and warmth she is not likely to lock herself up in the empty chamber of her heart. At a ball yesterday at Karl Zichy's I spoke a great deal with mother and daughter after the rear-admiral had introduced me.

"Tell me, Monsieur, were you really with Prince Louis? He is said to have been such a fine man. Does he resemble Prince August much?"

"You are making a mistake in inquiring of me. I was aide-de-camp and a war-time friend of Prince Louis, and I am therefore paid to be partial."

"But that does not prevent you from seeing, and all the world declares that there is a great resemblance between the two princes."

"In this case I must turn to some one who knows the two better than I, and who will say that Prince August is a caricature of Prince Louis."

That found its mark. At eight o'clock that evening the house was opened to me by the father and the mother.

Sir Sidney Smith is no Englishman in appearance and speech; he is known to the world for his deeds and his words. Of the numerous stars and crosses that he wears the one of greatest significance is a medal which the Bishop of

St. Jean d'Acre gave him after the defense of the fortress, with the words: "*Cette médaille est de Richard Cœur de Lion, nous la tenons de lui; nous la rends à son compatriote en souvenir de sa présence glorieuse chez nous dans la ville, où son roi a également porté sa gloire de son nom, il y a des siècles.*" ["This is the medal of Richard Cœur de Lion; we received it from him; I give it to his compatriot as a remembrance of his glorious presence in our city, to which his king also carried the glory of his name centuries ago."]

The ambassador Lord Stewart is an insolent Englishman, who appears to crush everything under his feet.

Among the old women who are misplaced in society, the Countess Festetics is especially singled out for attention by the Czar of Russia, not on her own account, but because she is the mother of the Countess Julie Zichy. In her own country she speaks Hungarian; in Vienna and wherever life may lead her unwieldy body, German. With difficulty the czar works his way through the strange words, even more laboriously than when he fulfills her need for consolation. Recently she was very sad.

"What ails you?" asked the czar.

"I have to weep. I hear that your Majesty wishes to begin war against us. That would be

horrible!" O innocence, how true and appropriate!

*January, 1815.*

Dancing is tiresome and is changing, just like everything else in Vienna. Formerly every one whirled about in the ecstasy of the waltz, and found refreshment in the quadrille and the *shot-tische*; now there is virtually nothing but the *polonaise*, which is danced by old women with the great lords through all the rooms.

In the theater pantomime has found its best interpreter in Bigottini; she presents passion in acting of the highest degree, has the noblest manner, and at the same time the most emotional expression. *Nina* is her triumph; in order to heighten the effect of her acting, it is said that she played the part of this insane girl so marvelously because of her love for the passion displayed at Duroc's death. Any one who has varied so much in love through frivolity and greed is not so powerfully shaken by death.

Reinoldy still excels as pantomimist in comedy, as, for instance, in the shy knight.

*January 20, 1815.*

The English ambassador Stewart gave a *bal paré* in honor of the birthday of the Queen of England on January 18. It was a brilliant assembly of rich men and women and high per-

sonages. The Princess Taxis, the grand duchess, and the empress appeared covered with jewels; the Queen of Bavaria also was not poverty-stricken. Everywhere was English comfort, but nowhere joy, which is ordinarily not absent where there is pomp and splendor. Among the local young women the eye is easily attracted by the young and pretty Countess Kobarty, because she once received a legacy of 500,000 gulden from her father.

The affection of Czar Alexander for the young Countess Auersperg grows more and more lively, perhaps because of the charm of her pure spirit. The Czar asked me at the ball given by the Princess Bagration, "*Si je connaissais d'ancienneté la princess*" ["Whether I knew the countess a long time"].

*"Je l'ai beaucoup vu chez son père, lorsqu'elle était encore enfant; elle s'appèle Gabrièle et elle est digne d'un Henri IV"* ["I have often seen her at her father's house when she was still a child; her name is Gabriele and she is worthy of a Henry IV"].

*January 22, 1815.*

Talleyrand has again been admitted to the present conferences at the request of Castle-reagh, so that Rasumowski (often with Capo d'Istria), Hardenberg (often with Humboldt), Castlereagh and Wessenberg, often also Met-

ternich, form the committee. In everything there is a marked agreement between England and France, and those who adhere strongly to the system of restoring the states to their former outlines place all the blame for the confusion in the Congress on the shoulders of Czar Alexander, who decided the fate of Poland on his own motion at Paris and made himself king of the new kingdom, so that Prussia was forced to turn to Saxony to indemnify itself for southern Prussia. Prince Czartoryski, who knows the intimate feelings of the czar from having been raised with him, is now called the moving spirit, who is impelled by the allurements of two crowns.

*January 24, 1815.*

To the diversions that one finds here belongs also the mass said on the twenty-second anniversary of the guillotining of Louis XVI. Talleyrand prepared for it in Stephan's Church, and it might be viewed as a poor piece of theatrical decoration.

Sometimes it seems as if a mighty spirit puts its imprint on human affairs in order to give the proper valuation to the true standards. Talleyrand was undoubtedly proud that with salvaged honor he was able to celebrate this day; I believe that he gave the feast more on his own account. It is true that he did not cast a vote [against



Louis]. Circumstances, which have been very advantageous to him, saved him from that; but a man can be judged by his works and not by his words, and we have but to look at the basic principles which moved the man of Autun to know that the head of Louis would not have been any more secure if he had been turned over to this man's judgment.

To the *mauvaises plaisanteries* regarding the present King of France belongs the following: "*Les Anglais ont nourri un cochon; les Français l'ont acheté pour Louis XVIII, mais il ne vaut pas I Napoléon*" ["The English raised a big hog; the French bought it for Louis XVIII, but it is not worth I Napoleon"].

*January 27, 1815.*

Austria was to present an ultimatum regarding Saxony at the end of January. Its content is already known; it was short and concise and declared briefly, "Prussia may count at the most on getting from 400,000 to 500,000 souls in Saxony; the rest go back to the despised king." Because of the manner in which this was expressed the note could be answered only by "Yes" from Hardenberg or "Vorwärts" ["Forward"] by Blücher [who was known as Marshal Vorwärts]. Just before this note was to be presented, an English courier arrived, who emphasized as most

important the sanctity of the agreements with Prussia, and brought very lukewarm assurances for Frederick August [King of Saxony]. Little attention was given to the prized principle of royalty [legitimacy] in the face of the political principle. Austria immediately withdrew from its position, and since that time the partitioning of Saxony has gone forward so energetically that the returning king will hardly retain a denuded branch. And yet in the end Austria may be regarded as doing everything possible for Saxony, despite the fact that it has started only petty intrigues. Prussia must be filled with rage and contempt.

Fear of war has wiped out the flames that were beginning to rise in England. So much the better for us. What the others do not wish to do we must do as soon as conditions are more favorable.

*February, 1815.*

The King of Denmark appears to me as the most comical of all the monarchs now assembled at Vienna not only because of his figure, but his whole being. He also would like to get something, waits from day to day for his turn to come, and in his person reproduces the whole ridiculous passivity of his cabine<sup>t</sup>

Think how clever the Danes considered themselves when the present king, then crown prince,

carried on his military foolishness in Holstein and attempted to strengthen his neutrality. The flaccid, narrow-minded cabinet meant that it could stand neutral while France and England fought, expecting both to protect Denmark's commerce because of their own interest. At first the matter really worked very well, and was not at all badly thought out by the elder Bernstorff; but when Napoleon began to make his war on commerce, when his armies occupied Germany, Denmark had to make a decision and could no longer procrastinate.

*February, 1815.*

At the ball of the Russian ambassador Stakelberg recently occurred an incident which astounded all those present. The Crown Prince of X—— [Württemberg?] suddenly began to call in a loud voice from behind the chair of Baron von Stein:

"He was once! He was once! The Crown Prince of X—— was once a most promising prince; his present conduct no longer fulfils that promise. Has your excellency heard that also?"

"Heard nothing whatever about it," replied Stein, brusquely.

"Surely the author reads his own writings," replied the crown prince.

Thereupon Stein jumped up in a rage and cried:

*“Mon Prince, c’était un propos insolent que vous vous êtes permis de tenir, et [raising his fist] gare à quiconque osera le repeter!”* [My Prince, that was an insolent act which you permitted yourself, and guard well against repeating it!”]

A short time later the crown prince came to apologize to Stein, or at least to make an explanation.

One would scarcely believe what pamphleteering miscreants there are now in Bavaria; their field of battle is the “Allgemeine Zeitung” of Cotta, and Marshal Wrede swings the torch most of all, a man who has wiped out the favorable impression he made in the last war by his proud, cold, and arrogant bearing, without having any external polish—everywhere except among the Austrians, whose need leads them to hope that this former disloyal Bavarian will make a good commander for the Austrian-Bavarian Army. The political stream that flows from the canal of Prince Wrede has its source to some extent in the sewer of General Langenau, especially that which concerns Saxony.

Another Bavarian general who clings to Austria is Count Pappenheim, a man who formerly served in the army and who as a real knight is

honestly paying back to his friends and to the world the debt that encumbers a proud name. Glad to be freed from French oppression, to which he acquiesced only with the greatest reluctance in order to save his fortune, he now acts harsh and insolently toward all persons whom his party regards as disturbers of the peace, simply because they do not approve the political distortions, and are combating the shams in their search for the substance. The German swash-bucklers adopted the same attitude in the Middle Ages; only the men who confused things in those days were the priests rather than the diplomats, who have come in our time. The knights were always the ones who bore arms.

*February, 1815.*

When one follows the princes from public into private life, he discovers that they live like other citizens in a proper manner with their own. The Empress of Russia is a great deal with her sister, the Queen of Bavaria; the czar, however, is often with his sisters, the Princesses Marie and Catharine, two very interesting women, one of whom attracts the mind and the other the heart of the brother. The Grand Duchess Marie appears delicate and refined, but always as if behind a mourning veil. She must be very susceptible to sad impressions from without; her

soul was long disturbed about the fate of her brother and of her fatherland.

Catharine seizes hold on life more forcibly, and makes its splendor her own in a truly masterful spirit. She has unusually beautiful parts, as mouth, figure, eyes of fiery brilliancy. Her mind is cultivated, wide-awake, and acute; her speech is not sufficiently feminine, coming more in sentences and phrases. In this princess I see Peter the Great, Catharine, and Alexander, and imprints of the times that followed them, mingled now glaringly, now softly. Through her union with the Crown Prince of Würtemberg two aspiring, commanding spirits are brought together, who wish to arrange the world according to their ideas. The project of taking command of that army of the empire [the German federal state], which is still slumbering far off in the background, is to be the first step toward power, which some day he would probably be glad to exchange for the imperial crown.

*February 8, 1815.*

While the progress of the negotiations was slowly going forward, the little princes shrieked like the ravens at the brook, and there was no foolishness imaginable that was not contained in their notes. All wanted to acquire something, and not only what they had—if, for instance, the



Peace of Westphalia was taken as a basis—no, not even that was sufficient for the hungry ones. Thus I had a discussion with the sixty-fourth [Prince of] Reuss, a young man of great depth and practical usefulness, on the reparation for the princes and their future rights. He immediately protested against the Treaty of Westphalia, and would hardly affirm the golden bull; these he considered interference in the rights of the princes. The cleverest talk this way. Now, what is to be done with these people?

Recently they spoke against all feudal obligations on their part to the greater sovereigns, but affirmed and even fought heatedly for those which their subjects had to have toward them.

## CHAPTER IV

### OF KINGS AND NOBLE LORDS

FROM THE REMINISCENCES OF THE COUNTESS  
LULU THÜRHEIM

Alexander and Frederick William—these are the personages who interest the Countess Lulu Thürheim, and she views them through the eyes of an Austrian woman whose life is a round of festivities at court, and whose ears hear the prattle of the queens and princesses and minor folk. The countess was born in 1788 at the castle of Orbeck in Flanders, and as a child fled with her parents into Westphalia to escape the vindictiveness of the French Revolutionists toward the *émigrés*. She presided over a salon at Castle Schwertberg in upper Austria and in Vienna, and when she came to attend the Congress she was an accomplished woman of the world, concerned not so much with politics as with personality.

#### OF KINGS AND NOBLE LORDS

THE features of Alexander [of Russia] are not regular, but despite this their whole effect is pleasing. The eyes lie deep, but betray wit and

vivacity; the nose is "à la Kalmuch"; the mouth small and well formed; and the teeth strikingly white. His figure is majestic, but he holds his body bent forward at an angle, probably because of his high, tight military collar, and he swings his body in walking in order to give the appearance of not being stilted. The expression of his features is a mixture of natural pride and an affability that is strange to him. His look is stern, but his smile is ravishing.

At first, when the czar begins to play his rôle, he appears to you as an original character; but when he lets himself go, you observe his mediocrity. Yes, he even makes the impression of a good fellow, and this also appears to be his innermost self. He speaks the French and German languages without the least accent. His conversation is not at all brilliant; since his arrival in Vienna not a single *mot saillant* [striking phrase] has been related of him; whereas in Paris, where he was idolized, a large number of bon mots credited to Alexander were repeated. He permits himself to speak at length only on military topics, and repeats at every opportunity the phrase "we soldiers," with which he tries to provoke Metternich, who is hardly a soldier. He is specially gracious to officers, and greets the simplest lieutenants with the distinguishing words, "Friends and brothers."

Alexander is unusually industrious; his secretary of state Nesselrode insists that there remains nothing for him to do. The politics of the czar, however, are not very complicated; they center on the desire to acquire Poland. Neither the opposition of numerous cabinets nor the devices of a Matternich, a Talleyrand, or a Castlereagh could swerve him an inch. It was believed that first out of lassitude and finally from impatience he would concede what at first he strenuously opposed. But if he is to be besieged for a long time, there is a possibility that his besiegers may die from hunger.

One day he said to Emperor Francis:

"I foresee that within two years we will declare war on each other if we are not able to arrive at an agreement."

Our emperor thereupon answered boldly:

"Not in two years, your Majesty, but at once, if that is your wish."

Knowing that he was in the midst of the seductions and love-affairs of the period of the Congress, we must wonder at the irreproachable relationship of Czar Alexander with the Princess Gabriele Auersperg, born Princess Lobkowitz, and of the King of Prussia with the most beautiful woman of Vienna, the Countess Julia Zichy, born Festetics. Gabriele Auersperg was a widow and had the reputation of a virtuous

woman; her beauty and her common sense, however, were regarded as highly mediocre. Scarcely twenty years old, she already had been a widow for two years. Good, simple, and modest despite her imperial conquest, she held the heart of Alexander in chains during the whole period of the Congress and also later.

Many Viennese women, who apparently did not understand the tactics of resistance, declared that the czar had never seriously attempted to capture this citadel; others declared derisively that the beautiful Gabriele deserved no praise, as she was cold and without passion. I am of the opinion that both groups deluded themselves. The fact that an attempt was made to enter the bedroom of the princess despite its bolts, and that an unostentatious piece of decoration was removed from the adjoining salon without anything else of value being stolen, stirred up a great deal of dust and put the whole police force into action. This attempt showed an audacity akin to insolence. As thieves have not the habit of breaking into the palaces of princes, watching before the doors of princesses, and carrying off a small porcelain vase instead of gold and silver, I, like every one else, laughed at this tale of robbery. The police did not catch a thief, and the door of the princess was not opened.

As for the indifference of the princess toward Alexander, there is an incident which proves what severe battles this beautiful woman had to fight with herself. On the day of the departure of the emperor a friend surprised her in her boudoir on her knees, bathed in tears. As the Countess Fifi Palffy-Ligne used to say in speaking of her youth, "*Hélas! ce ne sont pas toujours les remords, mais les regrets!*" ["Alas! it is not always remorse, but regret!"]

The King of Prussia is not the equal of Czar Alexander in understanding and character. Once in a time of misfortune he showed weakness and a lack of courage almost to abasement; now, in days of good fortune, he is proud, hard, unforgiving, and grasping. At the first conferences he demanded for himself 12,000,000 new subjects—namely Saxony. The injustice of such arrogance was pointed out to him in vain; it was vain also to attempt to indemnify him from another quarter. The good king calculated and considered, and as he could not find 12,000,000 subjects elsewhere, he demanded poor Saxony. The subordinate rôle which he plays beside Alexander is more like that of an adjutant than that of a king. He belongs to those characters who know how to endure abasement, but who feel oppressed by independence. Large, stiff, and cold,—the Prince de Ligne described him well



as "*figure d'arsenal*,"—the king speaks little and by fits and starts. His features have a certain regularity, but show an expression of misfortune, distrust, and hardness. The only interest which moves Frederick William is his sincere sorrow for his dead wife, whom he weeps for daily and to whom he would gladly tell all his thoughts and actions.<sup>1</sup>

Despite this great, sincere sorrow, the king had not become tired during the Congress of paying court to the beautiful Countess Zichy. It is certain that this attention can throw no shadow on the blameless reputation of the countess, and yet it appears to me, without wishing to detract from what is due both, that the battle of this virtuous woman cannot have been a great one in view of the coldness and tediousness of her admirer.

Prince William of Prussia affords amid this assembly of ambitious and egotistic human beings an example of old-time chivalry; I might almost say that he comes like a being from another world, like a comforter from heaven, to turn aside the threatening lightning which is

<sup>1</sup> Queen Louise of Prussia has become famed in history for her notable, but vain efforts, to mitigate the severity of Napoleon toward her subjects. It is commonly supposed that grief over the plight of her subjects brought about her death. King Frederick William instituted the Order of Louise in her honor, a decoration long awarded Prussian women for notable and self-sacrificing work during war.

about to descend and destroy corrupt humanity. He would be the good spirit of the Congress if he had a voice there. His countenance is angelic; manly pride and womanly mildness are combined there. He loves solitude, does not dance, speaks but little; but when he takes part in a conversation the person addressed feels that he has known and loved the prince a long time. He has been married for ten years to a princess of Hesse, a charming woman of heavenly virtues, and to her and their two children—twins—he gives all his love. Although he had devoted himself only to domestic happiness before 1814, he took up arms at the first signs of the uprising of his fatherland and became its hero. The king proposed to make him Viceroy of Saxony, but he considered this honor unjust and declined it. Upon his arrival in Vienna all the beautiful women fell in love with him; but when they saw that he favored none, they ceased to worry about him. Their places were taken by all the young people who were enthusiastic over the good cause. His conduct and his political views were exemplary, which could not exactly be said of the other princely personages.

I will relate an incident about the Princess Bagration which brings her perfidy into the clearest light. I learned it from the adjutant of the hereditary prince [of Würtemberg] himself, who

witnessed it. On the day of his departure from Vienna, Herr von Munchingen—that was the name of the adjutant—sat beside his lord in a carriage which was being driven on the road toward Purkersdorf. Both were asleep in order to make up for the time lost by rising early. Suddenly a voice cried, “Halt!” a woman pulled open the door of the carriage, demanded peremptorily that the astounded Herr von Munchingen descend, and commanded the coachman to “drive on.” All this occurred in a few seconds. The princess had seized the opportunity for a last tête-a-tête. The prince, however, caused her to leave the carriage at the next post, and she had to drive back to Vienna in her fiacre. The greatest perfidy, however, lay in the fact that the princess, upon entering the carriage, loudly directed the coachman to drive to the Princess Leopoldine Liechtenstein, a beautiful and blameless woman whom the prince had honored and on whom the Princess Bagration wished to be avenged. In the reports of the police the blame was undoubtedly placed on the shoulders of the innocent rival.

Among these resplendent and gallant princes the King of Saxony conducted himself modestly and humbly, a sacrifice to his fealty for Napoleon Bonaparte. Having lost the greater part of his lands, and robbed of his generals and soldiers, who had openly espoused the cause of the

enemy, he sought justice, or at least comfort, in prayer. Worshipers at mass and vespers often found him kneeling in a corner of St. Stephan's, wearing an inconspicuous brown cloak, beseeching the King of all the worlds to give him the necessary patience to endure the intrigues of the kings of the earth without complaint.

One evening, at the time of the English welcome, the Countess Hatzfeldt, a Saxon, visited the cathedral and found all places occupied. Her lackey, with the prayer-book of his mistress in hand, approached an unobtrusive man and offered him a copper coin for his place. The man did not move, whereupon the countess ordered her attendant to give him a piece of silver. The offered compensation, however, met the same reception. Angered at the egotism of the worshiper, the countess was about to give her name and thereby gain the right that was hers when her speech forsook her. She had recognized her king.

At the close of September the witty Marshal Prince de Ligne died. On his death-bed he remarked cheerfully, "The funeral of a field marshal is all that is lacking among the festivities of the Congress." With him passed one of the last of the *grand seigneurs*. He saw his end approach with the composure of a good Christian and a true nobleman, and, if the expression may

be permitted, he gave back his beautiful soul to his maker with the same deportment as he gave back to his emperor the cross of the Order of Maria Theresa.

Another more serious and more poetic festival was the anniversary of the Battle of Leipsic. After a great manœuver the officers of the various corps were served a dinner at innumerable tables in the Prater, while the soldiers gathered about great cooking-vats on the green. The sovereigns, princes, commanding generals, and numerous important personages dined in the riding-academy of Prince Rasumoffsky, in his beautiful palace on the country road. The academy had been attractively decorated with many trophies in the form of flags, and Rasumoffsky ceremoniously dedicated the place with this affair. Was anything more ideal than the triumphant assembly of the allies on this memorable day! Even if petty and egotistic feelings ruled certain selfish spirits and separated them, it is certain that the toast of Czar Alexander on the Battle of Leipsic found the unanimous approval of those who echoed it, and this expression of feeling was without doubt sincere and noble.

With proud contentment Rasumoffsky accepted the many congratulations of those who marveled at his festival and his new palace, little thinking that a fire would lay all these splendors

in ashes within the same year. He had given over years to its erection. It is true that there were more opportunities for him to give a number of beautiful and dazzling balls, but on the eve of New Year's, 1815, during a social affair the overheated pipes started a fire, and at dawn it had almost reached the bedroom of the prince. Awakened by the smoke, he was just able to save himself by fleeing to the garden. A whole wing of his palace, including a great number of the most valuable objects, was destroyed. The strength of character of the prince enabled him to suppress any show of feeling despite his severe loss, but this misfortune was the beginning of the breaking-up of his tremendous fortune, which was never again to attain its former size.

A few days later Metternich gave, in contrast to the festival of victory, a peace festival for the court and the city at his palace. All the women, led by the empress, had to appear in accordance with the program in a blue costume with a single garland of flowers of olives or oak-leaves in their hair. The halls and stairs were decorated with the same symbols. Nothing could have been more refreshing and more charming than this decoration, which even allegorically was in good taste.

The house of Metternich gave another ball at which the entire company appeared in the cos-



tumes of the various crownlands. My sister and I, as well as a number of our friends, had adopted the peasant costume of upper Austria, including the dark hood and the colored cloth across the black bodice. The costume, and especially that of the men, was somewhat idealized. During the quadrilles we were grouped in pairs, and our fresh young faces made a pleasing appearance under the hoods. We received a great deal of attention, and Emperor Francis declared smilingly, when he saw the costume of his favorite province, "Well, there are my stile-jumpers!" whereby he referred to the nickname of the peasant women of the upper Austria, namely, of the Salzkammergut, which was given them because the numerous lands and paths of that locality are cut off by hedges and fences over which stiles have been built. The costume of Lady Castle-reagh caused much amusement, for she had devised an original Austrian national costume. She wore the attire of a vestal virgin, with the Order of the Garter of her husband clasped about her head, and the device, "Honi soit qui mal y pense."<sup>1</sup>

The countess tells her own story of the theatrical performance at court, at which the news of Napoleon's arrival in France was first made known to the merry-makers of the Congress.

As a matter of fact, this terrible news had arrived a few hours before; it was being whispered on the stage, behind the scenes, among the rows of the parquet, and especially among those of the ministers and the gilded seats of the princes. These lords of the earth betrayed no feeling. With cheerful faces, lorgnon in hand, they acted as if they were following the drama most attentively. Yet many a darkened mien betrayed internal emotion, and the whispered remarks that they exchanged surely had more to do with the near future than with Olympus. Czar Alexander was heard to whisper into the ear of Emperor Francis, "I dispose of 300,000 men, which are at the service of the coalition at any time."

Those were words that could calm men if too many sordid passions had not depressed the Congress and caused mutual confidence to waver. Many a conscience, affected by its own conduct on this evening, must have had severe doubts of the sincerity of its neighbor, and many a pillow must have heard strange self-accusations. This was surely the case of Metternich; the report of his alliance between Austria, France, and England appeared even to have reached as far as the public.

For some time the icy coldness of Czar Alexander toward the chancellor had betrayed his anger. How easily the czar could have taken

revenge on the allies, and with Poland in his pocket as booty, simply have withdrawn from the coalition! The reappearance of Napoleon on the world's stage could not frighten Russia; it had proved that it could defend itself alone.

However that may be, Metternich hid his secret thoughts most skilfully, and opened the conference of the ministers on the following day as usual. Capo d'Istria, the representative of Russia, was late. A number of faces had already become long and drawn when the count finally arrived with a cheerful, composed disposition, carrying his portfolio under his arm. With a quick glance he took in the situation, and by keeping intentionally silent he celebrated a small triumph. (He described this to me with smiles several days later.) Then he spoke, and declared with fiery words that the czar placed all his strength at the disposal of the coalition against the common enemy. In a moment the expressions of those present became normal again, and every one followed the noble example of the Russian ruler. On this day Napoleon was declared an outlaw by humanity and turned over to general vengeance.

## CHAPTER V

### LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR THE PRUSSIAN POWER

FROM THE LETTERS OF WILHELM VON HUMBOLDT

Prussia is indebted to two men for the political development that eventually made it the preponderating power in Germany: Frederick the Great, who laid the foundations for the Prussian military system, and Czar Alexander of Russia, who put Prussia in a position to profit by the dissolution that occurred when Napoleon fell. A history written from the Prussian point of view would give credit to a host of other men, but it must be remembered that it was due principally to Czar Alexander that Russia gave Frederick William such strong support at the Congress of Vienna, and enabled it to prepare for the day when its boundary-lines would encircle all of Germany and confound the Austrian power.

Wilhelm von Humboldt, right-hand man to the Prussian chancellor, Hardenberg, at the Congress, gives an intimate view of Prussia's manœuvres there in these letters to his wife. Wilhelm was a brother of the famous naturalist, Alexander von Humboldt, perhaps the

most famous man of his time. His father was a major in the Prussian Army. He was primarily a philologist, and his presence at Vienna is for him an excursion into a field which was often distasteful for him. At one time he was minister plenipotentiary at Rome for Prussia. He held the post of minister of public instruction, and later, in 1812, that of ambassador at Vienna. In 1813, at Prague, he gained the adherence of Austria in the campaign of Russia and Prussia against France. He drew up the treaty between Saxony and Prussia in 1815, by means of which Prussia took over large portions of Saxon territory, a subject that caused a great deal of controversy at the Congress. He took part in the discussions on the federalization of Germany at Frankfort in 1816, and attended the Congress at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818. A year later he resigned from political life because he was not in sympathy with the reactionary tendencies of the Prussian monarchy. His work in the linguistic field was remarkable. He devoted much time to studies of the languages of remote peoples, and was famous also for writings philosophical in character, his correspondence with Schiller being the best known.

#### LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR THE PRUSSIAN POWER

*ZURICH, August 1, 1814.*

I AM very sad, dear, sweet Li, because I must again be separated from you for months; doubly so because I know that you are ailing and that

I shall not be able to think of you without apprehension.

To Vienna I go most unwillingly at this time, and yet rather there than elsewhere; for I feel that there will be much to do, and I also know that I shall be more able than any one else to perform what is possible, and naturally such performance draws attention to itself. On the other hand, I am just as strongly convinced that little good will be accomplished. Considering the men and the circumstances, it is virtually impossible, and I shall be fortunate if I can prevent anything detrimental from taking place.

Another thought that is distasteful to me is that it will be impossible for me to write you about anything of exceptional value. We have enough proofs of the dishonorable passion for opening letters to be convinced that none of our own will pass unread. Most assuredly I shall let no real opportunity go by for sending you news in a safe manner about what is going on; but if I should send through the mails letters that sound odd to you, remember that I do so particularly because I know they will be read.

It is really very necessary for me to discuss with you the details of my mission. I do this not because I know that it will please you, no matter how much this might be an impelling motive; but because you pass judgment so clearly, from such



deep understanding and such accurate insight into all the circumstances, that no man on earth would want to do without it. I know, and shall never forget, how enormously your counsel has helped me in the most difficult part of my present career, especially now when so many elements are working to bring about my downfall.

I have tried to make many preparations here. Above all, I am thinking of a strong union between Switzerland and Germany, which, however, is extremely difficult as Switzerland, sad to say, is no longer strongly German. Herein we reap the sins of the fathers who neglected all ties. I am making a special report to the king on the union of Switzerland with Germany. All this correspondence will help very little. Few have any predilection for these purely patriotic objects, which in the opinion of the majority do not really belong to the domain of higher politics. At the same time one must keep actively at work, even if only to please oneself and those who will run through the pages of old archives years hence.

There was probably never a time when it was necessary to guard with an iron hand the line between reasonable force and needed freedom, which is as necessary as the air. And speaking of the iron hand, I am reminded of a dictum of Napoleon which is one of the wittiest that a man

ever said and which you may not know. He said: "*Que le peuple Français demandait à être conduit par une main de fer avec un gant de velours*" ["The French people demand to be led by a hand of iron in a velvet glove"]. The worthlessness of a nation cannot be better described than that it needs the iron to be tamed and has not the courage to face it unless it is covered with velvet, so that the nation may be deluded by this smooth exterior.

Oh, I thank you without end, sweet child, for all the kindness and love and consideration that you have had in these days for me and have borne with me. I have been inordinately happy to be with you, I have suffered only because of your ailment.

With sincerest love forever your

H.

VIENNA, *August 10, 1814.*

I took breakfast with Gentz. You have no conception of what such a meal means. Before he even offered me anything he partook of everything. While I modestly drank two little cups of coffee without eating, he drank four and consumed two-thirds of a *solila* as big as a plate, which, you must know, is a piece of pastry in a sort of *patté*, which is steaming hot when opened and includes a large number of *kipfeln*, with but-

ter as thick as a finger. Temperance and moderation are noble virtues, and it appears to me to be an unfortunate provision in creation that eating and drinking are necessities and not simply pleasures, like whistling and singing.

In all things else Gentz remains as I formerly knew him. I always greet him with interest and regard even when I feel that others must be affected differently. I think I know him most accurately and that I have so characterized him in the writings dealing with my life which you will discover after my death. At present our views are more than ever in agreement and I am therefore doubly interested in him.

VIENNA, *August 14, 1814.*

It was agreed, as you will recall, that I was to be here by the fifth, and that I would then find my instructions from Berlin. I came at the appointed time in unbelievable haste. No instructions are here, however, and the best time is being lost, so that much will have to be made up later. I could have stayed with you so quietly and happily, and instead have to go about with men to whom I am indifferent in part, and of whom scarcely one interests me in the least. Naturally, that may change any day, but up to now it does not promise that.

The ordinary work of the ambassadors suffers

under similar handicaps. Metternich is in Baden, and is so remote from his work—lives for society, as you can well imagine—that it is virtually impossible to get a conference. Toward me he is favorable and friendly, likes to see me at social affairs, repeats what I say here and there; but as for business, he has the old prejudice, and calls me, as I very well know, too pedantic. What this accusation signifies you will know without any explanation from me.

Society is more inconsequential and more monotonous than ever. The endless bickering between the two Northern women [the Duchess of Sagan and the Princess Bagration], and the confusing gossip that this generates, is the lofty and worthy subject about which all thoughts and conversations turn. I do not mix in this affair in any manner, following only my former line of conduct; favoring the one without neglecting the other, and thereby merely suffering from ennui. Gentz did not have this discretion. He allowed himself to drift far out upon the stormy waters, and has virtually, if not entirely, become estranged from one of the two. Considering these circumstances, you may well imagine how glad I am that I shall be here only a short time. Because of this, Paris begins to look like a bright spot to me. It presents at least a great variety of interesting subjects; society does not demand

to be in one's confidence, and burdens one less with its pettifogging.

I am still looking for a place to live, and am still a guest at "The Roman Emperor." I make a habit of breakfasting with Gentz. I adhere to my simple cup of coffee, while he eats and drinks inordinately. In view of the enormous number of his needs and the paucity of mine, two men cannot be more unlike each other than we are.

VIENNA, *October 1, 1814.*

You close one of your letters with a remark regarding the inconveniences among which we live. We have to live here. Yes, sweet soul, these inconveniences have now reached their climax. I am sparing of my time whenever it is possible; for instance, I did not attend the display of fireworks in the Prater recently, for court duties, social courtesies, and formal calls are growing so enormously in number that I know of no other remedy than to apply myself every hour strictly to the business in hand. To do this I am determined, and I therefore keep my presence of mind, cheerfulness, and calm. There are tempests from time to time, but these have never caused me worry.

The Prussians here are most remarkably uncomfortable. You should have seen me drive to court last evening. I had a following of twenty-

five, which drew attention from all Vienna. It was the first circle in gala, but the crowd in the hall itself was so tremendous that the ceremony that every one had to perform simply consisted in standing motionless and letting the perspiration trickle from the forehead. Of my entire following I was able to present only five to the emperor, and I was one of the few ambassadors with whom the emperor actually conversed.

Count Münster experienced a most disagreeable accident yesterday. He, the perfidious one, was driving in the morning with Hardenberg in a hired cab to call on the Empress of Russia. Suddenly one of the rear wheels gave way, and the carriage toppled over. Münster felt internal pain, and it developed that he had broken a rib. I visited him last night. He complained about acute pain and was lying on his back; will have to remain in this position for several days. I could not look at him without a feeling of envy. There is a certain novelty in a situation of this kind—being suddenly taken from all this unrest and placed on a beautiful downy bed, unable to take any share in the blame for what may happen, and all because of the brittleness of human ribs! Condemned to inaction! It appears that I am destined to remain on my feet for some time longer, and I am reconciled. But if ever I



am placed in such a situation, you can well believe that I won't feel bad about it.

VIENNA, *November 2, 1814.*

My position here, dear child, is, as you would have it, most honorable, but not at all pleasant. I am present at all conferences and alone at many of them, and there is no question on which the chancellor does not explicitly ask me for advice; and as the chancellor works a great deal himself and possesses a most determined mind of his own, the false idea has become general that I am primarily responsible for everything that affects Prussia, and that I am to blame for all the opposition.

I am now also on good terms with Metternich. He could not really ignore me, especially as he feels the need of being sure of my views, and so he frequently coöperates with me in the best of spirit.

I do not get to see the king on business matters, which in the end is an advantage. It is hard to quarrel with him, especially when he is not of my opinion, and in view of the present circumstances, this must often be the case. Yet I see him virtually every evening in society, and he is always very friendly to me. In view of all this I have no complaint to make.

But our task goes slowly and badly, and at

this moment it is not even possible to see the outcome. The danger-point of it all is Russia, or, rather, the czar's idea [not the Russians'] about the Poles; and although he has no opposition, he wishes to keep the biggest part of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw for himself, without even giving Prussia and Austria a suitable frontier, and intends to crown himself King of Poland. Both plans are dangerous, and should not be tolerated; and the oddest thing of all is that his motives are really less ambitious than philanthropic, and that he simply possesses ideas that have been badly applied.

The case of Saxony is settled, as England and Austria are on our side, and only the public conference on the subject remains to be held. Everything, however, is still related to the first main point, and the fact that this is delayed has advanced everything else.

In addition to these important negotiations, a Congress has been called together here through an indiscretion in the Treaty of Paris. A whole lot of useless formalities have been hung about our necks, all of which is not at all a matter of indifference; for France and Spain, which otherwise have nothing to do, are eternally busying and tormenting themselves with it. With the Congress as an excuse, France pursues another object—that of getting its hands on affairs which

evidently must be set aside for the decision of the other powers. This discloses many of the evils brought about, because many things have been postponed from one epoch to another; now things can no longer be postponed, and no one knows how to get out of the predicament.

During the whole war unhappily only the downfall of Napoleon was kept in view; his own powers were underestimated, and everything was seized with avidity which could in any manner make the object surer, and anything that might have kept his fate in doubt was removed. Therefore an agreement on Poland was not reached with Russia at the only opportune moment, and the right attitude was never taken toward Bavaria and Würtemberg. All this now avenges itself ignominiously, and obstacles come up where otherwise there might have been a smooth road.

Caroline to Humboldt:

BERLIN, *November 7, 1814.*

The intentions of the Czar of Russia toward Poland are said to be known in France, and I heard about them at Mme. de Staël's, who could not hide her joy at them. Every one with French sympathies idolizes the Czar of Russia, because once he was exceedingly flattering to French vanity; also the French know his philanthropic ideas toward the Poles, and probably have a secret

hope that a new war will develop in the North, during which it might prove possible for them to start new mischief.

In Germany I found only one verdict on Saxony wherever I heard the matter spoken of. There was no mourning for the king; only a fear that Prussia might change the constitution. Saxony's nationality can exist, I think; as, for instance, Hungary's nationality has existed for so many years with relation to the Austrian.

Everything will depend on how Prussia conducts itself in Saxony, and its politics must be directed with a view to lightening the burdens of the country wherever possible, honoring its constitution, and instituting the changes which cannot be avoided in the mildest and most reasonable manner. The choice as executive in the administration of Saxony of Minister von Reck, who is supposed to be almost in his second childhood, is recognized as a guaranty that nothing will be changed or put into force precipitately.

The desire for representative forms of government seems to be general in Germany, and if after the close of this Congress Prussia should lead with this example in Germany—it is indisputably the driving power of human desires—it will have reached the foremost place in peace as in war.

Apropos, the daughter of Hubers has obtained

a divorce from the young man whom she married six or eight months ago because the two could not agree on the question of the German and French temperaments.

VIENNA, *November 7, 1814.*

Dalberg did not dine with me. He had an engagement. However, we had a talk together. He asked about you, and we actually talked on political subjects entirely on the strength of our old Erfurt understanding, which enabled us to tell each other the bitter truth. Thus he recently discussed Saxony with me, and our conversation led me to say that I considered our plan entirely just. With an irony of his own he wanted to consider this an official comment. Thereupon I said to him that I was known for and had proofs that I acted in all transactions strictly in accordance with my views. I added that I hoped this might always be the case with those who spoke with me.

At another time he wished to blame Prussia for the downfall of the old German Empire. At first I remained silent, for otherwise I would have had to say unkind things about his family; but as he would not refrain, I told him that it was solely his uncle who had delivered the empire to the French. He takes anything, and we always remain on the same footing.

VIENNA, *November 9, 1814.*

There was a large masked ball last night at Metternich's, which is said to have been very pleasing. I did not go, but remained at home to work. I hate these social affairs unto death, and there are now more important tasks to perform.

The principal difficulties are made by the really unjust demands of Russia, which are dangerous to the peace of Europe. I do not need to remind you of the painful and delicate relations that Prussia, and especially her ministry, bears to this question. I conduct myself with as much caution and shrewdness as possible, but I will remain faithful to my principles and will act with greater firmness. I do not fear this time that I shall have to resort to extreme meanness, as was the case in Prague. Yet if this became necessary, I would not fear it. I will defend my personal independence always and in all circumstances.

German affairs are not developing any more favorably. The conference between Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Hanover, and Würtemberg was first begun. This could not well be different, but according to my proposal, this business should have been finished before the arrival of the sovereigns. The delay has made everything worse. Bavaria and Würtemberg are hard prob-



lems in themselves, and the remaining princes are holding popular assemblies of their own, in which opposition is developing that will always make more or less difficulty if we get as far as a discussion. Thus every one goes his own way, or at least attempts to, and the force or understanding which should hold the whole fabric together is often sought in vain.

I must close, and go to the King of Würtemberg for a private audience. He most naïvely caused me to be informed that he would like to know me, just as if he had not known much about me before, and suddenly heard gossip about me at the Congress. Even Talleyrand informed me some time ago "*Que j'étais un homme terrible.*" So you see that I am not insignificant to these men.

Caroline to Humboldt:

BERLIN, *November 17, 1814.*

You probably do not know, as you are in the heart of things, how the work of the Congress is being watched and looked forward to from all sides; but having just traveled through a large part of Germany, I have heard it discussed everywhere. If the foolish sovereignty of the princes of the former confederation of the Rhine is not abolished and the rights of the people are not protected from these petty tyrants, you may

be sure that conditions will not remain quiet in Würtemberg, Baden, and Darmstadt. The people are deeply embittered and severely oppressed, and the latest war has enabled the people to visualize their wants.

Please tell me in a word when you have the opportunity whether the Holsteiners have made any attempt at the Congress to avoid the obligations of the Danish royal statute which was so unjustly forced upon them, and whether they do not wish to return to a closer union with Germany. In this city there are reports that England means to exchange Hanover for Denmark. However, this may be town talk, like so much else. Since yesterday there have been reports that as no agreement can be reached on Poland, we shall get back the greater part of our former possessions in Poland, as well as a strip of Saxon territory running from Würtemberg and Torgau, the remainder to be returned to the King of Saxony.

VIENNA, *November 13, 1814.*

France is wholly opposed to Russia and her ideas regarding Poland and also wholly against Saxony. If we really have to decide to stand either with Russia or Austria and England, I should be so strongly inclined toward the latter point of view that I should support it with all my power. Here is a deep secret: I have made

a German memorandum on the subject for the king which probably will not please him.

Caroline to Humboldt:

BERLIN, *November 26, 1814.*

If our Saxon plans should fail, as is reported here in Berlin, I must admit that this would be serious; for all the good feeling that has developed between us because of our favorable attitude would then be turned into the most repellent hatred and bitterness. Nothing is worse than not to succeed in your aim. And viewing it from a wider point of view, where is Germany to get its security in the future if this country [Saxony] is not united with Prussia? Is it possible that Bavaria, which dares to have and to honor a Montgelas, will be Germany's protector?

Surely Prince Eugène de Beauharnais will receive nothing from Germany?

Caroline to Humboldt:

BERLIN, *November 28, 1814.*

Your statement of to-day about Saxony coincides only too truly with what is being discussed here by the public. I confess freely that I should be greatly chagrined if we did not receive it. As things appear to me, the king cannot well retreat; I mean our king. It would not be regarded as magnanimity toward the King

of Saxony, but as a weakness of our own, a desire without the ability to carry it out, which of all lines of conduct is the most disastrous and least of all befits that land and that king which among all the countries and all the princes of Germany acted most gloriously, and to which Germany in effect solely owes its liberation from the French yoke. I know that all the other states took part, and I do not wish to dim their glory, yet Prussia has been the heart of this great undertaking—the heart that throbbed with all the pulsation of life.

If Saxony does not become ours now, it must be remembered that we shall have a most resentful and embittered neighbor, whereas wise and liberal treatment would unite us with this country in a few years. All those who think rightly throughout the whole fatherland will have been robbed of that moral guaranty for the future which alone they can find in Prussia's enlarged and consolidated power.

Leniency toward the King of Saxony in this case I should consider weakness; but this seems to be a case in which his whole treasonable conduct must be disclosed before the world. A prince who has acted as he did cannot be trusted with the central point of Germany; and also it seems to me that we cannot consider the descendants of princely ruling families as we consider

the descendants of ordinary private persons. Were there an empire and an emperor of Germany, I believe that the King of Saxony would be liable to be deposed. The fact that there is no emperor does not free him from princely obligations toward his country, and that he has acted against its interests can, I believe, be proved.

The Kingdom of Hanover, I must confess to you, displeases me much. Not only because of the far-reaching plans which perhaps are associated with its future, but because of the imitation there of the silly French nobility. This looks like a bestowal of high rank among great lords. It seems to me that one of the first steps should have been to ask the princes who had been raised to high rank under Napoleon, like those of Bavaria, Würtemberg, etc., voluntarily to give up their titles as something polluted and to reassume their former names. Names are not such an inconsequential matter. Surely it would be of great importance to us to remove as many traces of Napoleon's rule in Germany as possible. Oh, the scars of misfortune which that detested rule brought us will not be healed over very quickly!

To cling to any souvenirs of those times, to wear the orders and the like, appears to me as if

one continued to wear the clothing of the penitentiary after release.

I assure you that despite my joy at being here, where, it seems to me, the clearest political atmosphere exists, I am still often regretful that I am not in Vienna in order to cheer you up now and again for a quarter of an hour at your work. For, without doubt, seeing so many persons must give one a distinctly disagreeable feeling.

Gentz seems to be in bad odor here. A foreign woman who is about a great deal and listens everywhere said to me yesterday, "I hear that one of our most active opponents in Vienna is Gentz and that he goes to great pains to keep Prussia down." I do not know whether I told you in Bern that once last spring he said to Jeanne [Duchess of Acerenza] when the allied armies had already entered Paris: "Well, when we get to the negotiations, my greatest effort will be to put Prussia into obscurity." And when in February, 1814, Blücher had his unfortunate affairs, he blamed the "vain Prussians" and their foolhardy acts with real satanic cheerfulness.

The best uplifting influences of our time have not reached him. To me he has become most objectionable because I felt this about him, and in his oratorical efforts I hear only bombast and nothing that moves me deeply. Look well at him. Does he not appear to you like a ghost?



I do not mean to infer that he has aged, but how much like a hollow shell he looks! Do not trust him!

VIENNA, *December 4, 1814.*

The problem of Saxony is principally whether the old king is to be allowed to keep a small part; and even that I think should not be the case. Naturally, we are being opposed most severely, and our task is not yet at an end. What you say about this and about Prussia is right. It is really more humiliating for the others than for us that are here at the Congress, and especially among the German princes, Prussia is suspected, slandered, and almost made out an enemy; so that it is considered dangerous for Germany, and favor turns to Austria.

I see very little of Gentz; I might say hardly anything. Since I came to Vienna there have been only two things that lead me to him: the first, the use I could make of his well-known characteristics, and then a certain inclination that he showed toward me, despite the fact that, if I do not love and respect a man for other reasons, I am often ungrateful and mistrustful, as has so often been justly charged against me. The Prussians are all against him, and thereby confirm your opinion. Stein recently said to me, after an interview with Gentz in which the latter thought he had again made friends with Stein:

"What would you? He admits my contention in everything because he fears me. He is a man with a dried-up brain and a decayed character." The chancellor does not trust him and is not friendly to him.

VIENNA, *December 8, 1814.*

I do not doubt Paris. Yet sometimes it seems to me that things may turn out entirely different, and when I meet Talleyrand a strange feeling comes over me. Outwardly we are actually friendly toward each other, but at bottom there is a serious tension. I have actually had only two interviews with him as long as I have been here. A long one before dinner at Stackelberg's about Saxony. It began coldly and ended so. In a second talk he described how gladly France would like to have good relations with Prussia, praised me and my reputation, as well as Alexander's, and then directed my attention again to Saxony, saying it was an unjust situation, and that my whole reputation would be blasted because of it. Thereupon I had to answer in a manner that did not bring us any nearer in friendship.

Caroline to Humboldt:

BERLIN, *December 12, 1814.*

It is disconcerting to find that the German princes lean more toward Austria than toward

Prussia, but I realize that there are two reasons for this. Metternich undoubtedly is busy with his intrigues and machinations in every possible manner, and the fact that the meeting of all the princes and ministers is being held in Austria's capital gives him an unmeasured advantage over Prussia. On the other hand, the princes and ministers are prompted by their own vacillating and often not purely German spirit to draw closer to Austria than to Prussia, for an inner voice tells them that Prussia will be much more earnest and severe with them than Austria.

Meanwhile I hope, and know in part, that the people do not agree with their princes, and it is my hope also that the spirit [of German liberty and unity] which brought about this last war, is still powerful and guides the course of the world.

BERLIN, *December* 14, 1814.

Good Lord! do not consent to let Frankfort become Bavarian! It is such a famous city, where the German emperors used to be crowned. When the armies, or, rather, the monarchs went there, they promised the city its freedom. The proposed action would have a bad effect everywhere. Bavaria is hated intensely evrywhere except in its old provinces. It makes me feel badly enough, because it seems that we are not getting Ansbach and Bayreuth back.

VIENNA, *January 5, 1815.*

The chancellor is not at all well; he dined alone to-day, not with us. You cannot believe what anxiety I have for fear that he might get so ill that he could not carry the negotiations to a conclusion or even die. There would be no one left but me, and I could think of nothing worse. It would be a misfortune for the Saxons and a shocking situation for me. Therefore I cannot deny that I am worried. The poor old man does without everything that he loves. He is irritated beyond measure at what takes place, sees all his hopes unfulfilled, and this affects himself and his body. He cannot sleep; he walked about in his room until two o'clock last night, then worked until six, and was sleeping in his chair when I left him two hours ago.

Then the chancellor also strains himself needlessly, lives all day in an atmosphere of work and passion, or in general good fellowship, which is resting; but does not lift you out of yourself. Personally, I would lose everything in him; for he is so good and friendly to me, and I love him as I do hardly another man with whom I come into business contact. Do not speak about his illness; he does not like even to admit it here.

If the Congress comes to a peaceful end, the ambassadors will naturally receive snuff-boxes. They are most hateful to me. I abhor nothing

so much deep in my soul as private advantage for things which are done for the good of the whole. Yet, if there is no rupture, this will be the practice. Our large conferences include eight powers; counting only these, I shall ostensibly receive seven boxes. What shall I do with them? The stones would presumably be enough for one to make something beautiful out of, and at the same time provide you with jewels; as for money, eight boxes would bring from 20,000 to 24,000 thaler. Adornment does not mean much to you, yet I would also like to have you own diamonds. Tell me what you think of it.

Caroline to Humboldt:

BERLIN, *January 12, 1815.*

I do not exactly know what to say about the possibility of having gems and the likelihood of getting them as gifts. There are probably a number of occasions in your career at which it would be pleasing if I had gems, but they do not compare with the real use that the money would give in our situation. We still have many debts, and as we are absent more and more, it is important for us to get entirely free of them. Then I also find that in conditions such as have obtained in our fatherland, and which may come again, even if in a different manner, it is far nobler not to have adornment. I believe also that in the

future men will give more pleasure to girls by presenting them with property that is free of debt than a collar of gems.

There is quite a little talk here about you and the chancellor. He is said to have been indisposed four or six weeks ago, and the story is told that the king said, "Things don't seem to go well any more with the chancellor; I shall have to keep Humboldt with him."

VIENNA, *January 17, 1815.*

I was surprised at the king's remark that you wrote me. A thing of that kind is not easily invented. I should like to know what he thinks of me now. When I rode to meet him on his arrival I was with Knesebeck. He started a political conversation, and Knesebeck carried it on so awkwardly that the king began to argue in an unpleasant manner; and the situation became serious. I kept out of it as best I could, and was not always able to agree with him; nor, on account of the other man, could I turn the conversation. This was my last talk with him. He has never called for me here, he never asks any one when he is dining in his room, and he dines alone now, and has his own cook prepare his meals. The imperial [Austrian] cuisine and wine are said to be horrible.

I might have made attempts on my own ac-



count to visit him, to go with him, but I have avoided that. Things are not in good shape for the most part; according to my conviction they went differently than they should. You will understand that I cannot talk about that with the king.

VIENNA, *January 30, 1815.*

Since the departure of the last courier I have written you twice, dear Li, without numbering my letters.

I am certain that our letters are not opened; your seals are always of dazzling beauty. Yet I would not necessarily depend on the seals, as one may be mistaken. But it is so decidedly against the character of the chancellor, and could not take place without his knowledge, that I would never permit myself the least mistrust on the subject. At any rate, it is immaterial to me.

Caroline to Humboldt:

BERLIN, *February 4, 1815.*

Do be careful in your relations with the Jews. I do not consider it fitting to remove all restrictions and suddenly to place them in a position to enjoy all civil rights. Everything which comes naturally comes step by step. Why shall the Jews become *salti mortali*?

VIENNA, *February 5, 1815.*

I maintain that the affairs that interest us the most will be settled soon and still think that the sovereigns will leave this month. The matter will not be entirely satisfactory, as Saxony is still being divided; most probably we shall not get Leipsic, although Würtemberg and Torgau, and because nothing is right and nothing is whole. Nevertheless, we shall have 10,000,000 subjects; about 2,500,000 around the Rhine, counting our old Westphalian provinces, and 7,500,000 around the Elbe, Oder, and Vistula. For in actuality we now have two Prussias; but it will not remain so in the long run. What is out of plumb seeks to right itself.

The undertaking with Austria is deeply buried, according to my view. Metternich's conduct has implacably embittered the king and the chancellor. Both have just and true natures, entirely the opposite of his; but they do not have my tolerance, and I often say to myself that an alliance with Austria against France might never have been effected if I had always accurately described Metternich's conduct at that time, and had not looked at the best side of everything and taken the whole success of it upon myself. Now we have been too directly in communication, with the result that the eyes are often opened more than one wishes and sometimes more than is benefi-

cial. With all his faults and partly because of them, Metternich is more useful and leans more toward us than the others—Stadion, Zichy, Schwarzenberg, Langenau,—and much can always be done with him. But now that is past. Krusemark will not be able to bring it about, and even I was not able to do it. That is the saddest result of the Congress.

We are in better relations with Germany than formerly. The little ones are beginning to have confidence in me. I do not neglect anything in this direction. Prussia must have the most important influence on Germany, though—and this I always preach—not as a power that uses coercion, but that wins Germany of its own free will. That with which we distinguish ourselves the most is our protection of the mediatized houses; yet this does not give us the friendship of certain princes.

VIENNA, *February 8, 1815.*

I am writing you, dear Li, in Metternich's conference-room, surrounded by all the plenipotentiaries, now including Lord Wellington, at the moment when the last conference on the negro slave-trade is to be held. To-day happens to be one of those days on which it is impossible to steal half an hour, and so I must beg you not to be angry with me if I send you only a few hurried words.

Our affairs have been completely agreed upon since last I wrote you. At least that is the outcome of conversations between Hardenberg, Metternich, and Castlereagh, for we shall not have a conference on this subject until to-night. Leipsic is not ours, but Görlitz, Seitz, Naumburg, and Weissenfels have been added to the cities—about 900,000 souls,—and according to area we receive more than half. Thuringia and the two banks of the Saal we get entirely, and Schwarzburg is also under our influence now.

You know what I think about the whole of this agreement. The old Metternich [father of the Austrian chancellor] among his famous *dictis* once included this one: "*Cette affaire, comme toute affaire, finira d'une manière quelconque*" ["This affair, like every affair, will be disposed of in some sort of manner"]. And just as this is spoken in the deep equanimity of the father, to whom everything in the final analysis is immaterial, so the son acts; and thus has come about what has now been done.

Yet Prussia is not actually suffering. It is about to be restored, and that part of Saxony cannot escape it in the future; and in Germany we surely shall be victorious.

VIENNA, *February* 12, 1815.

At last, dear Li, I am writing you again at my desk, although I am still greatly occupied and bothered. Castlereagh is departing in the morning, and we are trying to make this circumstance the excuse for trying to complete as much as possible so well as we can. We signed everything last night that affects Saxony and Poland, and to-night will continue with the other affairs. The King of Saxony has been called to Presburg. He is to sign there. Whether he will do so remains to be seen. I would not do it. The partitioning of Saxony is too disastrous a thing for that country to permit a seventy-four-year-old man to bring such a curse upon himself.

This recalls an anecdote that Wrede recently told me. When Wrede came from Russia in the year '12 he told the king how things stood and advised him, most earnestly, so he declares, to take his measures accordingly. The king, however, replied: "Let him [Napoleon] alone. With his genius he will soon help us out of the difficulty." And this man is to rule again! Unhappily, it is true. It seems that things are never to be done justly, and this object is easily and wholly reached. The outcome of the affair will make a much greater sensation because it will come most unexpectedly. At least Körner wrote me on the first, and seemed to be wholly uncon-

cerned about a partition. I will send a few words to him to-day.

It was a pretty pass for the chancellor to say to me, immediately after it was decided that Saxony should continue to exist, that now we would have to take Körner into our service.

For us the present arrangement, although not necessarily the best, is still so much better that it would have been most unjust for us to prefer war or a long continuation of this uncertain situation.

Just consider that the monthly cost of the army when merely on a war footing is over 2,000,000 thaler.

The advantages which we have gained, in addition to the fact that we get our population of 1805 back with an increase, are:

1.—That we retain all military points in Saxony and Thuringia without exception.

2.—That the states on the Rhine receive an extent and a form which gives this part of the monarchy about the same population as the whole Prussian monarchy had at the beginning of Frederick II's reign; that is, when we take into account what we possess on both sides of the stream, and add only the little, mostly media-tized princes, who will still belong to our system and to our army. If we received all of Saxony, the above state would clearly be much smaller, partly decreased by alternative reparation that



was to be given the King of Saxony in Westphalia.

3.—That we have not suffered, and that mediatized princes, as in Bavaria and Würtemberg, have been ascribed to us as subjects. In the first place this gives us the friendship of all the mediatized princes that are politically united with us, and, secondly, these mediatized groups count politically and militarily with us, and therefore are a real addition not in income, but in power. You also cannot imagine how much popularity we have won not among the princes of the Rhine confederation, but among the oppressed ones and the others. Austria, Metternich, and Wessenberg help us along in this.

It is clearly seen now that Austria is not at all interested in Germany, but simply likes to have it appear so. Metternich talks to no one on earth and is actually inaccessible. Wessenberg is also very busy and has too little influence to counteract this exclusiveness. I see all persons as often and long as they wish, invite them to come again when I have to refuse them, and answer even the most insignificant billet; and even if the chancellor is not able to do all this, he invites every one to dine not merely to stiff dinners, but to his dinners at home. As many can come as wish; others he invites and then talks. We are never

less than from twenty to twenty-four persons at table.

Weimar had placed itself wholly on our side. It assumes the grand ducal title. This was signed yesterday. There were no difficulties in the way. It was signed at once; I urged it and accomplished it. The duke will also get an increase [in territory]. I am glad of everything that helps him. He was always most friendly and forbearing even when we lived at the "Elephant" and really needed some consideration. God! what a wonderful time, and how much has gone since then, been broken up, destroyed!

Orange will assume the kingship.

I will not take your time to tell what Prussia is actually to receive, for by the time this letter reaches you this will be in the newspapers.

It hurts the king a great deal because we did not get Leipsic; this was a point of honor with him. In this he is right. Yet this was a condition made by all the powers, who would not have signed otherwise. One idea, however, the king will put through. Together with Austria he will ask for a spot on the Battle-field of Leipsic in order to raise a monument on it, and to dedicate a home for invalids for warriors of all the nations who were wounded in that battle. It is really a fine idea.

You cannot comprehend how Metternich is

losing ground in all these transactions among many delegates, a large number of whom are not simple-minded, and to whom parlor tricks no longer count for intelligence and talent. At a large session of twenty deputies recently, the first attended by Wellington, things went so far that a man had to be ashamed of being a German. Metternich had kept the report of the Swiss committee in his hands for five weeks, and despite the fact that his representatives had sat in the committee, he brought it up with important and unexpected changes that had been made not by himself, but by Wessenberg; and when he was asked about them, he could not even give an intelligent reply for the reason that he had read neither the report of the committee nor Wessenberg's changes. Nobody knows what an effect is produced by such conduct.

In the latest conferences even Talleyrand has been with us and against him, because he at least has system in business affairs and knowledge of them. Metternich either does not notice this or does not wish to. In reality the illusion does not leave him, and I am firmly convinced that he regards himself as the most clever and versatile of all, yes, as a man with whom none other can be compared.

In addition to that, Wessenberg does not dare to say anything, and the difference between the

way Wessenberg has to conduct himself with Metternich and I can work with Hardenberg must be clear to every one. Metternich always looks me up in society and jokes and tells stories as much as ever. This, however, merely proves his absolute lack of feeling, as he is not even capable of hatred. For I know that it has become a habit for him to blame me whenever things go wrong for him and to revile me, and to comfort himself with the thought that he will one day play a good trick on me, which, however, will be rather difficult.

VIENNA, *February 23, 1815.*

We now know that Berlin is most dissatisfied with the arrangements that we have made. In most of the letters the blame is placed on the entourage of the king and principally on me. Tell me, do you hear the same thing? There is nothing to be done about it. In life we have to balance unearned blame with unearned praise. I know how everything came about, but what does that help?

Prussia is now the greatest German power, about 8,000,000 Germans; therefore a war power in Germany of 240,000 men, and the first war that comes must increase Prussia's possessions at the point where they still are incomplete. When the chancellor during the war told me for

the first time of his idea that we needed provinces on the Rhine, I replied that I agreed with him; it was like stretching out a hand and putting it down firmly.

Dissatisfaction generates also because at first every one had exaggerated ideas about what we were entitled to, and the military judged Prussia's share according to what the army had actually achieved, and not according to political possibilities. The feeling of not wishing to do without old provinces is most honorable, but of course it should not be overdone. How old are actually the countries that have been lost to us? Ost Friesland [Eastern Frisia] has been ours for about seventy years, and the Prussian state without Ansbach and Bayreuth has long been known to me.

Yet at the bottom of the discontent is a true and valid reason with which I wholly agree. It is not so much that Prussia does not get enough territory which hurts the feelings of the people but it is, lying perhaps deep within the soul and not expressing itself, that those who have acted most dastardly either receive back their land and their people or even are enlarged. On the other hand are the reasons why we do not possess this and that which is dear to us. We must retain the point of view that this condition is only transitory. The battle against wickedness has not been

fought out and will be renewed, even if not just now. Each and every Prussian must consider himself as a warrior reserved for that time, but must also make himself worthy during the interval of peace to fight for this cause. I look forward to this sort of a future with conviction.

It actually seems as if the Congress is to come to an end. Czar Alexander adheres to March 15 as his day of departure.

To the amusements of the great world here belongs also a wager which Czar Alexander made recently with Flore Wrba to determine which one could dress most completely in the shortest time. They both went to Zichy's in the evening in negligee and changed to formal court attire. Flore won the wager. She dressed in one and one half minutes and the czar in two and one half. When he returned to the salon he found all the other women also attired in full formal dress, in a sort of masquerade of old court costumes. How ingenious and amusing all this is!

You ask me whether the king [of Prussia] will adopt the title of kaiser. He would not wish to do this, and it would also not be possible to accomplish it. We have just as much influence without the name.

But would you believe—this wholly between us—that Stein has the foolhardiness to work at this task and try, through Russia, to get Austria



recognized as kaiser—Austria, to which it ought to be perfectly indifferent politically whether or not France again obtains a part of the Rhine provinces, as Gentz himself admitted to me! The amusing thing about it is that Stein includes an overly long and bitter tirade on the un-German character of Austria in his proposal, and asks that the imperial dignity be given Austria for this reason, so that it will become closer allied to Germany. I prepared a document in rebuttal yesterday.

It is an eternal mistake that Bavaria has been allowed to remain so large as it is, and perhaps will be made even larger, but wholly through Austria's fault. Metternich had such a great fear of Napoleon that he looked on Wrede as a savior. Afterward Metternich used clumsy political methods on the one hand, and on the other allowed himself to be fooled; in short, he acted unwisely, and it is impossible in coalitions to prevent the mistakes of one power. Yet Bavaria will never get to be dangerous, and serious war against us will result in its most certain ruin.

VIENNA, *March 7, 1815.*

To-day, dear heart, I bring you strange news, which probably will not astonish you, as you have often predicted it. Napoleon has disappeared with his whole army—actually only from 1000

to 1500 men—from the island of Elba, and it is not yet known whence he has gone. The news arrived here to-day by courier from the English ambassador in Florence, and therefore is trustworthy. It was great carelessness on the part of the English not to have ships around the island at least so long as there is a state of unrest in Italy; but they had none.

A sort of English overseer, Campbell, was there, but in a very small ship. He actually observed Napoleon's plans; but being unable to offer resistance, he left out of fear that he might himself be taken along. As soon as he considered it safe he returned, and learned that Napoleon had left on the evening of the twenty-sixth under sail. He embarked on a number of little ships, —I think three,—of which he had leased two, and took with him provisions for six days. On the twenty-seventh he was still within sight of the island. He took a northerly direction. His mother, the Borghese [Pauline Bonaparte], and the wife of General Bertrand remained behind. The Borghese demanded passage to Rome.

Wherever he may have gone leads to exhaustion of advice and conjectures. It is certain—and this is the fortunate part—that if this adventure does not succeed, he will no longer be able to save himself from destruction. It will no longer be necessary to practise any sort of for-

bearance toward him, and he can be shot dead like a robber. The right to do that existed even earlier; so I would not like to be responsible for him now, even if he is made a prisoner.

He is discussed here with a great deal of indifference, which, however, is wholly assumed. At bottom they are really most apprehensive. They look for war in Italy and are not the most confident. Schwarzenberg will be sent there at once, and troops already have been ordered there, enough to make 140,000 men for Italy. They departed, however, only a few days ago.

This event will undoubtedly bring nearer the end of the Congress. Talleyrand drew this moral of acceleration from it to-day, as every one will have more to do at home.

You cannot imagine how the foremost [of the Prussian staff] are alarmed and wish to make preparations. Only the chancellor is an exception. He is calm, and if danger ensued, would act most firmly. As a matter of fact, only Prussia is to be depended upon. It is also peculiar that virtually all the Prussians are cheerful at the news. They seem to regard this occurrence as an opportunity for testing what is false in men and nations and what has to be exterminated, which is the correct view.

VIENNA, *March 13, 1815.*

The King of Saxony refuses most emphatically to say "Yes" and wishes to negotiate. He was rather harsh to Wellington and Metternich. These are now greatly opposed to him. He presented a note of justification, which caused Wellington to say to me: "He must be answered sharply. He must be treated so meanly that he will feel himself blacker than my boots."

No one knows anything about Napoleon. Tonight, however, we shall prepare a declaration, according to which any one may shoot him, and which will be printed everywhere and distributed widely.

VIENNA, *March 14, 1815.*

We are lying here in a wonderful state of expectation. The public announcement [making Napoleon an outlaw] which I am sending you herewith, so that you will have a copy for yourself, is up to now the only creative work of the Congress in this case. The foundation was made by Gentz, and it was corrected later by everybody, for the last time last night at a four-hour conference of twenty persons, with whom it is difficult to arrive anywhere. In the first draft was a statement that any one who met him could destroy him [*exterminer*].

This seemed too drastic to Emperor Francis, and so he suggested that it be changed to read

that every one who supports his government, ruler, etc., shall have the right to destroy him. The English found making a private amusement out of the murder of a tyrant a bit too strenuous, and so the only part that actually pleased me has been left out entirely.

Metternich to-day related at a little conference that he gave a copy of the declaration to Marie Louise, and that she asked him what would be done with her husband if he were caught. He replied that if caught in Austria, he would be imprisoned; and if in France, he might easily be hanged. She replied that it was sad if her son should have a hanged man for his father. Even if the accuracy of this story may be partly questioned, it is still horrible that Metternich, who so dastardly sacrificed this woman, who would be most unhappy if she had any feelings, still dares to talk with her or to make up such a story and tell it. It takes more than a will of iron to do that.

VIENNA, *March* 17, 1815.

The situation is very serious. Napoleon really entered Grenoble on the eighth, and never before was seen such illumination and joy. Before he reached Grenoble a regiment coming from Chambéry passed to his side. When he met the first French troops with his thousand men he walked forward with his hands behind his back and said

to them, "*Voici votre général* ["Here is your general"]. The colonel thereupon embraced him, and the regiment went over to him. The colonel [Huchet de Labédoyère] is a cousin of Flahault and was an adjutant to Eugène. In Grenoble the troops mutinied, but the General Marchand and Desirailles remained loyal, and had to save themselves secretly with 160 men and a few cannon. Everything else fell to Napoleon. He then marched toward Lyons with 6000 men.

You should see Talleyrand. I am writing you from the conference which we have just had. Wellington said we ought to know what we are going to do if Napoleon is in Paris and in control of all France. There was silence for a moment. I said, "We will do what we did in 1813, and what has just been expressed—make no peace and no truce with him." Then the others joined in, and Wellington spoke reasonably. He will be in command.

Adieu, dear, sweet child. I know you. It will pain you, but you know real hate and true love, and it has to be settled sometime. As things are now, can we use life to better advantage?

VIENNA, *March* 19, 1815.

Dear Li, I have received your letter of the fourteenth, and seen with deep pleasure how you take the affair with Napoleon. I thought imme-



diately that it would not dishearten you in any manner. Our news from Paris is only up to the eleventh; from this it was expected with certainty that Napoleon had reached Lyons. According to this, he should be considered the master of France.

I like to have you know what I am thinking of and planning to do; my system, therefore, is that we fight Napoleon honestly and faithfully, with special regard always for our own defense; that we make sure of all the means at our command to this end, and therefore do not give up Saxony; that we exercise an orderly influence on Germany during the campaign; and, finally, that neither we nor our allies tie our hands against the Bourbons and that we enter into no unnecessary entanglements.

God knows how much or how little I shall be able to accomplish of this. I am in a most difficult position, and among us [that is, Prussians] there are innumerable significant things that worry me, and of which I can write you only through Hedemann.

Gneisenau has other ideas, as I see in a communication of his, that he has not imparted to me. He does not favor united action, and would even leave Napoleon in power, and, according to him, we would fight wholly for ourselves, although also for the right. I cannot share these views;

they are not a part of my politics, and might be carried out only if we had a king like Frederick II in his early years, and even then would be an experiment. The government of a chancellor and ministers under a king who certainly thinks differently must follow a system of greater co-operation.

VIENNA, *March 27, 1815.*

A most disturbing report is being circulated about France; namely, that of Ney's desertion and Suchet's indecision. If both these things are true, Bonaparte will without any doubt reach Paris without a shot. A Government can hardly experience a greater disgrace than that.

A treaty of alliance—this is between us—is now being prepared between Austria, Prussia, Russia, and England, which we will sign to-night. It is drawn up in most ordinary phraseology. With a great deal of difficulty I finally succeeded in eliminating everything that would have made it merely a treaty of assistance to the Bourbons. One article, however, was put in over my head: this includes the expression "when the Bourbons call on us for help." But it has been made innocuous, and will be even more so, as the Bourbons, if things go badly, will not even be able to hold their position in France.

VIENNA, *March 28, 1815.*

The situation in France has reached its climax for the moment. We received a telegraphic report to-day from Strasburg through Baden that Bonaparte apparently entered Paris on the twenty-second. An hour later the white flag was removed from the tower. What has happened to the king is not yet known. Ney's desertion is said to be confirmed. We are assured that he kissed the king's hand in tears, and promised that if it was not otherwise he would serve him as a volunteer. Talleyrand said to me to-day, "*Avouez qu'il n'y a pas de nation aussi indigné que la mienne*" ["You must admit that there is no nation so unworthy as mine"]. The way in which he finds this out is often laughable to me.

VIENNA, *April 9, 1815.*

More letters have come from Napoleon and Hortense, which are now always opened in the conferences and read there. Napoleon writes with a fist that hardly any one can read, usually on a duodecimo sheet of paper. Above is the word "Tuilleries," and the fact that he can write this must have pleased him extraordinarily, and this word is of course the greatest indignity for the Bourbons. His letters always begin with "Ma bonne Louise," and everything is always "*tu*" ["thou"].

The whole takes only a little page, and the principal phrases are: "*Je suis maître de toute la France. Le soi-disant roi s'est embarqué pour l'Angleterre. Je passe tous les jours en revue 25,000 hommes. La France ne craint rien de personne*" ["I am master of all France. The so-called king has embarked for England. I daily hold a review of 25,000 men. France fears no one"].

These sentences are written so illegibly that the chancellor still maintains that this is not what it says. "*La France*" is clear; "*rien de personne*" I deciphered; "*craint*," which is in one word, with "*ne*" was found by Wessenberg. He then tells her to come, and at the end writes: "*Fais que tu sois le 15 ou 20 Avril avec mon fils à Strasbourg*" ["On the 15th or 20th of April be with my son at Strasburg"]. The conclusion is, "*Adieu, tour à toi*" ["Adieu, wholly yours"].

Hortense writes very few words to her brother [Eugène de Beauharnais]. He is to come as soon as possible to Paris, but if he does not wish to do so, he is to be of service to the emperor [Napoleon] in Vienna and write what he has already done toward this end. One of the two things is absolutely necessary, else others will gain favor before him. She says that Napoleon will confirm the Paris treaty and adds, "*Si les puissances veulent pourtant la guerre, elle sera horrible; le*

*peuple et l'armée n'ont jamais été aussi unis*" ["If the powers wish war despite everything, it will be a terrible one; the people and the army have never been so united"]. Of herself she says, "*On me traite assez bien, mais tout dépend pourtant de ton arrivée.*" ["I am treated very well, but despite that everything depends on your arrival."] This makes me think only of the old Antonio's clever remark, "*Massa di canaglia.*"

Despite all this, despite my most emphatic and audacious talking, Eugène is leaving here for Bayreuth, it is said, exactly the place where, if the war should go against us, he can be most dangerous with regard to Bavaria and Saxony.

Hostilities have begun in Italy. Murat has pushed forward to Bologna. A number of shots have been fired. Metternich said in his conference that the Austrian troops were not powerful enough there to offer strong resistance.

VIENNA, *April 30, 1815.*

Clancarty made a fitting motion regarding the presents of the Congress, namely the snuff-boxes. He stated that so many delegates and others have come here that these presents would reach an enormous sum, which would arouse discussion even in parliament. We have therefore agreed that only the four original powers were to make presents to one another. If this is carried out, I

shall receive three, a matter of perhaps 10,000 thaler.

Whether the others have profited in another manner by the Congress I do not know and do not care to believe. You know me on this point. I have most antique principles in that regard, and love those people whose daughters are given dowries at public expense because they have none of their own.

VIENNA, *May 5, 1815.*

In this interval I have been compelled to undertake something that will cause you the greatest astonishment, and which I will entrust you with only under the seal of greatest secrecy.

Just think that I, in my forty-eighth year, a minister, during the Congress have had to fight, and with whom? With the minister of war, Boyen, whom you know. As we both returned uninjured, the matter has had nothing tragic about it. I will tell it to you from the beginning with all the frankness possible.

At two o'clock the day before yesterday there was a conference at Metternich's on the general provisioning of the armies, and in addition to the regular delegates the only non-delegate was Boyen; then Stewart and Münster were also present.

When the matter that interested Boyen had been disposed of and a few other affairs had been



settled, Nesselrode came to me and said that Metternich wished to make a secret communication to us regarding a letter from Napoleon to the emperor, and asked whether I would have Boyen leave. There was nothing in this proposal to insult Boyen, but I should not have mixed in the affair at all. I should have left this to the chancellor, and furthermore should have told Boyen the exact truth. How unfortunately things do go sometimes! Without reflection I rose, spoke to Boyen, took him to the door under a pretext, and led him through Metternich's long hall. It occurred to me that I also might leave. However, as I always was apprehensive of letters of this kind, I did not think this a wise thing to do.

When I left Boyen he told me that I had bowed him out rather clumsily, which might have been true as far as he was concerned, but which did not apply otherwise, for even the chancellor believed that he had left of his own accord.

I considered the matter closed with his sarcasm; but as it occurred to me that he might be angry, and as this pained me a great deal, for I think much of him, I accosted him when he came to dine with the chancellor and asked him if he was angry. He did not let me talk out, but said at once that we would have an understanding. Thus we went to dinner. After dinner I

went to him, but found him so vehement that I immediately said that I was sorry and that I would not defend my action on the ground of thoughtlessness. Bygones were bygones, and that I was ready to fight him if he so desired.

He said that was all he wished, and so our conversation quieted down. I made the condition that we should say nothing to any one, and should have no seconds, who might part us and make the matter fail. Also, as I did not see why, with all my work, I should go to the trouble of procuring pistols, I asked him to provide them, and said that on my part I would find a quiet spot. He found it most poetical that I wanted to fight with his pistols without bothering about them myself, but agreed to do so, and his heat abated considerably.

He directed my attention to the fact that the people in the room—we stood on the balcony of the second story—were observing us. I told him that this was his fault, as I had offered to drive with him in my carriage, which stood at the door; he said that such civilities went a little too far if men were going to fight each other. I recalled to him that Ariosto speaks of two knights riding the same horse in such circumstances, and thus we separated.

We had agreed to meet to-day at eleven o'clock, and it was my idea to go to the Prater.

Early yesterday morning it happened that he had to come to me for a conference that had been agreed upon before. After the conference he told me that he had not yet purchased the pistols and that he could not meet me at eleven to-day. I also told him that I thought the Prater rather out of place as a spot for a combat between two ministers of state, and that we would do better to take an afternoon drive later on. So we left the time indefinite.

Yesterday noon I dined with him at the chancellor's and told Hardenberg, whose lynx eyes had observed our conversation, that we had come to an agreement, and Boyen told him the same thing.

The chancellor went to Laxenburg to-day, and as I had been challenged, I could not let the affair rest, no matter how serious it might be to me because of the possible sensation that might result. Therefore I wrote Boyen early this morning that so good an opportunity would not come again and that I would be at his house at three o'clock. I had an idea that we would ride to the Kalten Berg [Kahlenberg]. I attended conferences from eleven to two, and at two I wrote you the lines which you will have received by this time, then dined,—which the Homeric heroes also did before their battles,—and went to Boyen. I found him alone, and he said he did not think it

expedient for us to be without any one, and that he would take Wolzogen, the major, with us. I naturally had no objection, so we called him. You can imagine the astonishment and terror of poor Wolzogen. He wanted to argue with us, but we soon calmed him. Boyen was more friendly than on the previous days, yet very serious and gloomy; and as for me, as you know, I have never been angry with any one in my life.

I had learned from Cathcart at the morning conference that his entire family had gone to the Kalten Berg, so I changed our plans, and had us driven to the Spitz. Between the first and the last bridge I suggested that we get out and go into the shrubbery toward the Danube. We did so, but had to wander about a great deal before we found a quiet place, a pretty meadow close to a wood.

Boyen wanted me to shoot first; but as he was the insulted, I did not need to do so, and I had a good reason of my own for not doing so.

He fired first. I had been frankly in doubt until he fired whether he actually meant to shoot at me or not. On the one side, it was clear that things would be most disagreeable for the man who was wounded in this duel. As we are both needed now, the latter would be the most criticized. On the other hand, he had been in such a temper and had remained so, and seemed to have

such serious ideas on the subject, that I could not well act differently.

He aimed long and directly at me, but I saw that in the moment of firing he deflected his pistol. My gun refused to work. As it was apparent that I had aimed to one side, Boyen would not permit the shot to be counted. I assured him that it would not be different if I aimed directly at him, as this would make me miss the easier. But when he urged me further, I told him that after having given him cause for this, it could not occur to me to wound him still more, and to act as if I were shooting, as he had done, I also would not do, because I could not control my shot. In addition it was for him to say whether he considered himself satisfied or not. He said "Yes," and we went to the bridge of the Danube, where we talked a great deal with each other in a friendly way, drove home, and parted on the best of terms.

Poor Wolzogen appeared unusually glad, for it could be plainly seen that he was fearful during the whole ride and did not know what to make of it.

I have passed through this battle in the most unsoldierly fashion, for except for the few seconds when I held the pistol, I did everything with my *baguette* [little cane].

I gave thought to the fact that the matter

might become most serious, and above all I thought of you and the children, even if this does not appear from the little slip that I sent you. But it seemed to me that it would have been unworthy with respect to you, even if ordinarily such a thing was not in my nature, to attempt to find a way out in view of the fact that Boyen took the matter so seriously. You have no idea how deeply he felt insulted. The whole affair was most peculiar to me, and I have made discoveries with which I would not like to part. I am also convinced that the matter is cleared up with Boyen forever, which would not have been the case if I had avoided the duel even in the best and most proper manner.

I have forgotten to tell you about Napoleon's letter. It came through because he entrusted it to a Belgian who was also an Austrian chamberlain. It was written very cunningly, for it turned on the idea that Emperor Francis would not keep Marie Louise, the wife, from her husband nor the little child from his father. It was well also that I did not go away with Boyen, for Metternich really wished to reply to Caulaincourt on the most intimate family affairs. But I objected to this immediately, and so did the others, especially Razumoffski [Rasumovskij] and Stewart. Farewell, dearly beloved heart!



VIENNA, *May 12, 1815.*

A most unpleasant incident has occurred, dear Li; namely, a revolution has fairly broken out against us among the Saxon troops in Liège. Blücher, Gneisenau, and general headquarters had to save themselves by fleeing through back doors, and in this way out of the city and the state. The mistake was made of talking about this division [of Saxony] before it had actually been effected, and I was present recently and had a lively altercation with Boyen and Grolman. It seemed to me as if the partition might well have been postponed until after the war. The armies might have been left to serve together, as, for instance, under Wellington, and the recruiting done only in the Saxon territories, using those who volunteer as the nucleus for new regiments that might be completed from our lands. The military, however, seems to treat this as a point of honor, and I understood that when Grolman departed he carried an implicit order for the partitioning with him. This was made public after his arrival, and what I have related then occurred.

I recently angered little Metternich again. Talleyrand has in his company an old man, La Besnardières, a councilor of state who was with Caulaincourt in Châtillon; as a matter of fact, a supporter of Bonaparte and an intriguer, but

shrewd. He wants to go back to France, and Metternich suggested that he had a parrot and a sister, and would die if he was not with them. The others did not say much. I remarked dryly that in addition to a parrot and a sister he also still had a king, and thereby spoiled the whole project for this time at least. As a matter of fact, hardly any man could be more dangerous in Paris; for he knows all our gossip, our disagreements, all intrigues.

VIENNA, *May 21, 1815.*

It is half-past one o'clock, and I have just come from a conference at Metternich's, dear Li; but I will tell you a few words before I go to bed. To-day we had a so-called German conference with Austria and Hanover, which might much better be called an un-German conference. If you could have been there, you would have become indignant. I hardly speak now of anything that is concerned with the most worthy motives, but wholly with the mechanical, but the ineptitude and indiscretion are terrible.

Yesterday we had already completed the whole enormous and unimportant draft. To-day Metternich came with several insertions that said nothing, and so for an hour long the matter was chewed over, tested, and altered, without the least progress being made. I was silent, because

it makes a person indignant to be present at such an affair. When finally nothing was accomplished and all the attempts and starts of Metternich brought nothing to paper, I was forced to speak and to write, and when this pretty work was completed, Metternich rose, filled with pride, and said, "We need not despair; we are always making progress." Children could not do worse.

You have no idea what a lot of trouble is made by men who wish special advantages. The hereditary Prince of Strelitz is continuously, at least interchangeably, angry with me; the Coburgs are like burs; the Taxis woman growls occasionally, and now and again finds out that I still treat her better than the others do; the Collereda, who wants forest country on the left bank of the Rhine, writes billets a yard long. Others are very well satisfied with me; for instance, Rodolstadt. At least, I hope so.

Gentz is working hard and busily, despite any other failings he may have. They wanted to give him the order of the Red Eagle, but I put a stop to that. The orders should be kept inviolate so much as possible, and during the winter and especially in the Saxon affair he did not act favorably toward us in any matter, not taking into consideration any friendliness for Hardenberg and myself. Upon Napoleon's arrival in Paris he was suddenly interested in the great-

ness of this event, and told me, with the greatest secrecy, that there was great wisdom in this Government. Metternich himself thought he might be regarded as dead. Once when Pauline [Princess of Hohenzollern] addressed him with the name of Jacobin when he visited her and when a great many guests were present, he reflected; and, as if scales had fallen from his eyes, found that he was in this repute, and became contrite and angry at the same time, and since then has kept more to himself.

You know that Vera [a Roman agent] is here in order to get Elba and Piombino back for the Prince of Piombino. I was greatly interested in the case, and Vera to-day promised most seriously to give me the great Juno [the Juno of Ludovisi] if I put the matter through. It has moved me extraordinarily that such an antique goddess is to let herself be bartered and sold in the North.

VIENNA, *June 1, 1815.*

In these last days many things are being decided, and so far I have had a great deal of luck. This between us. The pope may thank me for the most part that he did not have to give up 50,000 souls to Eugène [de Beauharnais], and, namely, Ferrara.

VIENNA, *June 4, 1815.*

I have received the Anne Order in diamonds from Russia for the signing of the treaty of alliance, presumably a sort of revenge on the part of Czar Alexander for the fact that I do not at all bother about his favor and his personal approbation, and am not any more Russian than I have to be. I am glad to have it for that reason. Otherwise it seems as if it has been carefully thought out to irritate me. For as an order it is hardly appropriate for me, and as a gift the orders with gems are usually not worth much; they include very many small stones. I will sell it at once and will never wear it. That is all of this. As for his favor, I shall do neither more nor less than in the past. If we ever again have business with each other, he will need me more than I will need him.

I refused a very great present yesterday. Since the beginning of the Congress the Jews have tried to get certain civil rights in Germany. I have always favored their wishes. I know, dear heart, that you think otherwise, but I have thought a great deal about it at different times and remained faithful to my former view. Moreover, it is an idea of my youth. Alexander and I, when we were children, were regarded as protectors of the Jews.

I also became interested in the subject here

for the reason that, as the Jews have pretty nearly all the rights in Prussia, it would be better for us if these privileges became general, as else all the Jews would stream over to us. For several weeks I observed that the Jewish patrons grew in number, and as Gentz stood at their head, the reason was soon clear. The Hanoverian Hardenberg also informed me with certainty that the former had actually made a written contract.

In the meantime I had no offers; but an old man from Prague, whose personality pleased me, as he did not belong to the more modern Jews, came to see me several times and recommended the cause to me. I prepared an article according to my convictions in the present conferences. This proved to be the principal subject for debate not because there were not more important things, but because it was impossible to debate the latter, for the reason that they would disrupt the Congress rather than bring it closer together.

Metternich, Wessenberg, Hardenberg, and I acted according to our lights. Rechberg [Count von Rechberg, the Bavarian minister], Darmstadt, Saxony, the Hansa cities, were principally against it. It was brought up in two sessions. Metternich, according to his custom, virtually gave the matter up, but I continued with it, gave it a new turn, and made it virtually innocuous,



so that I directed it to the forthcoming federal assembly, but preserved the rights already won by the Jews. A great deal was said about the matter, but every one knows that I merely drafted the article and put it through.

Yesterday the old man returned, thanked me without end, and offered me as a present three rings, an emerald set in large diamonds, with the option that if I did not wish them, I could draw on him for over 4000 ducats. I refused them as well as the money, and you can hardly imagine the astonishment of this man when I told him without affectation or bravado that I had done what I did only out of favor to the Jews, that I would take nothing for it, and that if ever there came a time when he could do me a favor, I would be glad to avail myself of it.

I have told the incident to no one but the chancellor and Hardenberg [the Hanoverian]. But I know through Gentz that it has become known and had a great effect. The old Jew will not be satisfied, and has now the idea of having a silver service made for me with the view of sending it to me within a year. I told Gentz that I would accept nothing in ten years, and I won't. Gentz cannot imagine that it is possible not to accept a thing of this sort, and to-day explained to me in a long discussion that it is a puzzle to him and an inexplicable action on my part, as the matter

is neither indelicate nor unreasonable, and that I do not do it out of ostentation in order to brag that I do not accept gifts from Jews. He said this most seriously, and I merely told him that when a person advocates a cause as warmly as I do the first condition is a clear conscience. I know nothing so dishonorable as not to be as clean and pure as gold in business matters.

Pardon me for lingering so long with this, but it will show you how many things, if not all, are carried on here.

Farewell, my precious, dearly beloved.

VIENNA, *June 9, 1815.*

I have been extremely busy in these last few days; everything happened at once, and the conferences do not end until late at night. It is after midnight, and I have just returned from another. We signed all the articles of the great agreement of the Congress—there are 120 in all—to-night, and there is virtually only one other matter to be settled, which is to be completed by to-morrow noon. We have had the duchy belonging to Darmstadt added to Westphalia, but do not have possession of it yet, because Darmstadt has never consented to a reasonable indemnity. You cannot imagine the egotism of this sad court, and Austria is so weak that it does not know how to deal with this prince.

The German act of confederation will be signed to-morrow. It has finally turned out to be a more wretched piece of work than it was in the beginning. In the case of this king everything depends on chance, which should have nothing to do with it. Three days ago we were on the verge of settling the affair without Bavaria. No detailed instructions had been received, as they asserted, by Bavaria, Saxony,—which agreed with Bavaria on the whole, even if not in detail, and which Metternich could not keep in line,—and Darmstadt, and every one was at a loss to know what to do. I suggested that we close the agreement between ourselves and let them join later. This had the advantage that we did not need to make concessions in matters in which thirty-two votes were united against three, and left an opportunity for them to sign, the only difference being in the order of signature. Everything was agreed upon; I had made the necessary changes, and we were to sign on the following day.

On the following day Metternich wrote that Rechberg had received his instructions, which differed from our view only in a few particulars. But among these particulars was an important one; namely, that Bavaria would not abide by the decision of the federal court. The other things were of no consequence, but as we had

already weakened the whole federation for the benefit of Bavaria, this was the last drop that overflowed my cup.

This led me to believe that by eliminating Bavaria we could make the federation stronger, better, and more popular among the others. I therefore made two proposals: we would either proceed along the lines that we had agreed upon, and Bavaria should join with a reservation on the point to which it did not agree, or to divide it into two parts, a state federation and a national federation, uniting all in the first group, and placing in the second group all those who were favorable to the whole.

Metternich, however, would have nothing of this, but insisted on conceding everything Bavaria wished. The Lord only knows how it happens that nothing can be done with the chancellor these days; he declared that he placed a tremendous importance on unity, and considered that the last few changes did not matter.

Münster, who has become much weaker since his marriage with that tremendously ugly woman [Princess Wilhelmine of Schaumburg-Lippe], was wholly silent, and so concessions were actually made in an ignominious manner. I expressed my divergent views most clearly and emphatically, but of no avail; Rechberg was called in and told that the change would be made.

In the evening session with the princes the better spirit still gave a few last gasps. Gagern, whom you know, spoke for a federal court and for a strong and wholesome Saxony; but I was too greatly angered to interfere, and only when I saw that at least one thing could be improved did I speak in a tone and with an attitude that made those present guard against irritating me further. I succeeded in this point, but the rest remained as it was, and so this constitution took on a wonderful form! For I left Metternich and the others in the lurch, no matter how often he asked my help, and they therefore chewed on a few phrases for a quarter of an hour, and nothing worse has ever been written than this document.

To-day even Würtemberg, which declared simply and solely in the French note that it would not appear at the conferences, came around, and is ready to join the agreement, but with new changes. This nation has finally been told that no more changes will be made, and that it can join this agreement only in a special declaration of its own and not by signature.

And thus has ended this affair with which I was most occupied; rather badly, but only because of Metternich. Prussia and I can always be satisfied with our work. My plans, my long notes to Metternich, have been printed and are

known; during the conference I had a preponderating influence, and even had the satisfaction of being able to raise and to put on a firm foundation what I personally protected, as, for instance, Schwarzburg. Every one knows that I am not only to blame for the unsatisfactory conclusion, but that it has hurt me a great deal. The minor princes showed a better and more honest will, but only these.

The Bernstorffs acted about worst of all; always making difficulties, always antagonistic, everywhere forcing their personality to the front and insisting upon it, and saying not a word in yesterday's session, where the last bit of good was destroyed. The silence yesterday was actually strange. It disclosed how greatly all wished the federation to be general and to include Bavaria.

Swedish Pomerania will now become Prussian; Denmark will get Lauenburg, which we gave from Hanover, and a money indemnity. This was one of the most tiresome negotiations for me, and it convinced me that Bernstorff has no talents for business, no matter how good he is in other capacities. He is neglectful, distracted, and at the same time vehement and unjust. In this matter he made scenes in my presence that are unbelievable, and I recalled that it was exactly one month after my rupture with



Boyen, which made me think that such a day of quarreling must come periodically.

In this case communications had to pass between Denmark and Sweden, and which, as they live like cat and dog together, had to go through my hands. On one occasion I forwarded one to him [Bernstorff]. He sent it back to me as if he were satisfied with it, and I continued the discussion. Later he recalled that there was something in this letter which he could not countenance, and I discovered that he had not even read it. He made bitter accusations against me, and if it were not for my imperturbable calm, we might have shot at each other because I did not direct his attention to what he considered an impropriety. I informed him dryly that I, who was so occupied that I hardly had a minute of my own, did not feel myself called upon to work for Denmark, and that he and his brother, both ambassadors and wholly unoccupied, might at least take pains to read what was of importance to their king. In the meantime I brought the whole matter to a conclusion. He goes to headquarters; she has departed for Holstein. Thus things are breaking up here.

## CHAPTER VI

### A PRINCE OF THE HOUSE OF HAPSBURG

FROM THE DIARY OF ARCHDUKE JOHN OF AUSTRIA

In the game of battledore and shuttlecock that was played for the German imperial crown by Austria and Prussia in the first half of the nineteenth century Archduke John of Austria had a notable part. We find him the true Hapsburg, jealous of the prerogatives of his house, solicitous for its welfare, convinced of its ability to lead the heterogeneous group of minor German states to power and prosperity. His figure is not always in the foreground, but often he stands close at hand, suggesting, advising, as he is pictured in this diary, in which he jotted down his comment on what took place at the Congress of Vienna. The diary has many points of interest. He himself appears as a man of great nobility of thought and feeling. He attributes sincerity to many of the men with whom he comes in contact. Here we gain another view of Metternich's entanglement with Czar Alexander of Russia, and the only sympathetic view given in this book. It is the incident that is discussed by Humboldt from the Prussian position, and by Baron von Stein from the

Russian angle. Archduke John's diary discloses his devotion to his emperor—his eldest brother—and to the house of Hapsburg. His view of Prussia is that of an ally that must be curbed and put into proper harness; his comment on the logic of an alliance between Prussia and Austria has proved almost prophetic. John's agitation over the affair of his brother with the Grand Duchess Catharine, and his careful advice to his brothers to marry for the sake of the house of Hapsburg, throw an interesting light on the business-like attitude of this royal family toward marriage.

The career of Archduke John, extending over a great number of years,—he lived to be 77,—is of both military and political significance. He was one of the eight sons of Emperor Leopold II and a grandson of Empress Maria Theresa. At the age of eighteen he was nominally in command of the Austrian army that Moreau decimated in the ill-starred battle at Hohenlinden on December 3, 1800. Many years later, in 1848, when a great wave of revolution—the revolution of liberal ideas that the Congress of Vienna had tried to stem—swept over the intellectual class of Europe, Archduke John was called by the famous German national convention at Frankfort to become the imperial vicar (*Reichsverweser*), or head of the provisional executive cabinet. Henry von Gagern placed his name in nomination for this office. In this diary the archduke speaks of his high regard for Gagern, and also expresses views which indicate that he believed in a German confederation under the leadership of the house of Hapsburg, governed according to his ideas of liberal-

ized paternalism. It is significant that the diet at Frankfort later offered the imperial German crown to the Austrian Emperor, who refused it on the advice of Metternich. That the archduke could accept the leadership of a liberal parliament like that at Frankfort presupposes his sympathy, to some extent at least, with the liberal ideas of the turbulent forties, and this is indicated also in the diary of the Congress, where we find expressed as tolerant views of the desire of the people to guide their own fortunes as were ever expressed by the member of a house that, ruling from medieval times down to our very own, is hardly taken into account save as a historical incident at the Conference of Versailles.

September 4.—The Queen of Sicily suffered a stroke of apoplexy during the night and died.

September 11-12.—Reception of the French ambassador, Latour du Pin; the Sardinian, S. Marsan, with whom it is a pleasure to converse; the Prussian, Humboldt, whom I have known a long time; finally, F. M. L. Pino, who most candidly explained to me our unjust presence and conduct in Italy.

September 19.—Gagern, my old friend, visited me; I saw him again with joy. He is called exalted. That may be, yet an honest German heart and a firm, loyal spirit is his; a man, strong in heart and mind, with whom I speak as I would before God. As he tells me so much, I have dis-

closed to him my efforts and my goal. [Baron von Gagern represented the Prince of Orange and the Duke and Prince of Nassau at the Congress.]

September 20.—The Danish ambassador, Bernstorff, visited me with his brother, a just and sensible man. I reminded him of what I had said about Norway, and found that Denmark cannot overcome its sorrow at this loss. It is sad to see that a country like this can become the prey of an ambitious stranger, who really should be included with Murat on the list of those who ought to be blotted out. [The reference is to Napoleon's general, Bernadotte, who won the throne of Sweden, and whose house rules to-day.]

Either Norway under its old kings or free and independent; and not without foundation does he fear that this country may become the cause for new controversies.

Oh, if I could but transmit to every one what I feel! Then Europe would have peace for a long time, forget, abandon the lust for possession and ambition. Mankind has suffered cruelly; it is time to help it. Mine is a weak voice, but, before God, I will speak wherever I can in a conciliatory spirit. It cannot be that all ears are deaf to right, magnanimity, and conscience.

September 22.—The King of Würtemberg

came, and the King of Denmark; later the Grand Duchess Marie. The former I knew from other days; his exceptional understanding, his pride, and his rudeness are known. Order in his states, but severe oppression for his subjects. He would like to go with his great state in the footsteps of Napoleon, but with more shrewdness.

I saw the second only at the reception, a haggard man, medium in stature, entirely candid, unpretentious; he pleased me. The voice of his people speaks in his behalf; he is greatly beloved in Denmark.

September 23.—Wrede of Bavaria. With him I spoke freely and openly about Germany's interests, about my own affairs, and about the agreement between Austria and Bavaria.

Two obstacles are in the way: Russia's designs on Poland, Prussia's struggle for Saxony. England is too lukewarm on the subject and seems too willing to have this happen, because, I fear, Hanover is to be enlarged.

Neither of the two plans can be tolerated. In addition, there is Bernadotte's arrival here, and his struggle for Denmark. This, I fear, means new controversies. How necessary are mutual renunciations and sacrifices in order to preserve peace!

Hereditary prince of Mecklenburg-strelitz, a



well-intentioned man, who thinks German and wishes to be German.

Stein [Prussian statesman, now in the suite of Czar Alexander] interested me most extraordinarily. My conversation with him brought out several points: Austria and Prussia as the principal powers; no enlargement of the others; independence of Germany from all foreigners and its protection against France and Russia. As far as I can see he has understanding and a firm will. I will cultivate this man and get to know him better. He recommended Gneisenau and Grollmann to me as able men.

Münster, representing Hanover, therefore England, a sensible, just, shrewd, and most reserved man; I will also cultivate him; I made only general remarks.

Bernadotte is decidedly on the black-list.

Castlereagh, a firm, quiet man, well intentioned, speaking slowly after reflection. It seems to me, however, that he is not the proper person to carry anything to its conclusion; it is always most interesting to converse with him.

Cardinal Consalvi, a refined Italian, who attempts to make his way with a few fundamental principles.

September 25.—At ten o'clock we rode with the emperor to the Tabor and there met the Crown Prince of Würtemberg, with whom I re-

newed my friendship. Then Prince William of Prussia, a good, frank soul; a charming face!

Then the emperor [of Austria] rode to meet the Russian Czar. Riding between him and the King of Prussia, he led the way to Vienna; I rode between the Crown Prince of Würtemberg and Prince William. All were behind the emperor. In the Prater the troops paraded, through the Jägerzeile into the Burg [Hofburg]. In the afternoon I escorted the Grand Duchess Catharine home.

September 26.—Talleyrand is here; it appears that he is struggling against Russia's taking possession of Poland. England is too yielding; Czar Alexander is firm in his resolve.

At three o'clock the Russian Empress arrived. She was once a beautiful woman; her features are smooth, composed, with traces of suffering; very agreeable, full of graciousness.

Greeted the King of Bavaria, a man good, smooth; that is all. The queen seemed very reserved; the crown prince is a man who thinks nobly, but is too precipitous with his words. Prince Karl is still young, but has served with distinction.

September 29.—Nothing but visits and return visits, dining, fireworks, illumination. In fact I have done nothing for eight to ten days. What a life!

October 1.—I perceive something that does not please me; the Grand Duchess Catharine appears to grow cold toward Karl; why, I do not know. There are so many little incidents that demonstrate this to me. I advised Karl, without disclosing this, to speak categorically. If he does this, he will know what he is doing; he does not deserve to be led about.

October 2.—Beauharnais; this man pleased me very well. We talked about the campaign in which we were opposed to each other; of the various events, etc. He acted most honestly of all the French. How must things appear to him now! He, a few moons ago the leader in Italy, one of the foremost men in Europe; now hardly a French marshal, begging for any piece of land. Thus goes the world. This is known to every one who had not gone high enough to become dizzy.

Stein is coming one of these days. I can discern so many influences. If only England would stand firm and support Austria! Wellington's arrival alone could turn the scale, as the others are too weak and yielding. Wrede speaks well. Münster likewise; unhappily he is confined to his bed these days.

October 8.—In the afternoon I met Karl. He told me definitely that his relations with the grand duchess [Catharine] had been broken.

Czar Alexander had told her in a few words that she should not leave him; she was indispensable to him [Karl continued]. I know her good heart; she was not able to protest. It sounds like a farewell; she is most unhappy, etc.

The grand duchess must have been dissatisfied with my brother. My brother did not declare himself, and so tension resulted, and this opportunity was used to put an end to the situation.

I know the woman, value her highly, and think I understand how one should associate with her; but very few persons understand this. I am very sorry that she is not to join our house. With Karl the matter is closed, Joseph is hindered by the law, and none of the rest of us can take this step after what has occurred; but I am certain I could have won her for myself if I had wished her.

Many petty princes visited me. These all stand by our emperor, as they hope to have him protect them from the arrogance of the larger German princes. We should not fail to give attention to this.

In the evening came a masked ball and soirées. The two crown princes of Würtemberg and Bavaria got into an altercation and wanted to fight a duel. Wrede mediated in the matter. The Bavarian is still angry because of his sister; is

very irritable, although nature has denied him hearing and fluency of speech. The one from Würtemberg is witty, gets the advantage, and this results in all sorts of quarrels. For what purpose!

October 10.—With the Grand Duchess Catharine. I found Joseph there; then came Constantine. What a rude, unrestrained man! Also a windbag in the highest degree. God save us from such a prince!

The Crown Prince of Würtemberg visited me, and I spoke several hours with him. The situation is not yet clear enough to me to enable me to put it down on paper.

October 13.—The Crown Prince of Bavaria, a well-intentioned man, wants to do good; there is nothing false and crooked about him, although he is somewhat slow of comprehension and has many drawbacks—deafness and a stuttering tongue. His heart, however, deserves a friend to advise him and to protect him from all men who would misuse it. I think highly of him. Yes, what an advantage this good neighborliness would be if I were in Innsbruck and could also serve my emperor in this manner!

October 14.—Visited the Grand Duchess Catharine in the evening and found F. M. L. Koller there. He is there daily, enjoys her blind confidence, and is valued by her, God only knows

why. Koller is a soldier, cunning, and serves my emperor; he is being used by the grand duchess in order to find out everything and to suggest to her what she should do. All letters pass through his hands; these are opened, read, and delivered by him. Possessing more cunning than she, he leads her as he wishes without her observing it. I would have warned her, but I cannot do so explicitly; and what is more, how does it concern me? Koller is playing a wild rôle, but he serves my master. Thus he is always with Wrede; thus he patronizes my niece Louise; her letters also will pass through his hands.

Irreconcilable conduct of the grand duchess, often childish friendliness, then again much that denotes reserve, almost falseness; frankness, uprightness paired with silence and reserve.

She dismissed Karl in the most friendly manner, but why does she demand from him the same attention as before? How can she demand that he play the lover without purpose? Or does she wish to use Karl before the world as protection against the advances of the Crown Prince of Würtemberg? This I do not understand.

October 16.—In the evening the marvelous oratorio "Samson" by Handel. What a noble idea, what power, and yet what melody in this music! How far behind this stand our motley



composers! Only Gluck and Mozart follow in his footsteps.

October 18.—Festival in the Prater. Only Austria can prepare such a festival, only Austria has such warriors. 1809! I was elated, and we little ones—the Crown Prince of Bavaria, William and August of Prussia—shared with one another [the hope] that God might always keep us of one mind, so that Germany might blossom.

In the evening soirée at Metternich's until two o'clock in the morning. The emperor was already tired. I was standing behind when the Russian Czar had a brush with Metternich. He told him that the diplomats made decisions, and then we soldiers had to let ourselves be shot to cripples for them. This pained the other. Then the Russian Czar observed that I had heard him and repeated his remark. I was silent, because others were standing by; but finally I said that unfortunately this was true, and that the lords often regarded us only as mere tools for their fantastic ideas and rarely took blood into account. It was unfortunate that I could not speak to this man alone; I would have given him other deductions.

October 21.—I met the Crown Prince of Würtemberg and took a walk with him. I then discovered, what I had long suspected, that Prussia meant to swallow Saxony, and the [story

of the] expansion of Bavaria on the Rhine. To the question of whether it is good that this state, which is now concentrated and forms a German entity, should be given a point of contact with France, thereby dividing its interests at the slightest threatening situation, the history of the compounded experiences of other times declares, No!

The struggle of our court to acquire the hereditary crown of the emperors! [The crown of the German empire of the Middle Ages.] Will conditions be better when Prussia or Bavaria receives it? Who will then protect the petty princes against the preponderance and arrogance of the grasping great ones? Whither will the German nation go? Who then will hold in check the stirring unrest of the people? Many things were neglected in Paris. Prussia aims in the direction of north Germany; England wishes to expand as king in Hanover, and therefore adopts a yielding attitude toward Prussia and Russia, when a firm stand on its part could save the situation. And we in one difficulty after another, always occupied, trying to settle the present one with palliatives. How, then, can great things come about?

The Russian Czar, unjustly, cannot tolerate Metternich. For Metternich to open his mouth on any subject is sufficient to have it condemned.

Have the petty princes lost the right of fighting for their cause? The peoples in Germany are in upheaval; the Würtembergers and the Bavarians, following the example of Nassau, give themselves a constitution. What is to come out of all this?

France wants tranquillity, because the present dynasty knows the danger of every war; for every one demands this state as an ally, and forces the organization of an army. If its enemy should release Napoleon, the army would join him, and disorders would begin anew.

October 22.—I talked with Talleyrand. What an interesting man! A worm-eaten heart, but an excellent head. He speaks frankly about the past; he described Napoleon's undertakings in Spain to me. In order to keep from going to Spain, as the voice of the nation demanded, since it wished to have conditions settled there, he began the war with Austria. This ended, he believed that he could retire with a brilliant stroke; therefore the marriage with my niece. Then he felt that he must remain at home in order to make sure of the succession, and when this was assured, he began the war with Russia. Talleyrand told me that Napoleon never had a plan; the latest events had always pointed the way for those to follow. Thus, at the close of the Russian war, he

would have moved on to Constantinople; he knew no end.

October 25.—Early to Metternich. I reported to him everything that had come to my attention and informed him of my views. On the twenty-fourth he had a tremendous quarrel with the Russian Czar. Alexander is set on Poland; he will accept no advice and continues unmoved on his way. Metternich told him that as an arbiter of peace he now passed over to the basic principles of Napoleon; nevertheless the czar argued for his interests, and finally emphasized his determination. There is nothing more to say. He accused Metternich of being the only one against him; whereupon this one declared that he was proud of it, as the nation criticized him for yielding and for weakness.

I infer from everything that Metternich is the only opponent. All who think justly must come to his aid now, else things will go badly with us all. If Metternich is to blame, it is because he slighted the czar and allowed him to feel it. The czar will not forgive this, and what Metternich says is sufficient to void it. I would never again treat directly with him [the czar]. In the meantime I behold pusillanimity among the good people and courage among the bad. The Congress in Vienna was a mistake. We have learned to know ourselves and our innermost thoughts, and

thereby confidence sinks low; whereas our weaknesses are only too glaring.

Only firm cohesion can save us here, can stop Russia, and then unite us with Prussia; finally to get on good terms with Bavaria without forgetting what it has always been to Austria and Germany, and without forgetting the corruption that has existed in the official class from Montgelas to the latest [incumbent]. This is Gallicism.

Neither Prussia nor Bavaria will receive the fortifications for Germany's boundaries. Mayence, city of the empire, commercial city, university, and fort, will have a mixed garrison, so that the Austrians will be stronger than the others. Yet not a single one of them shall have the only key to Germany on this side.

I am not at all pleased with the division of territory. Austria has received a great deal in Italy, to its misfortune. I would never have placed the boundaries beyond the Po and Chiesa. I would have given Lombardy to the King of Sardinia as King of the Lombards, because it would be useful to have a powerful prince there, as in the north of Holland. Austria under my plan would have received Italy as far as the Po and Chiesa; Tyrol, Vorarlberg, the Inn, Passau, the old districts of eastern Galicia, the Salines and Cracow, then the Dnieper up to the sea and the Danube, with Belgrade. In this manner

Russia would have been separated from Turkey. We would have the shipping on the Danube and its mouth; then Illyria, Dalmatia, Albania, and the seven isles. More than that is superfluous and injurious. Prussia goes to the Elbe, receiving Saxony; the Pfalz for Bavaria. The other states to remain as they are. All of the princes and some of the knights [Ritterschaft] to receive cities of the empire.

Germany! Germany! When will it become what it should be! Austria must not be deprived of the kaiserdome; otherwise this will go to Prussia or to Bavaria, which is continually striving toward this end.

The archduke years later wrote after the word Prussia, "I was right."

I observe what Russia's ruler is like. He is full of philanthropic ideas, yet shrewd; a pleasing exterior, smooth words, but I see passion. I see no warm heart for the general good; I do not trust him. I shall observe all of these men; it is great schooling for me.

October 27.—In two talks with the Grand Duchess Catharine I have learned the whole story. The matter is closed; my honorable plan for Karl is shattered. As things are, I can see that they have been badly bungled. It is possi-



ble that these two characters were not fitted for each other. She demands uprightness, deep feelings, a warm heart, complete sympathy and sharing of feelings; this she did not find. It is too bad.

November 2.—Disturbances in Paris and France since the debates on the emigrants [the nobles who fled from Paris during the Revolution]; this may be of advantage to us if its value is properly recognized, as it reunites all. It is time that it ended, for the people are tired of it.

November 22.—The King of Denmark visited Neustadt [Wiener Neustadt]. He observed everything carefully and investigated it; one of his aides took notes. This king is the only one who travels with profit.

I learned that because of an affection of the foot the Czar of Russia has become more tractable. He called Metternich to him, and there is even hope regarding Saxony.

I expressed the opinion, how little respect there is for the czar, and how little confidence one placed in the King of Prussia (for we saw him in the same way and in the retinue of the former). Our master knows them well.

November 29.—Gagern visited me to-day. How are things progressing at the Congress? The Lord have mercy! Russia as well as Prussia—king and Humboldt—insist on the system of

eating up [the conquered lands]; these men are not to be depended upon. We Austrians waver and talk; both yes and no at the same time instead of a firm, honorable language. England speaks, but is not supported. I hear that Metternich sinks daily in estimation, and the effect of his procedure is a total contempt for him. I do not damn him, and merely say that he must be supported until things are settled; then results will show where the truth lies.

It is a miserable commerce, this trading with lands and human beings. We cursed Napoleon and his system, and justly; he degraded mankind, and the very princes who fought against it are walking in his footsteps. Apparently we fought only against his person and not against his system. Russia pushes toward the west. Shall that be?

Prussia does not oppose it; it allows itself to be satisfied with Saxony and to return to the old, selfish politics, not yet taught by the severe lessons it has survived; capable of keeping its booty, if need be, by making common cause with Russia against the others and against Austria, which always has honorably proposed a division, and which had only to say "Yes" to enable it to join Napoleon and Russia for the purpose of wiping out Prussia. It is against Austria, which took up arms only to bring about the common

salvation, and which restored the doubtful conditions of the past; which sought nothing, established nothing, and trusted that the others would deal, think, and act like Emperor Francis. It should have remembered that one should never trust any one, but should attempt to hinder others from doing what is not just when it can be done. The moment for this was in Jitchin; later it was no longer possible.

Prussia, blinded, does not look into the future, and will regret this bitterly. Russia will give it no thanks. Prussia wants to possess Germany to the Rhine and the Main; it is the state which separates the nation. The idea of possessing Germany has not been rooted out. It strives to that end. May Austria, England, and France hold fast! All the German princes and Holland join them and show their teeth, and no one will dare start an unpopular war in view of the exhausted condition of these countries. In Russia it might cost the czar his life; in Prussia the nobility could rise and ask, "Why?" and curtail the king's absolute power. Now or never! The peace of our posterity for the next half-century is at stake; therefore firmness if we wish to remain victors!

December 5.—Visited my niece Marie Louise [consort of Napoleon, Empress of the French]

in Schönbrunn. She also does not know what is going to happen to her.

Prussia strives to possess all of northern Germany; that cannot be tolerated. This is the situation after three months, and only firmness can make an end of it.

In the evening Joseph wrote me a note in which he asked for statistical data. This is his letter:

Amice:

Honor and the safety of our skin is at stake, and as I have encounters and skirmishes virtually every day, I need, in order to maintain my cause with honor, statistical data, which you will be able to procure without much effort through your acquaintances. You should know that I am at the head of a distinctive party; therefore not allied either with Metternich or with one of the two emperors, and that I operate on my own behalf with both of them. For this purpose I should like to know: 1. The size of the population, territorial area, and income of the Kingdom of Saxony. 2. If you can find it out, how much of this would be cut off if the boundary-line of Prussia were carried from that of Magdeburg beyond Wittenberg, including this city, and to the point of Lower Lusatia? 3. How much population, territory, and income is contained in Münster, Paderborn and the lands between the Rhine, Moselle, and Meuse? Send me these facts as soon as possible if you can. I have a little more hope for Saxony to-night.

JOSEPH

December 7.—I caused the material [for Joseph's questions] to be collected for me early to-day in the war archives, the engineer's archives, and in the imperial private library. I collected as much as I could; Karl's library gave me something. This placed me in a position to deliver quickly what he asked. At 7:30 in the evening I was ready. The reason is this: Prussia is not to have Saxony, but an equivalent for it.

I gave him area, population, and income. Saxony is to remain as it is; only a number of districts to the north between the Elbe and Lusatia will go to Prussia. Prussia receives Münster, Paderborn, and the land between the Rhine, Meuse, and Moselle.

December 8.—I talked with a deputy from the Catholic Germans. He mourns the breaking up of the religious affairs of 12,000,000 German co-believers; they are working energetically to get a primate from our house.

December 9.—Württemberg has signed an agreement with Prussia regarding Saxony. It is shameful how every one goes his own way; no self-denial, only egotism, selfishness, ambition, hate. For shame! And the Crown Prince of Württemberg, with all his talents and gifts, plays a foul rôle; ambition is destroying him. He worked at this, for he passes everything on to his father. I gave him my opinion on it; he was

perplexed. I hate falsity, duplicity. He is said to have agreed to the plan, it is said, because offers were made that he become the commander of the consolidated German Army, which opens up many advantages. I will have to see this verified first. If it is true, then I am done with him and all his talents.

The Grand Duke of Baden, too lazy to govern, wanted to sell his country. A horrible word. Such princes are a scourge and an abomination; they are procurers. Is it, then, a wonder that the peoples begin to think of getting rid of them?

A rage that I cannot describe seizes me. If I had a hundred thousand men, I would step up to my emperor and say: "Master, you are the only one who has a heart. That is why Austria calls you father, that is why we all give you filial devotion, and gladly go forth to die for you. I have a hundred thousand men, and will discipline these gentlemen; and if God wills it, in three months they will agree. These princes are not worth being spoken to kindly; only Bavaria and the little ones are good.

December 11.—Pages from the history of the Congress. It is said that the old King of Würtemberg went to our emperor, protesting vehemently against the report that he had signed an agreement with Prussia. Now who has muddled affairs once more? I fear greatly that the crown



prince was inclined to do something, for it seems that he is also playing the game.

Wrede, chagrined at many things, is said to be ready to have the Congress adjourn without finishing its work. That would be the worst thing that could be done, irresponsible, and surely would lead to reaction from the people.

At last it seems as if a great storm is about to break over Metternich; his frivolity, his lies, his partiality—these are the principal accusations.

December 20.—The Congress will not end so soon; everything is undecided, nothing definite has yet been achieved. The principal difficulty is Saxony. The progress of the princes continues odd. Prussia has been offered Westphalia and the land across the Rhine as indemnity. The house of Orange makes demands on the latter; for by treaty, it has been promised an enlargement of its territory in exactly that quarter.

The Crown Prince of Würtemberg is playing a strange part. Blinded by the promises of Prussia, he takes sides with that country even in opposition to his father.

He tried to get Gagern to give Prussia the imperial dignity, and when the latter had listened long enough and thoroughly disagreed with him, he turned about and said that this was only a manœuvre to force Austria to take the honor.

While still in London he spoke malevolently.

Austria, he said, was not a German state. It should not be allowed to mix in these affairs, and should be ejected in case it did.

The two emperors talked together for certain about Poland, and I hope that this question will eventually be disposed of.

In the meantime Austria presented a precise note for the preservation of Saxony. The princes are speaking in behalf of this state, and also wish to send a note; this, it was said, was to be given by the otherwise excellent Duke of Vienna. The princes were threatened if they did not keep quiet. This resulted in the Duke of Coburg having a violent interview with the Czar of Russia in order to defend the justice of his cause.

This much is certain, that all are of one voice for Saxony. The Crown Prince of Würtemberg is alone against it, and seems to have compromised himself by going too far. It is likely that the report affecting Würtemberg originated from this. He is determined to play a part, and plays it badly; and thus it happens that one after another the princes desert him and that finally he will stand entirely alone, avoided by all and entrusted with nothing.

In the evening at court. A tiresome entertainment of tableaux. The conversations between the Crown Prince of Würtemberg and

me grow colder daily; our views are very dissimilar. Since the day when I told him frankly and openly what I thought with regard to Saxony we no longer talk politics. In place of that he asks peculiar questions, such as whether I entered the military from duty or voluntarily. I assured him voluntarily; whereupon he remarked that making war eventually becomes a passion. I did not reply to that; it is horrible.

I observed after dinner how greatly he was at outs with Wrede. Wrede taunts him and frowns angrily.

Genoa is to be united with Piedmont, although I was told that the deputies asked independence and an archduke. This was related to my niece Marie Louise by the Countess Bagnoli. This would please me, because the emperor would then see that I am somebody and that I can achieve something.

December 21.—I went to Prince Metternich to tell him everything I knew. I found him most obliging; unfortunately, there were women in the anteroom who were practising the *romanza*. He spoke very frankly with me on all matters; one word suggested another. He let me read the exchange of notes between Austria and Prussia. Of this conversation I transcribe the following:

Metternich brought up two questions, the one affecting Poland the other Saxony. He consid-

ered the first as more important, and believed that our efforts should be directed toward having our point of view adopted. In order to achieve this, it appears, we joined Prussia and even built hopes on Saxony. I do not believe that there was a definite promise. Prussia would not bite, or at least would take no active part, but merely pushed its own interests. The situation became long drawn out. England showed weakness; Austria did not wish to stand alone. After a long discussion pro and con, and when a feeling on behalf of Saxony had developed, it seemed to me that the case of Poland was dropped, and it was decided that Saxony was more important and that our contention in that quarter had to be sustained. As Prussia continued firmly to demand possession of Saxony, it was thought necessary to win Russia by yielding in Poland.

The second question was that of the preservation of Saxony, which had to be put through if that of Poland could not be settled in our favor. Czar Alexander, who gave Saxony to Prussia, should have been the one to force Prussia to relinquish it; but this he refused to do. As a matter of fact, it was hard to ask it. He sees the injustice toward Saxony, but it is my belief that he will not desert Prussia. The present state of the Polish situation limiting Austria to eastern Galicia, inclusive of Cracow, as in 1808, and

leaving western Galicia to Russia, was agreed upon with Alexander. It was determined that Prussia should have Poland up to the Warthe as well as Nidda and Thorn. In the note in which Austria communicated this to Prussia the statement was made that we would be pleased to see additional territory given Prussia by Russia.

I am not yet certain, however, that Austria will get Cracow; and if it does not, Russia should agree not to make a fort of it. This has been proposed.

In the note from Hardenberg, which was an answer to that in which we asked Prussia to help us induce Russia to give up its designs on Poland, we can read clearly the actual condition of Prussia, without means, without subsidies for making war, in a state of unrest, and yet proposing for the future to seize the first moment that is unfavorable for Russia and to utilize it [truly in the old Prussian manner!]. The personal affection of the king [of Prussia] for the czar will never permit anything to happen which might be obnoxious to the latter. In everything we see the desire to injure, to risk nothing, a boundless self-interest, and lust for Saxony.

When the status of 1805 was adopted, Prussia renounced all active participation in the Polish question, and England was still lukewarm; therefore the Polish affair was dropped, and all

attention was centered on Saxony. In the most friendly spirit Austria offered Prussia complete reparation and even the addition of from 300,000 to 400,000 souls, including a part of lower Lusatia, Hildesheim, Münster, Paderborn, etc., and finally the territory between the Meuse, the Moselle, and the Rhine. Prussia did not want it. Because of this and also because of the fact that Austria had settled its Polish negotiations with Russia, Prussia placed two Austrian notes and a private letter of Prince Metternich before the Russian Czar. These disclosed that Metternich had tried to influence Russia on the Polish question through Prussia and had given the latter nation hope of getting Saxony; and also that through Russia he had hoped to move Prussia in the Saxon affair, and therefore had yielded in Poland. Angered, Alexander went to our emperor, who, entirely put out, called Metternich to account, and ordered him to disclose all his transactions to the Russian Czar.

These transactions he showed me, and in these I saw our great mistake; but fortunately also recognized the tricky, false action of Prussia. This alone puts weapons into our hands with which to pay the account.

After I had told Metternich everything that was being said about him, I told him that the mask must be torn from Prussia. As a result



Russia might desert Prussia in anger, and we could then settle the Saxon question with the latter alone. Metternich replied that he could not tell everything he knew because it would disclose to Russia much of its own weakness in the direction of Poland, and it was wise not to take this step.

I disagreed with that. I believed that it would be better to tell everything in order to bring the matter clearly into the light.

I abhor the lack of frankness; it is miserable politics which swerves from this ideal. How mistaken is he who thinks that the superiority of politics lies in its great finesse, and in deceit, etc.! I do not share this view; I believe its superiority is rather in knowing the true situation, how to gage results well, and then to make the best decisions and adopt the best measures for carrying them into effect. He who is best fitted in these respects has the superiority, and honesty is compatible with such conduct.

In view of the fact that the situation developed as it did, I pleaded for firmness in the Saxon affair, because honor, advantage, in fact everything, was involved. It was absolutely necessary not to yield; this, I insisted, was feasible, because Prussia can do nothing without money, and the money, according to the views now expressed by England, is all at the disposal of Austria. Rus-

sia would become greatly occupied with Poland; internally it was as disturbed as any other state, and England would be able to make the war exceedingly unpopular by blockading the harbors and threatening the capital. France, Holland, England, Germany, and the voices of the people supported Austria. Under such conditions everything could be risked. Prussia's demand for Mayence, Luxemburg, the forts of the empire, and a sort of supremacy in northern Germany could never be countenanced. The true politics demanded by the interests of Germany lay in Prussia being strong enough to serve Germany, but not to oppress it. Prussia must see that it cannot isolate itself from German affairs, and for this reason we should hinder every concentration of its powers, and by extending it to the Rhine, force it to make common cause with Germany in every war, which it does not wish to do. I found Metternich agreeing with me, but I fear yielding measures may be taken. It would be a dastardly act if Austria should desert Saxony and merely protest.

For what purpose were 600,000 men mobilized if we had accomplished nothing by the time the Congress adjourned? That would mean the loss of the prestige our country possesses. Germany would be lost irrevocably, and what destructive

movements and popular upheavals might then come about!

A federation is being discussed in Italy. No matter how much I favor this plan, if such an organization can be controlled, I still disapprove the idea of breaking up Alexandria. It is advantageous for Austria to get the district of Domo d'Ossola, and thereby the road across the Simplon. I directed Metternich's attention to the need of our possessing Ferrara, Piacenza, and the Po, as well as Comacchio and Mirola. He agreed to this heartily, and said that even if we did not get them we should have garrisons in these places.

Here again I came across a choice story about the Crown Prince of Würtemberg. He had accosted Metternich and accused him of being the only opponent to the plan of taking Saxony, the more so because the archdukes were agreed. A fine lie in view of what I had sharply told him a few days before.

I wish that Metternich could pull himself out of this with honor; a great deal of pressure is being brought upon him. He must remain firm, that is the best and only thing to do.

December 22.—I discovered several new facts in this matter which confirmed my views. Metternich yielded to Hardenberg in the Saxon matter so long as he hoped to gain his point regard-

ing Poland; but when the Polish situation gave no hope, he recalled his remarks. Hardenberg had received the statistical tables that I prepared for Joseph, and in an angry mood took them to Alexander. Metternich was exceedingly embarrassed. Happily, Hardenberg's haste had proved his undoing, and we possessed facts enough to destroy him. This, however, we did not wish to do, in order not to enlighten the Russian Czar about his own affairs. I do not think this was the right course. We have presented a note regarding Saxony.

December 30, 31.—Nothing extraordinary; the year 1814 ends well for me. God grant that I may pass 1815 in activities for my czar, my fatherland, my dear mountains, and my little circle of friends! It is my aim to be useful to my fellow human beings, but far from the noisy distractions of the world, which has robbed us of so much time that might have been put to better and more pleasing use. I close 1814 with growing faith, with implicit confidence in God's wise guidance; strengthened by this I proceed courageously in my life work. This confidence will not let me fail; it will bring me the fulfilment of my wishes if I am worthy of this.

January 1, 1815.—The new year is greeted with the announcement of the peace between America and England, and thus the strength of the latter

will no longer be divided, and this nation can devote its whole care to giving the decisive turn to the negotiations that are to establish tranquillity on the Continent.

God save us from everything which may be interpreted as consenting to the plans of the covetous! Rather draw the sword again. It would be horrible, a curse on those who brought it about; the terrible Nemesis would follow them, and they would regret it bitterly. The people, who did everything for the good cause, will not let themselves be played with.

January 22.—Regarding the constitution in Würtemberg.

The declaration of the king is made public in a newspaper; just what the constitution grants is not stated. I know the king well enough to believe that assuredly he will give his country a constitution, that this will be extremely comprehensive and bear the mark of the greatest liberalism; but I think that he will make exceptions for the duration of his life and allow no restrictions in certain directions. Yes, I shall even be glad if he ties the hands of his successor. Whether the first is wise, and whether it is possible to do things half-way, remains to be seen. I think he has misjudged the situation, and once having made a decision, will go farther—yes, will have to go farther—without being able to ob-

ject. Baden is said to have followed this example, and Bavaria is said to be engaged at this task.

This has aroused interest here. Our empress regards these acts only as machinations of the *Tugendbund*; she thinks that Rome is now the seat of this organization and that Cardinal Consalvi, a delegate; Werner, the preacher, a propagandist; the Jesuits, etc., all have an understanding. She wishes to save Austria from the influence of these persons, and is put out by the forthcoming constitutions, which she regards as the work of the *Tugendbund*. She does not understand that the situation is entirely natural and that no *Tugendbund* is needed for this purpose.

Napoleon introduced the highest form of despotism; under him the other states became tools, the lands commodities. Nothing was honored, nothing preserved; everywhere there was intolerable oppression. Greed introduced the system of draining the land of everything methodically. The poverty which resulted made the people take heart. The princes had to turn to the masses for sanctuary as the last and only means left. The nation was armed, and the spirit of revolutions spoke, but for a just cause; all that was good, wise, and powerful came to the surface. There was general coöperation; the cause directed itself. The great body of princes



was too weak to lead it; they let the current go where it willed, too short-sighted to see the future and to prepare in the present ways for combating the evils that were bound to come with the good already achieved.

The great evil was banished, but the extreme factors took their usual course, and the despotic followed the liberal spirit. These peoples had now learned to know their power. They felt themselves saved, they realized how they had come to these calamities; they put their own estimate on the nothingness of many rulers, on the power of their new masters. The nations no longer wished to place their lives and their possessions at the caprice of a few ministers who had greatly misused them. This is the present situation, and only the Congress, which keeps everything waiting, is holding back; but there is unrest everywhere, and the princes are no longer able to dam the stream that they allowed to overflow in order to save themselves.

Every effort they make will only turn out unfavorably for them. Nassau started this in Germany; in Holland and in France there are such constitutions; England thanks its constitution for its greatness and its glory; Hesse, Hanover, Würtemberg, and Baden had to follow suit, because the severity of one and the sluggishness of another caused unrest. Bavaria follows,

whether the king wills it or no; Prussia surely will have to do the same, and perhaps most comprehensively; the other princes are carried with the tide. This is the situation.

What does Austria intend to do now; what can it do? I find that the emperor is in the most fortunate situation. He needs change nothing in all the old practices; he should merely hasten to put the old, restored provinces back on their former footing; Tyrol as in 1805, Carnia and the littoral as in 1809, Milan as it was under Maria Theresa, and Venice like it. Then there will be no uprising; the emperor remains unrestricted, the people satisfied.

When I visited the empress my emperor was present, and we spoke of this. I found his judgment accurate, and told him exactly what I thought. Yet I will have to speak with him privately; it is my duty. Truth, when quietly brought to his attention, always brings results with him.

January 23, 25.—Joseph and Karl have both informed me of a decision that pleases me very much. When I saw the negotiations with Grand Duchess Catharine fail, I advised both of them to marry; it was the best thing they could do, as they were the only ones in the house (of Hapsburg) who had estates sufficient to allow them to do so, and it was necessary to provide for the

preservation of the house. The emperor has two sons, the crown prince (Good Lord!) and Francis, who will be a good man, but who is delicate and not likely to live long. Ferdinand has only his Leopold. We cannot run the risk of having the house in danger of dying out, and also cannot have the power pass to the Milan line, which is not purely German. All my arguments brought results. Joseph, as shrewd as ever, and quick to put a plan into execution once he has made a decision, has taken up this idea and is working on it. His aim is the Weilburg house, which has the daughter of the duke, and the niece from the house of Anhalt-Bernburg-Schaumburg, owners of the holding of Holzappel. I hope he will succeed there. Karl also is decided, and happily Grünne agrees with me. I tried to direct his attention to Prussia or Anhalt-Dessau; the first would be a good political marriage. As both are brothers of mine, I have to prevent them from interfering with each other's plans, and I had a frank talk with Joseph about it. I hope to see both of them satisfied before the end of 1815, for then I shall again have promoted a good action.

February 16.—Bavaria speaks through its "Allgemeine Zeitung." The articles on Stein and the condemnation of Saxony by Prussia are excellent. Bavaria plays a good part. I find it

only natural that it wishes to remain powerful; it should be our task to set the true limits to which it may go. It seems to me that Metternich has made another mistake here; it was worth while for us to make friends with this state also. He agreed to Fulda's plan without the knowledge of Bavaria; now they do not wish to give up Salzburg and the Inn district unless they get a full equivalent for it. I am afraid that we shall finally yield here, where we should never yield. These lands are much too important for us.

England, it seems, was for a long time in the dark on the subject of Saxony. The nation wanted peace, and this at any price; this brought about Lord Castlereagh's doubtful, weak behavior when a firm attitude might have been useful. Arguments were then circulated, principally through Bavaria. These brought about the right views; soon the nation [England] spoke for the preservation of Saxony, resulting in debates to the close of Parliament and new orders to Vienna. Lord Castlereagh thought only of saving the situation, but did not know how, and thus it comes about that Saxony, torn in pieces, reduced by one half, remains a bone of contention, and will always invite the greed of Prussia.

Lord Wellington then arrived, for Castlereagh was indispensable to his party and needed

in Parliament, where it was threatened with trouble. I don't know whether he will be able to defend his political conduct; he will always have an excuse, such as Metternich's variable and so-called frivolous conduct. Würtemberg offered Russia a separate alliance; Russia refused.

Talleyrand, with whom I spoke, thinks the revolution began in Germany with the Reformation, and after a great deal of talk he said that Poland must form an independent country. (This was always the policy of France, for Poland was its ally.) He said that Prussia must be placed behind the Elbe and that Austria's rôle was to be the protector of all the states in Germany and their head. (The old fox! To tell that to me, an Austrian prince!) Cracow was a question for Austria to decide. I replied that it would not wear roses for Russia. It should have been Leipsic. And now, he continued, since things were emasculated, it was time to bring them to an end.

Talleyrand has confused every one, and that only through doubts, contradictions, etc., which he spread around. Stein, with whom I spoke, yields to his exaggerated views and determination. What an impractical idea! Germany's constitution is to be federative, the princes are restricted so far as they are concerned from

making peace, war, or an alliance with one another and with Germany; but are to have this power if Germany is not involved. That is to say, Bavaria can make war with France against Spain, but not with France against Prussia, or with Würtemberg against Hesse. Oh! oh! This leads to the old independence and separation.

The case of the Prussian cabinet is a real tragedy, especially the way things are conducted here.

Only one cause is good and salutary—an intimate, loyal alliance between Prussia and Austria. This holds Germany and forces it to join, with the result that France will not cross the Rhine, but go only to the Vosges, and in order to defeat the barbarians of the North, which are now pushing southward, to free Poland and to force Russia back to the boundary which nature gave it—to the Niemen, the Dnieper, and the Dniester.

Who will bring about a real union with Prussia? Not France, let us hope. We have no other union (open to us) except with Prussia. The latter would gain thereby and win strength and security against internal unrest. The state of things there may be indicated by the fact that General Grollmann wrote Lord Wellington that the Prussian Army would never permit Leipsic to be returned to Saxony without the knowledge



of the king. And he goes about as if he had said nothing!

On the seventh the cases of Poland and Saxony were decided; now they are occupied with German, Welsh, and Swiss affairs, but how? I hear so much that I do not know what to believe: fragments only, no general plan, no glance into the future; everywhere neglect, mistakes, everything done in a petty fashion. Truly, I am living in continual unrest. I do what I can, but to what purpose? Who listens?

February 17. March 4.—The Congress progresses; Prussia gets its boundaries, but such boundaries! If it had adhered honestly to Austria, it would have fared better.

My niece Louise received Parma through the action of the Russian Emperor. The Swiss and Italian affairs are now being discussed; an arrangement is being made with Bavaria, regarding which I handed Schwarzenberg a note on the subject of Salzburg. The Crown Prince of Bavaria learned of this and accused me of it; I did not deny it and asked, "Why not?" He said I did right in serving my master; it was his duty to fight for his cause. Exactly! We are and remain, therefore, the best of friends.

While these things are being discussed here, Murat is moving: he is said to have declared war on France. We are collecting 15,000 men in

and about Italy to maintain our neutrality. France goes by sea. I think that before we expect it we will have to go at Murat ourselves. I wish that we had spared ourselves this.

The Crown Prince of Würtemberg seems to draw away from Russia; he is not putting into effect his plan of having a possession of his own on the Rhine, the command of the army of the empire, and the inspection of the forts. He is determined to play a part; so he turns to the Austria, about which he spoke so loudly. Yes, he seeks service; Milan, the command against Murat, is his aim.

This would give him an excuse for breaking his relation with the Grand Duchess Catharine, of which he seems to be tired, and which he cannot do in any other way, as he has already gone too far. Of what good are courage, knowledge, talents, if the character is not honest, firm, and fixed?

Karl and Joseph are going forth to reconnoiter for wives. Joseph goes with the Russian Czar to Berlin, and thence will visit the German courts and hunt for a wife. Karl goes to the baths at Wiesbaden, where he also will search for a wife; he has talked a great deal, however, and the Prince of Reuss has spoken with the Weilburger, so that the latter assuredly knows that his daughter is the objective. I am urging

both brothers on, so that they will marry before fall. I should like to have Karl get a good wife, so that the grand duchess [Catharine] will not be able to interest him again if the Würtemberg case should fall through. I am not at all concerned about Joseph.

Napoleon left Elba with 1200 men and six cannon on February 26, 27. Colonel Campbell of England was to watch him; he had gone to the Continent to make preparations! No ships to be had. I said long ago we should have a care; he was preparing something. Every one looked on me as a pessimist. I marvel only at the generosity of the victors who left 1000 men of the guards, a battalion, and several ships in his hands. He went north, and was seen to sail past Capraja and Corsica. Murat has 70,000 men, and France wanted to oppose him; so Soult arranged to have 60,000 men at Lyons. He had drawn his army corps to Paris and had sent away all other troops, all at the time when Napoleon began to move. This is very dangerous. Talleyrand, whom I met at court, thought the situation unimportant; yet his anxiety was apparent, for he sought a declaration by the allies. He said he thought Napoleon was going to Genoa.

Wellington, who sees things simply and accurately, thought Napoleon would go to southern

France; he would not have many supporters there, but the army favored him.

Metternich treated it as a joke. This angered me, for I did not find it a joke, but exceedingly serious. Bellegarde was ordered to gather together all the troops he could if Napoleon landed in Italy and to attack him at once. It is my view that there is no time to be lost. England and Holland under Wellington in the Netherlands; Prussians and Russians at Mayence; we and the South Germans at Strasburg—we must try to hold these forts. In Italy 100,000 Austrians will be sufficient.

March 14, 18.—Napoleon's undertaking, the trip to Grenoble. He found the peasantry against him everywhere; but in Grenoble the situation changed. In the meantime we issued a manifesto too precipitately; for if Napoleon's affair was insignificant, it was superfluous, and if the army, and thereby France, fell to Napoleon, how could we carry out what we promised? The phraseology of the manifesto may be criticized even more.

Talleyrand was in haste; therefore it was issued so quickly.<sup>1</sup>

On the sixteenth nothing was known at Paris;

<sup>1</sup> The archduke added at a later time: "Out of fear; for if Napoleon won, Talleyrand's neck was at stake."

this to me seemed a bad sign. To-day I had a talk with the Emperor of Austria.

March 17.—News from France. All these reports, which came so suddenly, as well as the activity and speed of Napoleon, frightened the lords. The Russian Czar unbent, showed fear; long conferences about operations, etc. This is no time for much conferring; act! To-day is the eighteenth. Napoleon may be in Paris to-day; if he succeeds in this, we shall soon see him with 200,000 good fighting men among us. His proclamations are in the name of the King of Rome and his rights; he calls himself his general; promises the nation Belgium and the left bank of the Rhine; is determined against the allies. Now comes the fourth act, a war more dangerous, more severe than ever; there is no way out of it. We cannot be on the Rhine for a month; the Russians come much later, and time is precious.

Letitia, Pauline, and the other sisters [of Bonaparte] and Jerome have been arrested; Joseph is in Switzerland, and officers have been sent to get him.

To-day came the news that the Swiss had agreed in Zurich to unite intimately, to forget everything, and to concentrate only on the danger that threatened the fatherland. Geneva had asked for help. The Swiss offered the draft of from 30,000 to 40,000 men.

Fortunate the man who will command such brave fellows! If I could get this commission, and thereby fight with from 5,000 to 6,000 Tyrolese marksmen for my emperor, we surely would not disgrace ourselves.

March 19, 20.—Karl went to the emperor to ask for a commission if war should break out; he offered himself for anything, really with a great deal of self-denial. The emperor was embarrassed.

To-morrow Ludwig goes; on Friday I shall drag myself up; it is a question whether we can accomplish anything. However, it is our duty to speak, and the moment is opportune, as all the field equipages are being prepared. I go as they will have me and under any one and will make no conditions; honor impels me, nothing more. I have no object; I demand neither distinction, advancement, nor anything else.

March 21.—I am satisfied. Karl spoke with Schwarzenberg; so I learned that we shall all get a position. Karl will be governor of Mayence; Italy was probably his field. In the meantime it is good of Karl to take this place.

I am to receive the direction of engineers with the main army. I am satisfied; I shall be at headquarters, shall learn and see everything, and as I wish to gain Schwarzenberg's good opinion, he can use me for whatever he wishes. Perhaps



Heaven will give me an opportunity to accomplish something. Ludwig gets a division of grenadiers.

We must accept everything that is given us, and then every one must do all he can to show what we are capable of. Now is the time to show the world that the Austrian princes are men in courage, knowledge, fulfilment of duty, self-denial in everything. We must show our emperor how shamefully we have been maligned.

We serve only for honor and the fatherland. We want no orders, no higher rank, no pay; nothing but his recognition that we are loyal to him, that we are capable of doing something, and that in us lives the spirit that has so often saved Hapsburg by the compact union of its descendants for the common cause of the house.

An exposition of what must be done to prevent another uprising by Napoleon. Thus only can this dragon be crushed, and crushed he must be, so that his slaver does not poison other states.

Metternich has made peace with the Czar of Russia. This gracious lord can now comprehend what injury his philanthropy has done. What mild treatment was that in Paris! Everything conceded! The 100,000 prisoners could not be sent to France too soon. These are the very ones who now are firm adherents of Napoleon. It was this man who discovered doubt, anxiety, diffi-

culties, and the possibility that France wished neither Napoleon nor the Bourbons; who considered what should be done—and actions like this! I say that the French have to take the Bourbons because we have said so, and because we have the power to make them do so. I would not have issued the 'declaration [making Napoleon an outlaw], but now it is fortunate that it took place, for now we have to act. The summer of 1815 must see the matter concluded. Only then shall we have peace and be able to build up something substantial.

March 22, 24.—I put my case before Schwarzenberg and pleaded that I be not left behind. I would do anything, even the smallest task; it would be cruel, unjust if we men of Austria were the only ones left behind when all others departed. He said he understood this and believed that the emperor would take it into consideration, but he did not know when or how. To-morrow I will go to the emperor and will plead and make representations.

March 24.—William [Prince of Prussia] is leaving to-day; we said farewell; our friendship is forever. Where souls find each other, even death does not part them. God grant that we meet again! We both were greatly moved; he, as if he believed that we would not meet again. He is the father of a family, an honorable German

man. May God be with him and protect him and give him long life to do great and good things for our common fatherland, for our people, and for his nation!

March 25.—To-day Ludwig received his assignment, a division of thirteen battalions of grenadiers in the reserve; my cousin Ferdinand received the command of the reserve itself; I am working out my views on the Italian positions for Schwarzenberg.

March 26.—Yesterday I visited the emperor, who made me director of engineers of the army and who was most friendly. I told him that when I learned that Ludwig was to have a command I determined to say nothing to him, as I was convinced that he would not forget me. This pleased him. He spoke a great deal about Italy, and I saw that he was inclined to take me with him when the unrest has ended, or to let me proceed thither and to investigate the country and the fortifications. He agreed to everything that I need for my equipment. Dear, good man, to whom I am so devoted, if I could but do him a real service, then I would be happy. In the evening I received a command from Prince Schwarzenberg as follows:

“His Majesty in a most exalted decision of the twenty-fourth of this month has deigned to attach your imperial Highness to the army in

Germany; and also instructed your Highness to take charge of the direction of the engineers in the field," etc.

April 4.—Note of Prince Metternich delivered early yesterday evening to the emperor. The archduke wished first to receive the homage of Italy in the name of the emperor, then inspect the fortresses, and then to proceed to him either to Vienna or through Switzerland and make a report. Conferences with Metternich, Schwarzenberg, Lazensky.

Metternich advised him that Goës and a commanding officer had been decided on for Venice, Saurau and Frimont were to go to Milan, and Bellegarde was to act in the interim as viceroy. The emperor would assume the title of King of Lombardy and Venice; the attack on Murat would now open. He had only 35,000 men.

Karl has received orders to go to Mayence—very brief. That is to say, he will be commandant of this fort.

I naturally feel the bitterness which he must feel at having to play such a passive part; criticism, adverse comment on what has taken place, general disapproval. This is the poison that is circulated; I shall warn him and beg him as a true friend. I would surely want to see him in an exalted place as he deserves. God knows.

April 5.—At the emperor's. Before God, my life is nothing to me if I cannot give him a proof of how much I think of him, and that I am his true servitor. Hail my master and Austria!

## CHAPTER VII

### THE MASTER CRAFTSMAN OF DIPLOMACY EXPOSES HIS HAND

FROM THE LETTERS OF CHARLES MAURICE DE  
TALLEYRAND TO HIS SOVEREIGN, KING LOUIS  
XVIII OF FRANCE

THIS is Talleyrand's own story of how he defeated the attempt of the allies to revise the map of Europe without consulting France. Through a long number of years of French diplomacy from the time of the Revolution to that of Louis Philippe, Talleyrand is either in the foreground or in the background, never very far away. Estimates of his usefulness vary, and his character, violently attacked during his lifetime, has had both its apologists and its detractors. Talleyrand appeared at the Congress of Vienna as the most accomplished of all the diplomats of the old school. He had often been a match for them; he had beaten them at their own game, and for the most part they hated him: yet he triumphed again, just as he did in Paris in 1814 when the allied armies had taken Napoleon's citadel.

To understand Talleyrand it is necessary to know the times in which he lived. He began his career as



Bishop of Autun. In 1789 he proposed that the property of the church be confiscated by the state. He became minister of foreign affairs, and when Napoleon seized power, he was retained in office. Throughout the early years of Napoleon's reign Talleyrand appears at his right hand, conducting most of the diplomatic negotiations. After the Peace of Tilsit he broke with the emperor. He founded that Confederacy of the Rhine which was still talked about at the Congress of Vienna. He helped bring about the abdication of Napoleon, and when Czar Alexander arrived in Paris in 1814 and made his headquarters in Talleyrand's house, the latter formulated his famous principle of legitimacy, setting forth that unless a legitimate sovereign ruled France, all thrones of Europe would be endangered. He obtained the restoration of Louis XVIII, and represented him at Vienna. Here he obtained for France her old frontiers; succeeded in forming a secret alliance between England, Austria, and France to checkmate Russia and Prussia; compelled Alexander to be satisfied with a part of Poland instead of the whole; and prevented the complete absorption of Saxony by Prussia. The means he used were those of the old diplomacy, and in these letters to his sovereign, Louis XVIII, he has exposed his hand. It is of interest now to recall that Talleyrand many years later took an important part in the negotiations that led to the foundation of the present Kingdom of Belgium.

VIENNA, *October 4, 1814.*

SIRE:

On September 30, between nine and ten o'clock in the morning, I received a letter of five lines from Prince Metternich, dated the day before, in which he made the proposal, on his own responsibility, that I attend a preliminary conference at two o'clock, together with the representatives of Russia, England, and Prussia. He added that a similar invitation would be sent to M. de Labrador, the representative of Spain.

The words "together with" and "attend" were apparently used after careful consideration. I replied that with pleasure I would visit him together with the representatives of Russia, England, Spain, and Prussia.

The invitation sent to M. de Labrador was couched in the same phrases as mine with this exception, that it was placed in the form of a letter in the third person, drawn up in the name of Prince von Metternich and his colleagues.

M. de Labrador communicated this writing to me and asked my advice regarding an answer. I showed him my reply, and he compiled one exactly the same, in which France was named together with, and preceding, the names of the other powers. In this manner M. de Labrador and I checkmated this scheme for separating and

isolating us, and drove a wedge between the intimate alliance of the others.

I arrived at M. von Metternich's before two o'clock, but found the representatives of the four allied courts already assembled in conference about a long table. Lord Castlereagh, at one end, evidently had the chair; at the other end sat a man who was introduced to me by M. von Metternich as the secretary of their conference: it was Gentz.

Talleyrand here meets a remarkable figure of the Congress of Vienna, Friedrich von Gentz, first a Prussian, then an Austrian, statesman, also known as the Chevalier Gentz, to whom we are indebted for our knowledge of the minutes of the Congress. Gentz drew up the resolutions and treaties of the Congress. He was one of those indispensable men who never lack work, for he served as secretary for the Austrian plenipotentiaries at Vienna, Aix-la-Chapelle (1818), Carlsbad (1819), Troppau (1820), Laibach (1821), and Verona (1822).

A chair was vacant between Castlereagh and Metternich, and I seated myself there. I asked the question why I alone of the embassy of your Majesty had been invited. This led to the following conversation:

"The chiefs of the various cabinets alone were intentionally invited to the preliminary conferences."

"M. de Labrador is not chief, and yet was invited."

"The Spanish secretary of state has not yet arrived in Vienna."

"But, in addition to Prince Hardenberg [of Prussia], I see here M. von Humboldt, who also is not secretary of state."

"This is an exception that is made necessary by the physical defect of Prince Hardenberg, which is well known to you."

"If this is a case of physical defects, then every one can make use of his own and has the right to capitalize it."

This little verbal tilt refers first of all to the fact that Prince Hardenberg was hard of hearing; Talleyrand, who was lame, speaks ironically of his own deformity.

It seemed to be the feeling that every secretary of state should bring with him a plenipotentiary who had been assigned to him. For the moment I held it useless to parley longer on this issue.

There follows here the report on the protest of the Portugese ambassador, Count Palmella, who had not been invited to the preliminary conference.

"The subject of to-day's conference," explained Lord Castlereagh to me, "is to present to

you the communication regarding the steps that have been taken by the four courts which are here represented." He then turned to Metternich and said, "You have the minutes."

Metternich thereupon handed me a written document, signed by himself, Count Nesselrode, Lord Castlereagh, and Prince Hardenberg, in several paragraphs of which occurred the term "allies." I objected to this term; I said that this word prompted me to ask whether we were still in Chaumont or in Leon, whether peace had not been achieved, and whether enmities still existed, and against whom? All replied that they placed no weight whatsoever on the word "allies," nor used it in a sense not in keeping with our present relations; the word had been chosen solely for its brevity. At this I protested that even if the word was of value for its brevity, this did not permit us to ignore its exact meaning.

The contents of the protocol was a tangle of metaphysical conclusions; the object was to give validity to demands based on treaties wholly unknown to us. To discuss these conclusions and demands would have had the same effect as jumping into an ocean of disputation; therefore I saw the necessity of turning everything down with a conclusive argument. I read a number of paragraphs and said:

"I cannot make anything of it." I then read

them carefully for the second time, with the attitude of a man who desires to go to the bottom of a matter, and then said, "I still am not able to make anything of it," and added: "For me there are two dates between which nothing has happened. The first date is May 30, on which the organization of the Congress was proclaimed; the second, October 1, on which the Congress was to meet. Everything that has happened in this interval is unknown to me, and does not exist so far as I am concerned."

The reply of the plenipotentiaries was to the effect that they placed little weight on the document and thought it would be better to withdraw it. Thereupon M. de Labrador remarked that, nevertheless, they had signed it. The document was then withdrawn; Metternich put it aside, and no more was said about it.

The document which caused all this verbal sparring between Talleyrand and the representatives of the four powers is known as the resolution of September 22, 1814, which opens with the presumptuous phrase, "The representatives of Austria, Russia, England, and Prussia have gathered to decide on a suitable order of business for the Congress of Vienna by means of which it will be brought to a speedy and successful conclusion." The resolution in effect was meant to deprive France of any voice in the most important transactions of the Congress, such as the division of conquered



territory. In a secondary resolution of the same date, which is meant to interpret more clearly the intent of the first document, the allies state specifically that: "The four powers are to come to an agreement solely among themselves regarding the division of the provinces that have become accessible through the last war and the Treaty of Paris; the other two [France and Spain] are later to be called upon to give their views and, if they consider it necessary, their objections, which will then be discussed with them; and also, in order not to be led away from this guiding line, the plenipotentiaries of the four powers will enter into negotiations with the other two only after they have completed wholly and in agreement the division of the territories in the Duchy of Warsaw, in Germany, and in Italy." Farther on in the resolution the allies also state that "as France has again received a legitimate government, the four allied powers have no intention of barring this nation or Spain from any discussions on the division of territories in so far as these powers have a special interest in them, or in so far as the interest of all of Europe comes into question, as they would have barred France had peace been made with Napoleon."

The supplementary resolution precipitated a similar discussion when it was read at this conference. Talleyrand again made good his objections, especially against the fact that the six great powers, England, Austria, Prussia, Russia, Italy, and Spain, should do all the preliminary work for the Congress. He succeeded in winning Castlereagh over to his point of view, and

created for the first time a feeling of indecision among the allies.

Then I went to the special audience that Czar Alexander, through Nesselrode, had commanded me to attend. The czar came forward to meet me and shook my hand, but his air was not friendly, as formerly; he spoke sharply, and his attitude was earnest, almost ceremonious. I saw clearly that he was engaged in trying to play a rôle.

"Above all," said he, "how is the situation in France?"

"As good as your Majesty might wish, and better than we could hope for."

"How is public opinion?"

"It improves every day."

"The liberal ideas?"

"They develop nowhere better than in France."

"What about the freedom of the press?"

"It has been restored; but a few restrictions are still necessary in the circumstances, and will be removed in two years. These, however, are not to interfere with the publication of all that is good and useful."

"And the army?"

"It is entirely on the side of the king; one hundred thirty thousand men are under the

colors, and with the first call three hundred thousand could be added."

"What are the marshals doing?"

"Which do you mean, Sire?"

"What is Oudinot doing?"

"He is faithful to the king."

"What is Soult doing?"

"At first he was disaffected; he had received the office of governor of the Vendée and conducted himself excellently there, and had won love and respect."

"What is Ney doing?"

"He is still thinking with regret of his endowments; but this regret the favor of your Majesty can diminish."

"What are the two chambers doing? It seems to me as if opposition is rising there."

"It is the common belief, where there are deliberating assemblies, that there may be differences of opinion; but in feelings they are one. Despite the change of opinion of a few, a great majority is still with the Government."

"But there is no unity."

"Who could have reported such a thing to your Majesty? After a revolution lasting twenty-five years the position of the king has become so secure in a few months that it seems as if he had never left France. Can anything prove better that all are marching toward one goal?"

"But your personal position?"

"The proofs of the king's confidence in me exceed my hopes."

"Let us now talk of our transactions; we will have to conclude them here."

"That depends upon your Majesty. They will be brought to an end quickly and happily if your Majesty shows the same nobility and the same greatness of soul here as in France."

"But every one is entitled to his accounting."

"And every one to what is his right."

"I will retain the occupied territory [Poland]."

"Your Majesty will wish to retain only that which is yours by right."

"I am in agreement with the great powers."

"I do not know whether your Majesty includes France among them."

"Surely; but if you do not want every one to have what is due him, what is your intention?"

"I place this accounting after the right."

"The accounting of Europe is the right [justice]."

"This language, Sire, is not your own; it is foreign to you, and your heart is not in it."

"No; I repeat it, the accounting of Europe is the right."

Thereupon I turned to the wall beside which I stood, leaned my head against it, pounded the

panels, and cried, "Europe! unhappy Europe!" Then I turned again to the czar and asked:

"Shall it be said in the future that you forced Europe into the abyss?"

He replied:

"Rather war than to give up what I have occupied."

"I let my arms fall, and remained silent in the attitude of a deeply grieved, but determined, man, with an expression as if to say, "It will not be our fault."

It was several moments before the czar broke the silence, and then he repeated:

"Yes; rather war."

I continued in my attitude. Thereupon he raised his hands and shook them as I had never before seen him do, in a manner that called to mind the closing lines of "The Eulogy of Marcus Aurelius," and cried out:

"It is time for the theater; I must go. I have promised the emperor; he awaits me." Thereupon he departed; in the open door he turned about once more, took hold of me with both hands, and said to me while wholly beside himself: "Adieu, adieu. We will meet again."

During this whole conversation, of which I can report to your Majesty only the most important part, Poland and Saxony were not mentioned a single time, but were referred to only by circum-

locution. For instance, the czar meant Saxony when he said, "The traitor to the cause of Europe." Thereupon I replied:

"Sire, it is a question of facts"; and after a short pause I added, "And the result of difficulties in which one may be placed by circumstances."

At one time the czar spoke of "allies." I rejected the term, as I had done before in the conference, and made its use cumbersome to him.

This, Sire, is the present situation.

Your Majesty sees how difficult is our position. With every day it may become worse. Czar Alexander is developing his ambition; he is being urged on by La Harpe and Prince Czartoryski. Prussia is looking forward to unusual enlargement of territory; Austria is faint-hearted, and has only an ignoble ambition, but is glad to find support. And these alone are not the only difficulties. Others are growing out of the treaties which the courts that were once allied made with one another at a time when they did not expect the fall of the man whom they saw fall, and when they had resolved to make a peace with him which would permit them to become his imitators.

To-day, when, with your Majesty, Justice has reascended the throne, these powers for whose advantage these agreements were made do not



wish to give them up; whereas those who are perhaps sorry that they are pledged do not know how they are to free themselves. In the latter situation, according to my view, is England, whose plenipotentiary is weak. It is possible that the representatives of your Majesty may meet such opposition that they will have to give up all hope except of saving their honor; but we have not yet come to that.

VIENNA, *October 9, 1814.*

SIRE:

The representatives of the four courts were embarrassed by my note of October 1, and as they could find no argument to refute it, they acted as if insulted. "This note," M. von Humboldt said, "is a torch thrown in our midst." "They plan to separate us," said Nesselrode. "This shall not succeed." They confess publicly, therefore, what was easy to suspect, that they have made an agreement with one another in order to become masters of the whole situation and to represent themselves as the supreme arbiters of all Europe. More moderately, and in a milder tone, Lord Castlereagh said to me, that it was their view that the conference to which they invited M. de Labrador and me should be an extremely confidential one, and that I had robbed it of this character by my note, and in

addition to that, by an official note. I replied that the mistake was on their side, not on mine. They had wished to know my view, and I had thought that I should communicate it to them in writing and with my signature, because I had seen that they communicated among themselves in their conferences in writing and with signature.

The ambassadors wanted Talleyrand to withdraw his note, but Labrador remarked that it was too late, since the note already was in circulation. Metternich became embarrassed and pointed out that the four powers alone would make all preparations. Thereupon Talleyrand declared that he would take part in no further conferences until the Congress was opened. In this manner he managed to create a feeling of insecurity and to win Castelreagh over to his side. Then Metternich, fearing the designs of Russia and Prussia, showed a leaning toward Talleyrand. He sent Talleyrand a note asking him to call, "because it concerns important matters." The narrative which follows deals with this incident.

I arrived at his home at seven o'clock and was admitted at once. He spoke first of the draft of an explanation which he had caused to be prepared, and which, he said to me, differed a little from my own, but yet was so similar that I might be satisfied with it. I asked him for this document, but he did not have it at hand.

"I suppose it circulates among the allies?" I asked.

"Speak no longer of the allies; they no longer exist."

"There are persons here," I said, "who should be allies in the sense that, without having an understanding, they have the same object. How do you get the courage to let Russia coil itself around Hungary and Bohemia, your foremost and most important possessions? Can you permit the heritage of a good old neighbor into whose family a duchess has married to be turned over to your natural enemy? It is strange that we should wish to oppose your enemy, and that you do not."

He said to me that I had no confidence in him; I replied that he had given me little cause for it, and reminded him of several instances in which he had not kept his promise to me.

"In addition to that," I added, "how can I trust a man who acts secretly against those who show by their leanings that they intend to make his own cause their own? On my part, I am not doing this secretly, and do not need to do so. That is the advantage of men who act on the basis of principles. Here," I continued, "are pens and paper. Will you not write that France asks nothing and will take nothing? I am ready to sign this."

"But," said he, "the Neapolitan matter remains open, and this is virtually yours."

I replied:

"No more mine than that of all the others. It is for me only a question of principle; I ask only that he who has the right to remain in Naples shall remain in Naples, and nothing more. And this all the others must wish as much as I. You need only to observe these principles, and you will find me ready to agree in everything. I will tell you frankly and freely what I can give and what I will never give. I can understand that the King of Saxony in his present situation may be forced to make sacrifices; I take it for granted that he is ready to do so, because he is reasonable: but I will never agree if he is to be robbed of all his states and if the kingdom of Saxony is to be given to Prussia. I also will never agree that Luxemburg and Mayence shall be given to Prussia. I also will not allow Russia to expand beyond the Vistula, to have forty-four million subjects in Europe, and to place its boundaries on the Oder. If, however, Luxemburg is given to Holland, and Mayence to Bavaria, if the Kingdom of Saxony remains intact and the king in office, and if Russia does not expand beyond the Vistula, then I will have no more objections to make regarding this part of Europe."

M. von Metternich thereupon seized my hand and said:

"We are not so far apart as you think. I promise you that Prussia shall have neither Luxemburg nor Mayence, nor do we wish Russia to be overwhelmingly enlarged; and as for Saxony, we will do everything we can to keep at least a part of it intact."

Metternich then begged Talleyrand not to bring up the question of admittance to the Congress, so as to give Murat no ground for an outbreak. Talleyrand agreed to this.

At the conference that followed, Talleyrand declared that he would support Metternich on the condition that the following sentence be added to the document announcing that the formal opening of the Congress would be postponed to November 1: "The opening will take place in accordance with the principles of public right."

At these words there arose a tumult difficult to imagine. M. von Hardenberg rose at the table, leaned upon its surface, and, chopping off his words, yelled in a loud and threatening voice such as is usually found among men who have defects such as his:

"No, sir. The public right? That is unnecessary. Why declare that we will act according to the public right? That is understood without a word."

I replied to him:

"If it is understood without a word, it would be much better understood if the word were spoken."

M. von Humboldt cried:

"What have we to do with the public right?"

I replied:

"The fact that you sit here shows what influence it has had."

Lord Castlereagh took me aside and asked whether I would show myself more conciliatory if my wishes on this point were followed. I asked him, on my part, what I might hope for from him in the Neapolitan question if I showed myself more ready to coöperate; he promised to support me with all his influence.

"I will talk with Metternich about it," he said; "I have the right to a decided view on this question."

"You give me your word of honor?" I asked, and he replied:

"I give it to you."

"And I," I added on my part, "give you my word of honor that I will be unyielding only in those principles which I dare not jeopardize."

In the meantime M. von Gentz had neared Prince Metternich and made representations that he could not refuse to mention the public right in a document such as the one under discussion.



The amendment that I asked for was finally agreed to, and then there resulted a no less lively discussion about the place where this was to be inserted. It was finally agreed to put it in a sentence preceding the one that I had suggested.

M. von Gentz could not refrain from saying in the conference:

"The story of this evening, gentlemen, belongs to the history of the Congress. It is not for me to tell it, for my duty forbids, but the story surely will be repeated."

He said to me later on that he had never experienced anything like it. I therefore consider it fortunate that without giving way on any of our principles I have been able to do something which may be regarded as leading to the opening of the Congress.

On October 12, Talleyrand wrote to the ministry of foreign affairs: "It is said that we have won a victory by obtaining the addition of the words 'public right.' This view gives you a measure by which to judge the spirit which moves the Congress."

The minister of war, Dupont, wrote to Talleyrand on October 8, 1814, as follows:

"The resident on the island of Elba frequently receives couriers from Naples and other places. He often rises during the night, writes despatches, and seems very much occupied, although in a studied manner he

speaks of his rest and his aloofness from business. It is really highly important that he should be removed from Italy by united action of the powers. It is certain that there will not be war; but should another again break out, Napoleon without doubt will bring together a number of Italian and even French deserters and disturb the peace of the continent at various places."

VIENNA, *October 13, 1814.*

The determination to remove Bonaparte from Elba seems fairly well defined. Up to this time, however, no one has a clear idea of whither he can be taken. I have proposed one of the Azores, which are five hundred leagues from the continent. Lord Castlereagh seems to believe that the Portuguese would favor this new arrangement; in this, however, the question of money will again play a part. The son of Bonaparte is no longer treated as he was at first upon his arrival in Vienna. There are fewer formalities, and everything is done more simply.

Czar Alexander said a few days ago, "Talleyrand is here acting as minister of Louis XIV," and Humboldt told the Saxon delegate Schulenburg, in order to win him over or to intimidate him: "The French plenipotentiary appears here with noble words; but they either hide something or there is nothing behind them. Woe to the man who depends on them!"

In order to stop such remarks and to make an end of all irresolution, your Majesty should issue a declaration to your people announcing the basic principles which you have ordered us to adhere to, as well as your firm determination never to depart from them; at the same time you should make it understood that the just cause will not remain without support.

VIENNA, *October 17, 1814.*

SIRE:

The ferment of revolution is scattered all over Germany. Jacobinism prevails there, not as it did with us in France twenty-five years ago,—in the middle and lower classes,—but among the highest and richest of the nobility, a difference which makes it impossible to judge the progress of a revolution breaking out in Germany by the progress of our own. Those who have stepped down from dynastic rank to the position of subjects by the dissolution of both the empire and the confederation of the Rhine suffer with impatience the rule of men who, in reality or in their eyes, were once their equals. They would like to destroy an order which hurts their pride and substitute a single power for all the governments of this land. In agreement with them are the men of the universities, the youths who are filled with theories, and those who blame the fact that

Germany was made up of many small states for the suffering which came upon the land through the many wars of which it was the theater. Unity of the German fatherland is their cry, their faith, and their religion, reaching to a point of fanaticism, and this fanaticism has even affected some of the princes who are now ruling. This unity, however, from which France need fear nothing if it possess Belgium and the left bank of the Rhine, would have most regretful consequences for us now. In addition to this, who can foresee the results of the upheaval of a mass like Germany if the elements now divided should begin to move and coalesce? Who can tell where the impulse, once begun, will stop?

I cannot believe that Russia and Prussia are willing to allow war to come between Austria, France, Sardinia, Bavaria, and a great part of Germany; yet if they wished to take a chance of this kind, they would not be held back by Austria in the event, which is not the case, that Austria would take up the fight alone.

For Austria, therefore, if it should see itself robbed of our help, there remains no other remedy except an indefinite prolongation or dissolution of the Congress. That would mean opening the gates to revolution or giving consent to things which your Majesty has determined never to indorse.

The committee composed of delegates from Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Hanover is working on a constitution for Germany; they have already held one conference. In view of the clash of interests and the personal characters involved, it is doubtful if they will reach an understanding.

VIENNA, *October 19, 1814.*

SIRE:

The four courts have not ceased to be allies in the sense that the feelings with which they conducted the war have lasted beyond it, and the spirit with which they fought governs them also in the regulation of European affairs.

It was their intention to regulate these affairs alone. Then they recognized that the legality of a new order of things could be obtained only by the obvious sanction of all. For that reason the Congress was called together. The powers would gladly have eliminated France from it, but they were not able to do so after the fortunate change which took place there, even though this change was distasteful to them. Thereupon they flattered themselves that France would be too long and too exclusively occupied by its internal embarrassments to do more than take part in the Congress as a matter of form, and when they saw us appear with principles which they could not

oppose and did not wish to indorse, they decided virtually to keep us at arm's length without formally excluding us. At the same time they planned to concentrate everything in their hands in order to proceed without hindrance in the execution of their plans.

This plan at bottom is only England's plan. England is the soul of all; its lack of enthusiasm for the principles should not surprise any one: its interests are its principles. Its goal is simple; it wishes to maintain its preponderance at sea and to hold the commerce of the world by this preponderance. For this reason French sea-power must never be allowed to become dangerous to it, whether alone or united with others. England has already taken pains to separate France from the other sea-powers by means of obligations which it caused them to agree to, and as it arranged for the renewal of the family pact as a result of the restoration of the Bourbon house, it also hastened to close the treaty of the fifth of July with Spain, which says that this pact can never be renewed. It remains only for England to place France in such a position as a continental power that only a small part of its resources can be used for its sea-power. To accomplish this England wishes to bind Austria and Prussia close together, to make this as strong



a bond as possible, and to set them as rivals opposite France. Because of this plan, Stewart has been made English ambassador in Vienna. He is entirely favorable to Prussia, and was chosen exactly for that reason. In the same manner a man who leans toward Austria will be picked out for the post in Berlin. Nothing, however, would be more advantageous to the plans for strengthening Prussia than the gift of Saxony. Therefore England wants this country sacrificed and delivered to Prussia. The delivery of this country to Prussia would be regarded even by the members of the cabinet in Austria as a misfortune for the Austrian monarchy, and in Germany it would be looked upon as a calamity.

The King of Bavaria yesterday ordered his delegate to take new steps on behalf of Saxony. He said, "This plan is pure injustice; it robs me of all my composure."

KING LOUIS XVIII OF FRANCE TO TALLEYRAND

PARIS, *October 21, 1814.*

I will have Jaucourt write the letter that you ask for immediately; but between us I will go beyond the obligations of April 11 if the excellent idea of the Azores is realized. I would be greatly pleased if Piacenza, Guastalla were returned to the young prince of Parma. This is

his heritage; Tuscany was a possession unjustly acquired.

The king refers to Talleyrand's idea of moving Napoleon from Elba to the Azores. Apropos the activities on Elba, Jaucourt wrote to Talleyrand on September 27:

"The minister of war remains emphatically of the opinion that the island [of Elba] has a garrison of from 3600 to 4000 men. We have here detailed statements according to which there are only from 600 to 800 men of the guard, and at the most the same number of men who have come together from Corsica and elsewhere. At least the reports of Count Dupont are based on the statement of an officer who was personally in that country."

Talleyrand wrote to Jaucourt on October 12:

"M. Mariotti, consul in Livorno, has done well in refusing to give passports to the island of Elba to tradesmen. In general he should be very careful with this sort of passport."

VIENNA, *October 25, 1815.*

Four days ago Prince Adam Czartoryski, who thinks Poland is the whole world, called on me. He excused himself for not having looked me up earlier. He confessed that he had been deterred mainly because he had been told that I was unfavorably disposed toward the Polish question.

"I am more favorable to it than all the others

are," I remarked. "We want a complete and independent Poland."

"That would be very pretty," he replied; "but it is a chimera, for the powers will never agree to it."

"In that case Poland is no longer our most important affair in the north," I replied. "The integrity of Saxony comes closer to us; this question is of primary importance to us, that of Poland only secondary. If Austria and Prussia are agreed on the subject of their boundaries, we have no objection to the Czar of Russia giving any form of government he wishes to the country which has been relinquished to him; for this favor on our part I demand the preservation of the Kingdom of Saxony." This suggestion so pleased the Prince Czartoryski that he left me immediately for the czar, with whom he had an interview lasting three hours.

On the following day Count Nesselrode came to Talleyrand to announce that the Czar of Russia wished to receive him. The czar showed a certain embarrassment upon his arrival. Talleyrand's letter to his king describes the interview as follows:

"In Paris you favored a Kingdom of Poland," said the czar to me. "Why have you changed your view?"

"My view, Sire, is still the same: in Paris it was a question of the restoration of all of Poland. Then, as now, I favored the independence of Poland. Now, however, it is something entirely different; the question is superseded by that of the determination of the boundaries by which Austria and Prussia shall find security."

"These states do not need to become restive. Besides, I have two hundred thousand men in the Duchy of Warsaw; let any one try to chase me out! I have given Saxony to the Prussians; Austria agrees to it."

"I do not know whether or not Austria agrees to it," I replied. "It is hard for me to believe, as it is so contrary to Austria's interests. However, can the consent of Austria make Prussia the owner of the possessions of the King of Saxony?"

"If the King of Saxony does not abdicate, he will be taken to Russia and will die there. One other king has already died there."<sup>1</sup>

"Your Majesty will permit me to doubt that; the Congress has not assembled to witness such a crime."

"A crime in what manner? Did not Stanislaus go to Russia? And why shall the King of Saxony not go there also? It is the same case

<sup>1</sup> Alexander referred to Stanislaus August Poniatowski, king of Poland, who was forced to abdicate in 1795, and who died in 1798 in St. Petersburg.

with both. So far as I am concerned there is no difference."

My answers came so fast that they almost choked me. I confess, your Majesty, that I could hardly control my indignation. The czar spoke rapidly. One of his remarks was:

"I believed that France was indebted to me somewhat. You speak always of your principles. Your public right does not exist for me. I do not know what it is. What value shall I place upon your parchments and treaties?" (I had reminded him of the treaty in which the allies had agreed upon the division of the grand Duchy of Warsaw among the three courts.) "There is one thing which for me stands above everything else, my word as czar. I have given it, and I shall keep it. The King of Prussia demanded Saxony at the moment when we again allied ourselves." [In February, 1813, at the conference which led to the alliance of Breslau-Kalisch.]

"Your Majesty has promised the King of Prussia from nine million to ten million souls; you can deliver them to him without destroying Saxony." I had with me a memorandum which showed the lands that could be given to Prussia and which, without the obliteration of Saxony, would give Prussia the number of subjects promised to that state by treaty. The czar took this and kept it.

"The King of Saxony is a traitor."

"Sire, the designation 'traitor' can never be applied to a king; it is important that it should never be applied to a king." It is probable that I placed a little more stress upon the latter part of my remark. After a moment of silence the czar said:

"The King of Prussia will become King of Prussia and Saxony, just as I shall become Czar of Russia and King of Poland. The favors that France accords me in this case will be a measure for the favors that I shall show France in everything in which it has an interest."

In the course of this interview the czar did not permit himself to be overcome by passion as at our first; he was calm and determined, but betrayed suppressed resentment.

I saw Prince Metternich to-night. He has again taken courage; I have talked as energetically to him as I could. The Austrian generals, a great number of whom I have spoken with, all declare themselves for the preservation of Saxony. They bring up military considerations, which are beginning to make an impression.

VIENNA, *October 31, 1814.*

On the morning of the day that Czar Alexander departed for Hungary he had an interview with Metternich, during which, as is told with



great certainty, he treated this minister in such a high-handed manner and used such strong expressions toward him as he would never have thought of using toward one of his servants. When Metternich remarked regarding Poland that if a Poland was to be created, Austria could do so, the czar characterized this remark not only as out of place, but even allowed himself to exclaim that Metternich was the only person in Austria who could adopt such a rebellious tone. The matter at length is supposed to have gone so far that Metternich declared to the czar that he would ask his master to name another ambassador to the Congress in his place.

When Metternich returned from this interview he was in a temper such as his intimates had never before witnessed. He who had said only a few days before to Count Schulenburg that he "intrenched himself behind time" and "made patience his weapon" might have lost the latter very easily had it been put to a similar test more frequently.

It is said that Czar Alexander complained about Metternich on the trip [presumably the trip of the sovereigns to Budapest], and that Emperor Francis thereupon replied that he considered it better to let these transactions be taken care of by the ministers, for the reason that they would be carried out with greater freedom and

more in relation to one another; that he did not act on his affairs in person, but that his ministers acted entirely according to his directions. In the course of the conversation he is said to have remarked, among other things, that when his subjects, who had never deserted him, who had done everything for him and sacrificed everything in his behalf, were as restless as at present, he considered it his duty to do everything that might help to calm them. Upon Czar Alexander's question whether his character and his integrity did not serve to prevent and remove all anxieties, Emperor Francis is said to have answered that good boundaries were the best guaranties of peace. This interview was described to me in almost the same words by Count Sickingen and Metternich. It seems as if the emperor, who is not used to acting with decision, was greatly pleased with himself upon his return.

All the precautions that were taken to keep me in ignorance regarding the negotiations of the committee on the political organization of Germany have been unsuccessful. In the first session Prussia introduced the proposal that all princes whose various states belonged to the confederation should relinquish the right of carrying on war and signing peace on their own initiative, as well as the right of sending embassies. When Marshal Wrede [of Bavaria] turned down this

proposal, Humboldt cried out that here one saw that Bavaria was still allied with France at heart; that this, however, was for them only another reason for insisting upon the acceptance of the resolution. When, however, the marshal, having in the meantime received the command of his king, rejected the proposal decisively in the second session, it was finally withdrawn and replaced by another, according to which the whole war power of the confederation was to be divided, and one half placed under the leadership of Austria, and the other half under that of Prussia. The King of Bavaria recognized that Prussia by this union intended to insure its possession of Saxony against the opposition of those powers who want the kingdom to continue in existence; he knows also that he must fear for himself as soon as Saxony is sacrificed, and for this reason he is ready to defend it. In the event that he should be thrown upon his own resources, he has ordered 20,000 recruits to be called to the colors in his own country, by means of which his army will reach a strength of 70,000 men.

The Prussians do not know of this plan of the king, but nevertheless they are informed of the mobilization.

As we, the duke of Dalberg and I, owed Lord Castlereagh a visit, we jointly presented him last evening with the resolution for the first assem-

bling of the plenipotentiaries. He found nothing to criticize, but remarked that the anxiety with which the Prussians regarded us would lead one to think that they had a hidden motive. The real or apparent anxieties of the Prussians naturally led the conversation to the eternal Polish and Saxon questions. He had several maps lying upon his table, and on these I pointed out to him that if Saxony and Silesia were in the hands of one power, Bohemia could be taken in a few weeks, and that with Bohemia once taken, the heart of the Austrian monarchy lay open and without defense. He seemed astonished; he had talked with us as if he based all his hopes on Prussia, because it was not possible to expect anything more from Austria. He appeared greatly surprised when we told him that Austria lacked only money to bring its troops together. It would then have most unusual fighting strength, and at this time £1,000,000 sterling would be sufficient. This quickened his courage, and he seemed inclined to see the Polish question through.

He had received news that the Serbs had again taken up arms, and informed us that a Russian army under the command of one of the foremost generals of Russia was approaching the Turkish border. Nothing, therefore, seemed to him more necessary and urgent than to limit the ambition

of Russia. However, he wished that this might be done without war, or, if war was unavoidable, that it might be carried on without the help of France. From his manner of estimating our power I could see that he fears France the most. "You have," said he, "25,000,000 inhabitants; we value them as if they were 40,000,000."

Once the exclamation escaped him:

"Oh, if only you had no more designs on the left bank of the Rhine!" It was not difficult for me to prove to him by the situation of France and by the general readiness for war in Europe that ambitious designs could not be attributed to France without at the same time considering it insane.

"That may be," he replied, "but a French army which marched through Germany, no matter on what errand, would make too great an impression and awaken too many memories."

After the conference Metternich invited me to come to his workroom, and informed me that he and Lord Castlereagh were determined not to permit Russia to cross the line of the Vistula; he added that they were engaged in trying to convince Prussia to proceed jointly with them in this matter; thought they might hope for success, and pleaded that I might give them the necessary time and not hurry them. I now asked on what conditions they flattered them-

selves they would obtain Prussia's coöperation. He replied that they wished to promise Prussia a part of Saxony; namely, 400,000 to 500,000 souls and especially the fortress and the environs of Wittenberg, which were necessary for the protection of Berlin. In this manner the Kingdom of Saxony would retain about 1,600,000 souls as well as Torgau, Königstein, and the course of the Elbe from the Wittenberg district to Bohemia.

I have discovered that a state council has been held under the chairmanship of the emperor [of Austria], and that Prince Schwartzenberg and Metternich, as well as Count Zichy and General Duka, took part. They have come to an agreement on the basic principle that the Saxon question is of greater importance to Austria than the Polish question. The welfare of the monarchy depends upon the passes of Thuringia and the Saal not falling into the hands of Prussia.

VIENNA, *November 6, 1814.*

Lord Castlereagh remarked that the word congress terrified the Prussians, and that Prince Hardenberg especially had great fear of it. Metternich brought up once more the larger part of the considerations which he had presented to us in the latest conference; he considered it best not to call the Congress together until we were in agreement upon at least all the great questions.



"Among them," he remarked, "is one that divided us into hostile groups." He meant the Polish question, but he did not mention it by name, and passed quickly to the matters that affected Germany proper. "Among the persons who are occupied with them there is the greatest unanimity," he said. "We will also take up the matters relating to Switzerland," he added, "and these are not to be regulated without the participation of France." I replied that I had no other intention, and that therefore I had already arranged with M. von Dalberg for participation in the discussions.

We then passed to the Italian affairs, and Metternich applied the word "entanglements" to the affairs of Genoa and Turin as well as to those of Naples and Sicily, this being a word that Metternich uses incessantly in order to deal in generalities, which is demanded by his weak political methods. He wanted to prove that the tranquillity of Italy as well as that of Europe depended upon the Neapolitan question not being regulated at the Congress, but rather put off for a later time.

"The force of circumstances," he said, "will necessarily lead the house of Bourbon back to the throne of Naples."

"The force of circumstances," I thereupon replied, "is evident here with all its power. The

question must be settled at the Congress. Taking up the question geographically, this comes as the last of the Italian questions, and I am in accord with the proposal that the geographical order be adhered to. More than that I cannot concede."

Metternich then spoke of the supporters of Murat in Italy.

"Organize Italy, and he will no longer have any. Make an end to the hated provisional administration; determine the ownership of upper and middle Italy; do not let a foot of land remain under military occupation from the Alps to the Neapolitan boundary; place just rulers and a well-ordered administration everywhere; determine the succession in Sardinia; and name an archduke to become governor in the Milan region; recognize the rights of the queen of Itruria; return to the pope what belongs to him and what you are holding: then Murat will no longer have power over the spirit of the people; for Italy he will then be merely a bandit."

This geographical treatment of the Italian situation seemed to meet with approval.

King Victor Emanuel I (1802-21) and his brother Carl Felix (1821-31) had no children; the right of succession therefore was expected to pass to the house of Savoy-Carignan. As a matter of fact this house ascended the throne of Sardinia in 1831 under Carl

Albert, and is to-day the reigning house of Italy. Talleyrand, true to his program, attempted to pave the way for the succession of the house of Savoy-Carignan in order to support his principle of dynastic rights, which he called the principle of legitimacy, as well as to checkmate the plans of the house of Hapsburg and make it impossible for it to succeed to the legacy of the house of Savoy.

The court of Vienna continues to show such a generous measure of hospitality toward its titled guests that it must be a burden in view of the state of its finances; one sees everywhere nothing but emperors and kings, empresses and queens, hereditary princes, ruling princes, and the like. The court pays for everything; the daily expenses are estimated at 220,000 paper gulden (\$106,700). At these assemblies royalty undoubtedly loses something of the greatness that belongs to it; the presence of three or four kings and a large number of princes at the balls and tea-parties of simple private folk of Vienna appears to me most incongruous. One must go to France in order to see royalty in its glory and its majesty, by means of which it wins at the same time the esteem and the love of the people.

VIENNA, *November 12, 1814.*

SIRE:

Metternich and Lord Castlereagh had argued the Prussian ministry into making common cause with them on the Polish question, but their hope of Prussia's participation did not last long. The Czar of Russia a few days ago invited the King of Prussia to dinner at his house, and there had an interview with him, details of which have become known to me through Prince Adam Czartoryski. The czar reminded the king of the friendship that united them and of the value that he placed on this friendship and of everything that he had done to make this friendship eternal. They were nearly of the same age, and it pleased him to think that he would long be a witness of the good fortune for which their people could thank their intimate union. He risked his reputation on the restoration of a Polish kingdom, and now, when he was so near to the fulfilment of his wishes, was he to feel the pain of seeing his best friend included among his opponents, the only prince on whose faithful attitude he had counted? The king fervently assured him of his loyalty and swore that he would support him in the Polish question. The czar replied:

"It is not enough that you adhere to this determination. Your ministers also must act according to this view." He then requested the

king to call in Prince Hardenberg. In the latter's presence the czar again repeated his own words and the promise of the king. Hardenberg wished to make objections, but as Czar Alexander pressed the question whether he did not intend to obey the commands of the king, and as these commands admitted of no contradiction, there remained nothing for him to do but to promise that he would scrupulously follow the commands of the king. This much I have been able to learn about this scene. A great deal more of which I know nothing must have taken place if it is true, as Gentz assures me, that Prince Hardenberg said that he had never before experienced anything like it.

This reversal of Prussian politics had disturbed the composure of Metternich and Lord Castlereagh not a little. They would gladly have seen Hardenberg hand in his resignation, and it is certain that he would have placed the czar and the king in no small embarrassment by doing so, but he does not seem to have thought of that.

On my part, I have always had the suspicion that Metternich bought the participation of Prussia by greater concessions than he cared to admit; therefore I was inclined more to the view that the desertion by Prussia was good fortune.

In addition it is related that Czar Alexander complained bitterly of Metternich in a conversa-

tion on the opposition of Austria to his views, and that he said, "Austria believes itself to be sure of Italy, but there is a Napoleon there who can be made use of."

After the conference I remained alone with Metternich. I wished to learn how things stood with Poland and Saxony and what he planned to do in the one and in the other affair. Therefore I did not put questions to him which he might have evaded, but began to talk with him about himself. In the tone of an old friend I remarked that with all this energy for business one must think also of oneself, and that it seemed to me that he did not do so sufficiently. By this sort of consideration for him I gained a little more frankness from him. He read me his note to Prussia on the Saxon question, and by hearty and spirited thanks on my part I induced him to intrust me with it. I promised him to hold it inviolate. I inclose herewith a copy for your Majesty, and beg that you will please preserve it, and allow me to ask for it again upon my return.

Your Majesty will see by this document that Metternich did not promise Prussia a part of Saxony, as he assured me, but the whole of Saxony; fortunately, he had made this promise dependent upon a condition (that Prussia could not be indemnified elsewhere), by the unfulfil-



ment of which it would become void. In addition your Majesty will see by this note that Metternich wishes to leave Luxemburg to Prussia, although he assured me at different times that Prussia should not have it. The same note disclosed a plan that had existed for a long time, of placing Germany under the influence of Austria and Prussia; in reality, however, bringing it under their unrestricted and exclusive domination.

Metternich now asserts that he will not leave Saxony in the lurch. In the Polish question he has led me to understand that he will concede much; that is to say, he will concede everything if Czar Alexander does not relinquish anything.

I was still with him when the list of the Austrian Army was brought to him; he allowed me to look at it. The present strength of this army reaches 374,000 men, of these 52,000 cavalry and 800 cannon. With such fighting powers he believes that the Austrian monarchy can do nothing better than to be patient and submissive in everything. Your Majesty should note that this number of troops is the actual strength of the army.

Extract from another interview of Talleyrand with the Czar of Russia.

The Czar: "But Austria will give up Saxony."

Talleyrand: "Metternich, with whom I spoke last evening, expressed opinions which absolutely contradict what your majesty deigns to tell me."

The czar: "And as for yourself, it is reported that you agreed to surrender a part of Saxony."

Talleyrand: "Only most unwillingly. If it is actually necessary to give up from 300,000 to 400,000 Saxons so that Prussia may again receive the population it had before 1806, and which reached 9,200,000 souls, we will make this sacrifice for the sake of peace."

The czar: "That is exactly what the Saxons fear the most; they are content enough to belong to the King of Prussia; their sole wish is not to be separated."

Talleyrand: "We are informed concerning what is going on in Saxony and we know that the thought of becoming Prussians leads the Saxons to despair."

The czar: "No, the only thing that they fear is separation, and as a matter of fact that is of course the greatest misfortune that can befall a people."

Talleyrand: "Sire, what if one wished to apply this basis for action also to Poland?"

The czar: "The division of Poland is not my work; it will not be my fault, as I have already told you, if a disaster is not averted. Perhaps some day it will come to that."

Talleyrand: "The cession of a part of Upper and Lower Lusatia would not really be a partition of Saxony. These lands were not actually a part of it but until recently belonged to the Bohemian crown; they had nothing in common with Saxony except the ruler."

VIENNA, *November 17, 1814.*

Metternich discussed an alliance with Prince Wrede and asked him whether Bavaria would not immediately allow 25,000 men to be added to the Austrian Army. Prince Wrede replied that Bavaria would be ready to provide up to 75,000 men under the following conditions:

1. That an alliance be made with France.
2. That Bavaria should send 25,000 men to every 100,000 which Austria placed in the field, and no more.
3. That Austria should turn over to Bavaria a part of the subsidies which it was likely to receive from England in proportion to the relative strength of the fighting forces.

VIENNA, *November 25, 1814.*

The Duke of Wellington, who is zealously engaged in correspondence with Lord Castlereagh, writes him of nothing but conspiracies, secret discontent, stifled complaints, as the vanguard of a coming storm.

Czar Alexander says that his letters from Paris predict unrest. M. von Vincent on his part reports to his court that a change in ministry is in prospect, and asks for verification of the report. There is a feeling that a change in ministry were the certain sign of an upheaval in internal and foreign politics, and there is an inclination to conclude that France cannot be depended upon and that it should not be included in any agreement.

I had received a letter from Italy in which I was informed that Murat had an army of from 60,000 to 70,000 men, of which the greater part was armed, thanks to the Austrians, who had sold him 25,000 rifles. I wanted to have a discussion with Metternich on this subject, or at least prove to him that I knew this fact. I therefore led the conversation to the Neapolitan question. As we were in his salon amid a large assembly I suggested that I follow him to his office in order to show him my letter. He replied that the matter was not urgent. I then asked him if, then, he had come to a decision. He replied yes, but that he did not wish to set everything afire at once; and as he usually was apprehensive that Murat would cause an uprising in Italy, I asked him:

“If you fear him, why do you deliver weapons to him? Why have you sold him 25,000 rifles?”

He denied the fact, as I expected him to do,

but I did not give him the satisfaction of letting him think that his denials had convinced me. After I left him he attended the masked ball, for he passes three fourths of the day at balls and festivities.

The French delegate, De la Tour du Pin, wrote his ministry as follows on December 7:

"The public generally is dissatisfied with the situation; the Czar of Russia is principally blamed for this, and he loses standing in public opinion daily. It is not that he does not show himself unusually gracious and accessible in society; he seems to want to mingle with it without being singled out. He will sit down to dine at a table laid for twenty guests, at a little ball of forty persons he dances with virtually all the women; but these manners do not obliterate in the eyes of intelligent Austrians the injustice that is bound up with his ambition; and this injustice is increased because he is pondering on means to injure his host even when he is in his place. Another minister than Metternich would profit immeasurably by this feeling, but what can one expect of a man who, while placed in the most serious situation in which a man can find himself, puts in the greater part of his time with trivial affairs and who does not shrink from inaugurating a rehearsal of "The Pasha of Surene" at his quarters, a man who can be said to have wasted a good number of days at the opening of the Congress in the same useless manner? Therefore you will not be astonished further at the meager progress that is being made here."

VIENNA, *November 30, 1814.*

The 25,000 guns that were sold to Murat have been detained at Venice. Murat does not appear to feel secure despite the protection of Metternich, as a short time ago he wrote a long letter to the Archduchess Marie Louise [Napoleon's consort and former empress of the French] in which, among other things, he declares that if Austria will help him, he will restore her to the rank from which she should never have descended. This sort of dare-deviltry in a man of his nationality and character can be described only as the result of fear, which betrays itself.

VIENNA, *December 7, 1814.*

I have the honor of forwarding to your Majesty a letter from your consul in Livorno [Leghorn].

The consul Mariotti wrote to Talleyrand, under date of November 15, 1814, as follows:

Most gracious sir:

I believe it necessary for me to inform your princely Highness that the number of travelers coming from and going to Elba is most significant, and that they have all made the same remarks to persons of my acquaintance. They are all Italians, Piedmontese, or Swiss. They all say that Bonaparte will not remain exiled in Elba, that he will leave it, and that as soon as he appears at the head of his guard in Italy more



than 50,000 men who are now ready will rise and gather about his standard, and that thousands of French soldiers will join them. Two of them, among others, have been especially pointed out; they are a certain Eltovi and Louis Cevani of Milan. At a dinner held last evening in one of the suburbs of the city they named more than 150 higher officers who are scattered about the various cantons of the former kingdom [Italy], and who are in communication with one another. These two persons arrived the day before yesterday from Porto Ferrajo. The former departed this morning, as he announced, for Lucca; the latter is said to be leaving soon for Parma. I directed the attention of the governor of Livorno to them, but as they are Italians and Austrian subjects, no one dared to adopt decisive measures toward these disseminators of secret correspondence and intrigue. The Austrian consul in this port is an honorable man, but happens to be seventy or more years old. He probably has no instructions to keep watch over the subjects of his imperial master who come and go here, or else he has not the necessary capacity or the necessary means. If stringent measures are not adopted to stop this correspondence and to seize it, the tranquillity of Italy will not be of long duration. Recruiting has ceased in Italy and Tuscany since the recruiting officers were arrested and imprisoned. King Joachim [Murat] received the officers of Bonaparte exceedingly well. He inquired about the health and occupation of the Prince of Elba and especially regarding the condition and number of his troops. When Capt. Jaillade replied

that there were only 1500 men on the island, Joachim answered, "Well, that is the nucleus of 500,000." Even if no soldiers are being recruited, officers are being accepted and used in the guard, these men being satisfied with a very modest sum. The Tunisians were received very well in Porto Ferrajo, and one of these Barbary ships is cruising under the protection of this asylum in local waters and is making the whole coast tremble. The Government of Tuscany has ordered the enrollment of a local national guard for protection against these pirates."

VIENNA, *January 4, 1815.*

The report of the signing of peace between England and the United States of America was given me in a note from Lord Castlereagh on New Year's day. I hastened therefore to express my felicitations, and I congratulated myself, as I well knew what influence this event would have, on the one hand, on the views of this minister, and, on the other, upon the decisions of those whose demands we have had to fight till now. Lord Castlereagh showed me the treaty. It compromises the honor of neither the one nor the other group, and therefore will satisfy both.

This happy news was only the precursor of a much happier event.

To-day, Sire, the coalition was dissolved, and it is dissolved forever. Not only is France no longer isolated in Europe, but your Majesty al-

ready has a confederacy such as could hardly have been expected as the outcome of half a century of negotiations. You are in agreement with two great powers, with three states of secondary rank, and soon will be with all those states that do not adhere to revolutionary basic principles and maxims. You will be, in fact, the head and soul of this confederacy, which will defend the basic principles which you were the first to promulgate.

Next to God the causes which have brought about this change were:

My letters to Metternich and Castlereagh and the impression that they created.

The hints regarding an alliance with France which I gave Lord Castlereagh in the interview that I described to your Majesty in my last communication.

My anxiety to appease his lack of confidence, to accomplish which I showed the greatest disinterestedness on behalf of France.

The peace with America, which robbed him of all anxiety from that quarter and gave him more freedom to negotiate and more courage.

Finally the demands of Russia and Prussia, which are contained in the Russian draft, a copy of which I beg to inclose herewith, and especially the tone in which these demands were presented and supported in a conference between your

plenipotentiaries and those of Austria. The arrogant tone in which this unseemly and muddled document was couched wounded Lord Castlereagh so greatly that his usual composure deserted him, and he declared that the Russians wished to dictate laws, but that England would not put up with this from any one.

All these incidents had put him in a favorable mood, which I made use of. He became so heated that he himself suggested that he put his ideas on the subject on paper. We signed the convention to-night. I hasten to send it to your Majesty.

As General Dupont wrote me on November 9 that your Majesty would have 180,000 men at your disposal on January 1, and 180,000 additional on March 1 without calling up a new draft, I believed that an auxiliary force of 150,000 men could with certainty be promised, as England bound itself to provide the same number of troops.

The object of our agreement is to complete the conditions of the Paris treaty in a manner that is most compatible with its true spirit and with the general interest of Europe. If however, war actually broke out, it would be possible to give it an aim which would virtually make its failure impossible and give Europe immeasurable advantages.

In so honorable a war France would wholly regain the respect and confidence of all peoples, an acquisition worth more than that of one or more provinces, the possession of which, happily enough, it needs neither for its actual power nor for its prosperity.

VIENNA, *January 6, 1815.*

The Czar of Russia wishes to have your Majesty believe that in consideration for yourself and in order to do you a favor he has made the suggestion that the King of Saxony be given several hundred thousand souls on the left bank of the Rhine as a substitute for his kingdom. General Pozzo is said to have been charged with obtaining the assent of your Majesty to this proposal.

But your Majesty knows that the Saxon question is to be viewed not solely from the point of view of legitimacy, but also from that of the balance of power. The basis of legitimacy would be affected by the forced transposition of the King of Saxony to the left bank of the Rhine, so that the King of Saxony would never give his acquiescence thereto; and finally, apart from the claim of legitimacy, Saxony cannot be given to Prussia without greatly weakening the relative power of Austria, and without totally destroying the balance of power in the Germanic organization.

VIENNA, *January 19, 1815.*

The addition of Bavaria to the triple alliance is in progress. Following Bavaria, Hanover and Holland will join. The Grand Duke of Darmstadt is allying himself for the same purpose with Bavaria, and promises 6000 men.

Austria, England, Bavaria, Holland, Hanover, and virtually the whole of Germany agree with us regarding the preservation of the King and the Kingdom of Saxony. Saxony, therefore, will continue to exist despite the fact that Prince Hardenberg dared to demand the whole of Saxony in a scheme for the rebuilding of the Prussian monarchy that he recently placed before us.

In addition we find in an examination of the Prussian plan that everything that Prussia possessed in 1805, and which is everything that it has a right to demand, can be given to it, and that still 1,500,000 inhabitants will remain in Saxony. Prussia, however, contends, on the ground of the enlargements which have come to Russia and Austria, that it ought to have 600,000 more inhabitants now than in the year 1805.

VIENNA, *January 25, 1815.*

I attended a conference yesterday with Metternich and Schwarzenberg for the purpose of determining, according to the judgment of the Austrian military, what points in Saxony could



be ceded to Prussia and what others could not be given up without thereby endangering the security of Austria.

VIENNA, *February 8, 1815.*

The Duke of Wellington arrived here on the evening of February 1. At ten o'clock on the following morning the Czar of Russia visited him and began with the question:

"Things are going badly in France, is it not so?"

"Not at all," replied the duke. "The king is much beloved, greatly respected, and conducts himself with accomplished wisdom."

The czar rejoined:

"You can tell me nothing more agreeable. And the army?"

"For a foreign war, no matter against what power, the army is as excellent as ever," answered Wellington; "but in questions of internal politics it may not be available."

As Prince Adam tells me, these answers perplexed the czar more than he allowed himself to show.

Lord Castlereagh adheres unequivocally to the view that Prussia must be strong, and above all has the object of avoiding the war. Lord Wellington is himself of the view that England could not wage war at the present time, and that

France is the only nation in a position to do so. Castlereagh insisted that we would have to concede a bit more to the Prussians in order to satisfy them.

In order to enlarge their share, therefore, the share of Holland has been decreased by 100,000 souls, and that of Hanover by 50,000. The district of Fulda is added to this. The Czar of Russia—he is entitled to this credit—desired to augment this adjustment and gave the city of Thorn back to the Prussians, so that this matter may now be regarded in general as disposed of even if it has not been finally settled. Saxony will be diminished in size by less than 1,500,000 souls.

VIENNA, *February* 15, 1815.

At last the abolition of the negro slave-trade, a cause for which the English nation showed a passion verging on madness, has been conceded by the two only powers which had not yet renounced it.

Lord Castlereagh is therefore well armed against the attacks of the opposition; he returns home with achievements which he needs in order to flatter public opinion.

The czar spoke most contemptuously regarding Murat. "He is *canaille*," he said, "and has betrayed us. But," he added, "when I interfere

in any matter I like to be sure of the means for carrying it to a successful conclusion. If Murat offers opposition, we shall have to force him out. I have talked about this with Wellington," he went on. "He thinks that we shall need considerable fighting forces and that we shall face great difficulties if it becomes necessary to send these forces by ship." I replied that I demanded no forces,—for I well know that they would have been refused me,—but only one line, a single line in future treaties; France and Spain would take over the rest. Thereupon the czar replied, "You shall have my support."

In the entire course of this interview the czar appeared cold, but in general I was more satisfied than provoked with him.

VIENNA, *February* 24, 1815.

The Swiss affairs will, according to all appearances, be disposed of in a few days with the exception of one single point, that of the Veltlin. It appears that it is intended to leave the Veltlin question in doubt in consideration of the acquiescence of the Swiss cantons to the proposals that will be made to them; for it has been decided, first, merely to propose the solution that has been agreed on before taking steps to force it upon them as law, if need be.

VIENNA, *February 26, 1815.*

I wish that the Austrian declaration might have expressed itself more specifically against Murat. But we were anxious not to give him an excuse for making a desperate decision while the Austrians in Italy were not yet mobilized. Orders to send forces thither have been issued; 150,000 men are to stand in Italy and 50,000 as a reserve in Carinthia. This will be sufficient to hold Murat in check or to crush his undertaking.

NOTE BY METTERNICH TO TALLEYRAND

VIENNA, *February 25, 1815.*

The undersigned, prime minister and minister of foreign affairs for his imperial and royal apostolic Majesty, is called upon to convey the following official communication to his Highness Prince Talleyrand:

In the course of the negotiations in Vienna between the representatives of the powers who signed the Paris Treaty the undersigned has not desisted from giving in the name of the emperor, his gracious lord, proofs of the desire of his imperial Majesty to assure Italy a condition of stability and tranquillity by which Europe and his empire naturally are affected.

The continued tension between the courts of France and Naples has drawn the whole attention of the emperor the more because strong concentrations of troops are taking place on the boundary of the Kingdom of Naples, and assemblies are also taking place in southern France.

Although it is far from the desire of his imperial Majesty to ascribe hostile intentions to the one or to the other of these courts, which might endanger the peace of Italy and therefore also an interested part of the Austrian monarchy, the emperor and king, nevertheless, has felt the need of renewing the declaration which the undersigned was in a position to present at one of the first conferences: that his Majesty is firmly determined never to permit the peace of his own provinces or those ruled by princes of his house to be disturbed by the entry of foreign troops into Italy; the emperor will consider as directed against his interests, and therefore against himself, any plan or order which is contrary to this resolution.

In informing Prince Talleyrand that he is directing an identical declaration on the same subject to the court of Naples, the undersigned begs his Highness to accept the expression of his high regard.

#### NOTE OF TALLEYRAND TO METTERNICH

VIENNA, *February 25, 1815.*

The undersigned, ambassador of his Majesty, King of France and Navarre, at the Congress and his minister and secretary of state in the department of foreign affairs, has received the declaration with which his Highness Prince Metternich has honored him this day.

Should conditions make necessary the march of French troops for the defense of the principles affecting Naples, which the embassy of his most Christian Majesty has so steadily championed at the Vienna Congress, these troops will not march through the Austrian

provinces in Italy or through lands ruled by the princes of the house of Austria. It can never be the intention of his most Christian Majesty to attempt anything that would disturb or endanger the peace of these provinces—a peace which, on the contrary, his Majesty is most unselfishly interested in strengthening and preserving.

VIENNA, *March 3, 1815.*

Austria and Bavaria are agreed except for one point, namely Salzburg, all of which Austria would like to have, and of which Bavaria wishes to keep a part. I have advised each of the two negotiators separately to come to an agreement in order to give Russia and Prussia no excuse for interfering in the discussion.

I have just received the description of the troops now on the march to Italy. There are 120 battalions and 84 squadrons, all full strength, a total of 129,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry. The commanding generals of this army are Bianchi, Radetzky, Frimont, and Hieronymus Colloredo. Outside of these there is a reserve of more than 50,000 men in Carinthia, Styria, etc.

General Pozzo is merely waiting for the last despatches of the emperor before leaving.

KING LOUIS XVIII TO TALLEYRAND

*March 7, 1815.*

I had decided to take up with you to-day a discussion of the convention of April 11 of the previous year.



Bonaparte relieves me of this task. Before you receive this despatch you will without doubt have received news of his ill-starred undertaking. I immediately took the steps which to me seemed best fitted to make him regret this, and I count confidently upon their success. This morning I received the ambassadors. I turned to all of them and besought them to inform their courts that they had not found me in any manner disturbed by the news that had been received; moreover, that I was convinced that the peace of Europe would be disturbed as little hereby as that of my soul. My gout has recently progressed remarkably toward convalescence.

SIRE:

VIENNA, *March 7, 1815.*

I may assume that your Majesty already knows, or will have learned before you receive this letter, that Bonaparte has left the Island of Elba. In any case I hasten to send this report to your Majesty. I learned it first through a note from Metternich, to which I replied that I saw from the dates how this escape of Bonaparte was connected with the demand made by Murat on Austria, asking passage for his troops through the Austrian provinces. The Duke of Wellington also acquainted me with a despatch from Lord Burghesh, a translation of which I have the honor of inclosing, together with an extract from the letter of the vice-consul at Ancona [Dumorey]. This extract was also given me by the Duke of Wellington.

On February 26, at nine o'clock in the evening, Bonaparte embarked at Porto Ferrajo. He had taken with him about 1,200 men, 10 cannon, among these 6 field-guns, a number of horses, and provisions for five or six days. The English, who took upon themselves the task of watching his movements, have done this with a negligence which it will be hard for them to justify.

In a session of the English House of Commons, on April 7, the English minister said:

"It is asked why Napoleon was not better watched on the Island of Elba. The reason was that Napoleon was not there as a prisoner. The place had been assigned to him as an independent possession. If he had been placed under any kind of restriction on this island, the agreement concluded with him would have been violated. As for the possibility of watching over the island, I believe that the whole marine of England would not be sufficient to hinder the escape of a man from the Island of Elba. Besides, it is clear from the treaty that it was not at all the intention of the allies to regard Napoleon as a prisoner on the Island of Elba."

The fact that he has taken a northerly direction seems to indicate that he is going either to Genoa or to southern France.

The King of Sardinia is momentarily in Genoa, and must have his guard there. In the harbor also lie three English frigates. If, therefore, Bonaparte should attempt anything against

Genoa with his 1,200 men he would fail. It is to be feared that he will go through the mountains to Parma and Lombardy, and that his presence there will be the signal for a rising that has been long prepared for and which has been greatly favored by the bad conduct of the Austrians and the false politics of their cabinet.

The results of this event cannot well be predicted, but they may be happy ones, if we know how to reap advantages from them. I will make every effort, so that they will not go to sleep here, and so that the Congress will adopt a resolution placing Bonaparte wholly outside the rank which was left to him through inexplicable weakness, and so, finally, making it impossible for him to call down new misfortune on Europe.

Metternich tells the following story of the receipt of the news of Napoleon's flight from Elba:

"When the members reached my quarters, the occurrence was still unknown to them. Talleyrand was the first who entered; I gave him the report from Genoa to read. He remained cold, and the following laconic conversation took place between us:

"Talleyrand: 'Do you know where Napoleon is going?'

"Myself: 'The reports contain nothing about that.'

"Talleyrand: 'He will land on the Italian coast and throw himself into Switzerland.'

"Myself: 'He will proceed directly toward Paris.'"

VIENNA, *March 12, 1815.*

In Pressburg we received the news that Bonaparte had been driven off with cannon-shot before Antibes, which he had called upon to surrender, and that he then landed in the bay of San Juan. These are the last reports we have concerning him.

So long as we were still in uncertainty about where Bonaparte was going and what he would attempt, no declaration could be issued against him. As soon as we learned this we busied ourselves to have one adopted. The wording was drawn up by the French embassy and reported to the Duke of Wellington and Prince Metternich. It will be read to-morrow at the meeting of the eight powers that signed the Treaty of Paris, and it is likely that it will undergo a number of changes.

I cannot doubt but that your Majesty has given orders for troops to be sent to southern France. If I may be permitted an opinion concerning the commander whom it would be best to place over these troops, I would suggest Marshal MacDonald. He is a man of honor, who can be depended upon; he possesses the confidence of the army, and as he signed the agreement of April 11, 1814, in the name of Bonaparte, his example will make a greater impression if he marches against him.

I have seen a list of the higher officers who have been placed in command of the 30,000 men whom your Majesty has ordered to be assembled between Lyons and Chambéry. Many of the names are unknown to me, but among them are a number in whom I can place no confidence; among others, General Moritz Mathieu, who was, I believe, the willing creature of Joseph Bonaparte.

The appearance of Bonaparte in France, an incident that is otherwise so disagreeable, will at least have the advantage of bringing things to a speedy close here. Every one here feels his energy and his capacity doubled.

VIENNA, *March 14, 1815.*

I inclose herewith one of the declarations that was printed in Vienna and circulated throughout Germany:

TO THE NATIONS!

Bonaparte wishes to rule solely for the good of the Jacobins. He is satisfied with the present boundaries of France and wishes to live in peace with the rest of Europe. As guarantees for this he offers: 1.—Shooting down the Paris sections with grape-shot; 2.—the poisoning of the hospitals in Egypt; 3.—the murder of Pichegru; 4.—the shooting of the Duke d'Enghien; 5.—the oaths of fealty sworn to the French republic; 6.—the repeated assaults on all the governments of Europe; 7.—the plundering of the churches in Russia

and Spain; 8.—his escape from Elba; 9.—the organization of 3000 battalions of the national guard as a substitute for conscription; 10.—the violation of all treaties signed by him, including that of Fontainebleau; 11.—the abolition of the indirect taxes in favor of public drunkenness. In addition he promises to issue a decree against perjury immediately after the May assembly, if it turns out favorably for him, which will be drawn up by Regnault de Saint Jean d'Angely and countersigned by Ney.

The declaration is an answer to Napoleon's proclamation of Grenoble, in which he promised liberal internal reforms for France and announced that he would wage no wars of conquest.

VIENNA, *March 19, 1815* (evening).

SIRE:

I have the honor of sending your Majesty a communication which I received this instant from the Russian minister. It appears to leave nothing to be desired on the point with which it is concerned. The views expressed therein are very good and in harmony with the policy which the czar follows at this time. Everything that relates to this shows the best spirit.

It is intended to raise three active and two reserve armies.

The one, which is to operate from the sea to the Main, will be composed of English, Dutch, Hanoverian, and Prussian troops, and northern



contingents. Its commander-in-chief will be the Duke of Wellington.

The line of operations of the second army, which will be commanded by Prince Schwarzenberg, is to stretch from the Main to the Mediterranean Sea. This army will be composed of Austrians, Piedmontese, Swiss, and contingents from South Germany.

No commander-in-chief has yet been determined on for the Italian Army.

Of the two reserve armies, one will be called the Northern Reserve Army and commanded by Field-Marshal Blücher; Gen. Barclay de Tolly will command the other, which is to be called the Southern Reserve Army.

All these are but proposals, which, however, it seems, find favor with England and Austria. We are soon to receive information regarding the strength of each of these armies.

VIENNA, *March 23, 1815.*

The fighting forces which are being raised by Austria, Russia, England, Prussia, Bavaria, Holland, the German states, and Sardinia will include, counting the garrisons, 700,000 men, ready to move at the first command. The Prussians already have 80,000 men on the Rhine; the English, Dutch, and Hanoverians virtually the same number; 250,000 Russians will arrive at the

end of April with 590 pieces of artillery. I believe that in place of three active armies there will be four, one of them under the chief command of Field-Marshal Blücher.

VIENNA, *March 26, 1815.*

SIRE:

Following a command of Czar Alexander that I call on him, I went to the Burg [Hofburg] this morning at eleven o'clock. During all the time that I have been in Vienna he has not been so gracious toward me. It was necessary, he said to me, to avoid blaming any one for what has occurred, and to face the present situation frankly and to profit by it, not in order to discover the cause, but to find a solution for it. He spoke a great deal, as if he wished to unburden himself of his attachment to your Majesty. If need be, he will give his last man and his last dollar for you. He spoke like a brave soldier who does not fear to risk his health or his life in the game.

VIENNA, *March 29, 1815.*

The treaty of coöperation was signed on the evening of the 25th and officially reported to me on the 27th.

After this important transaction had been disposed of, the Duke of Wellington no longer wished to delay his departure for his army, and left Vienna this morning at six o'clock.

VIENNA, *April 5, 1815.*

The events that have taken place in France have not in any manner upset the embassy of your Majesty at the Congress; the circumstances affecting the future of Europe will come up for attention in the same manner as heretofore.

KING LOUIS XVIII TO TALLEYRAND

OSTEND, *March 26, 1815.*

As it is contended that France needs my head, I have had to take measures for its security, which might have been endangered if I had remained many hours longer in Lille. Bonaparte, therefore, has the fighting forces to himself. All the hearts belong to me; of that I received incontrovertible proofs all along the route that I traveled.

TALLEYRAND TO KING LOUIS XVIII

VIENNA, *April 13, 1815.*

All the news that I receive from France proves to me that Bonaparte finds himself in the greatest difficulty. I infer this also from the messengers he has sent hither.

One of the latter, M. de Montrond, has come to Vienna with the help of the Abbe Altieri, attaché of the Austrian embassy in Paris.

Napoleon has made the following comment on this mission in his memoirs: "The Montrond mission had a number of objects: The winning of Talleyrand; the

conveying of letters to the empress [Marie Louise] and to bring back answers; at the same time Talleyrand was also to be furnished with an opportunity of writing to France in order that we might grasp the threads of the intrigue that he had spun there. All these objects were attained."

Draft of an announcement made by the French delegates to the conference of the eight powers at Vienna, April 1, 1815:

The powers flattered themselves that they had secured for the world a lasting peace by the treaties of April 11 and May 30, 1814.

France was the first to enjoy this; all of its interests were placed in order; whereas those of the other powers remained dependent upon the future decisions of a Congress. It was not that its boundaries had been decreased; it had actually been enlarged. Liberal institutions had taken place of the horrible despotism. Its colonies had been returned, and the seas had been reopened. No obstacles stood any longer in the way of the development of all the capacity for prosperity which it possessed. It was no longer reproached for the evil of which it has been the tool, and it was reconciled fully with Europe; and while internally it enjoyed the benefits of a paternal government under its legitimate king, externally it drew new strength from the confidence that it created. Invited to attend the Congress, it there exercised the influence of one of the most prominent members of the great European family.

The man who to-day loudly admits that he planned

the enslavement of Europe for fifteen years and who sacrificed the lives of 2,000,000 Frenchmen to accomplish this ruthless object, who devastated everywhere with fire and sword, and untiringly strove toward his goal with force and deception; the man who spurned the united will of the people that had placed its happiness in his hands, and whose life had to be defended against the justified anger of the people; this man, whose character and transactions are branded by the testimony of the authorities that he himself appointed, through the declarations of those whom he knew how to mislead; this man, who not only was removed from his power, but who gave it up himself and then renounced it for himself and his own, in solemn treaty with the powers, —a treaty from which, therefore, only the powers could release him,—has again seized power in the hope of once more satisfying (by his designs) on France and Europe a lust for ruling which has never had its equal.

Europe cannot and shall not submit to this; it does not arm itself against France, but for France as much as for its own safety. It knows no other enemies than Napoleon Bonaparte and those who fight in his cause.

When the powers declared on April 1, 1814, that they would not treat with him regarding peace, all the people, and above all the French, applauded loudly.

At the first report of his appearance in Southern France, in the month of March, they declared that they would give him neither peace nor a truce. To-day, when he has conquered the city of Paris and has again seized power, they renew this declaration in a most formal manner.

The independence of the French nation will remain untouched.

The treaty of May 30 and the territorial and political arrangements decided upon at the Congress will remain the guiding line for the relations between France and the other European countries.

If Europe is forced into this new and unexpected war, it is its wish that neither Napoleon Bonaparte nor his own people shall again gain advantage from his guilty undertaking, that this obstacle to the peace of the world shall be renewed, and that France in its organization shall possess and give Europe a pledge of safety. When this goal has been reached, then, and then only, will the powers lay down their arms.

VIENNA, *April 23, 1815.*

Czar Alexander, who does not comprehend the principle of legitimacy very well, had caused an article which lies before me to be printed in the "Frankfurter Zeitung" without waiting to find out what the English cabinet thinks on the subject. In this it is set forth that the powers wish only to cause the downfall of Napoleon. They do not, in any way, make any pretense of mixing in the constitutional matters of France, nor to force a government on France; France has full liberty to adopt a government which befits it.



VIENNA, *May 5, 1815.*

The English representatives to whom I turned to overcome the need for money of your Majesty's embassy, and who have shown themselves most approachable in this matter, have received a communication from their Government which empowers them to advance to us within six months only a sum of 100,000 francs.

VIENNA, *May 27, 1815.*

SIRE:

I am able to communicate to your Majesty to-day all the anxieties that have possessed me for eight days. The question had come up whether we should postpone the signing of the acts of the Congress to a later time in view of the fact that circumstances demanded that a few points remain undecided; a fairly strong intrigue was active to this end. The object was to bring matters that had been decided again into question, and to delay a decision on a number of points which were still awaiting regulation. Nothing was more important for your Majesty than to place your name under an act which should announce the unanimity of all the powers. Therefore I had to use all my strength in order to reach this goal. I was excellently supported by the English embassy and by Austria; the signing will take place to-morrow or the day after to-morrow.

## CHAPTER VIII

### POLAND AND SAXONY ONE HUNDRED YEARS AGO

FROM THE DIARY OF BARON VON STEIN

BARON VON STEIN probably has reported the negotiations leading up to the partitioning of Poland and Saxony better than any other statesman who took part in the Congress of Vienna. Stein attended the Congress in a peculiar capacity. He was one of the foremost Germans of his time and had been Minister-President of Prussia, yet he appeared at the Congress as an adviser to Czar Alexander of Russia, a champion of the idea of a unified Germany, and a determined opponent of Napoleon and his system. It was the irony of fate that as the servant of a despotic ruler he should advocate a liberal government for the heterogeneous mass of German states under the leadership of the country that his own nation of Prussia most despised and sought to displace—the Austria of the Hapsburgs.

What Talleyrand has told with such brevity and piquancy in his letters to his king Stein relates in his diary in a detailed manner that records every step of the long-drawn-out controversy over the two na-

tions that were regarded as lawful booty by right of conquest. It is this detailed manner of writing which discloses most clearly the methods of the old diplomacy; the stubborn determination to hold out; the marshaling of forces to overawe an opponent; discrediting the representatives of the opposition; proposing alternatives that do not solve the problems; above all, bluffing in the most accepted modern manner. The old diplomats passed away, but their methods survived well beyond the eighteenth century.

Baron von Stein appears to throw little blame for the controversies on Talleyrand. This is another evidence of Talleyrand's subtlety. All the odium falls on Metternich, whose double-dealing is apparently proved by the Russians to Metternich's own sovereign, Emperor Francis of Austria. This is the Russian side of the story of the deception practised by Metternich, a defense of which was written by Archduke John in his diary.

Stein is the tragic figure of the Congress of Vienna. He lived one hundred years before his time. Had his view prevailed, it is likely that Europe to-day would not be mourning the results of a war imposed upon the free nations by the Prussian monarch; for Stein worked for a democratization of Prussia that has not yet been achieved. He was the forerunner of Bismarck, but had a confidence in popular rule such as Bismarck never acquired. He reached high office largely against the inclinations of his king, who made him minister-president of Prussia on October 4, 1807. Five days later Stein published his famous ordinance

of emancipation, by which serfdom, the caste system, the restrictions on occupations and callings, and feudal rights over person and property were wiped out in Prussia. In 1808, by means of the municipal ordinance, he gave free local government. Napoleon, who is credited with having directed the attention of the King of Prussia to Stein with the remark that he was a man worth using, discovered that Stein had hopes for a German uprising against him and forced him into exile. Stein went first to Austria, and later to Russia at the invitation of Czar Alexander, where from 1812 to 1815 he advised the czar on German affairs and helped conduct his anti-Napoleonic work. The czar made Stein administrator of affairs temporarily in East Prussia when that land was occupied by German troops, and here Stein is credited with developing the Landsturm and the Landwehr.

This diary discloses how completely the Russian diplomatic service was dominated by foreigners. This was due to the fact that the Russian court was not close to the Russian people, and also to the change from court to court frequently made by statesmen in these turbulent times, a procedure which is not possible now because of the intensification of the nationalistic spirit in our own era. The diary also shows how Stein often differed with the czar, and discloses most completely the circumstances surrounding Alexander's reconciliation with Metternich. The name of one man in the czar's entourage is worth remembering—Pozzo di Borgo. He played a minor part at Vienna, but in 1839 he signed on behalf of Russia the treaty

guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium, which has become historic as "the scrap of paper."

#### POLAND AND SAXONY ONE HUNDRED YEARS AGO

Organization of the order of business at the Congress. Proposition by Nesselrode on eliminating the French from participation in the German questions. Adoption of this view by the allied ministers. Declaration by Gentz, drawn up along the lines of the conference protocol of the ministers and the incomprehensible amendment of Humboldt. Appearance of Talleyrand and Dalberg. Oral remarks by the French on non-recognition of Murat, on participation in the transactions of the Congress on a par with the other allies,—which is being supported especially by Lord Castlereagh,—and regarding Saxony. Contempt of the public toward Dalberg. According to the reports of Pozzo [Pozzo di Borgo] the leanings of the King of France are toward peace. His private letter. German affairs. The mediatized princes.

The Austrians take more interest in German affairs because Emperor Francis extolled the proofs of the devotion of the Germans that he received during his trip through southern Germany, because they are apprehensive over dis-

orders in Germany and their resulting influence on Austria, and because the complaints about sultanism are getting more intense and are being spread in view of the more lenient censorship of the press. The princes themselves are more pliable. The Grand Duke of Baden excused himself to me for his bad administration (July 13). Nassau is preparing a constitution. Relations with Würtemberg. I have communicated to the Crown Prince of Würtemberg the draft for the German constitution of Frankfort and that of the territorial constitution. He convinced himself of its usefulness, called the minister, Linden, informed him of his certain determination to adopt these fundamental laws, and commissioned him to announce this to his father, and to add how determined he was to carry them out.

The king was influenced by this serious declaration to discuss with Prince Metternich the intentions of the allied powers and to ask him whether the forthcoming territorial constitution had the backing of the confederation, and whether the nobility should have the right of appeal to the Bundestag. He affirmed this. His interview with the chancellor, Hardenberg, was in the same spirit, and thereupon he determined to ask his ministry to prepare a constitution and to forward it to him.

The continued movements in Saxony prompted



me to propose to Czar Alexander the urgent need of turning the administration of Saxony over to Prussia (September 29). He approved this, and this declaration in the name of the czar was made at a conference between Count Nesselrode, the chancellor [Hardenberg], Herr von Humboldt, and myself. We agreed, however, not to begin the administration until this had first been communicated to Austria.

September 28, 29.—The allied powers united in a declaration according to which the discussion of the more general European affairs should be brought before a gathering of the powers that took part in the Treaty of Paris [Russia, Austria, England, France, Spain, Prussia, Portugal, and Sweden]. German affairs, however, are to be placed before a special group of German powers; namely, Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Hanover, and Würtemberg. This decision was to be made known in a declaration to all present at the Congress. The project of this declaration was communicated on October 2 to Talleyrand, who repudiated it, and proposed that the participants in the Congress should meet and adopt the resolution which outlined the organization of the various working committees.

In an interview with Czar Alexander I expressed my view on the decision regarding Saxony. The czar refused to enter into a discussion

on this subject and declared that after the peace of Paris the allied powers had reserved for themselves the disposition of conquered countries. Talleyrand replied that he thought "*qu'il n'y avait plus de puissances alliées*" ["that there no longer were any allied powers"].

"Oui, toutes les fois qu'il s'agira de soutenir le traité de Paris," replied the czar ["Yes, always when it is needed to sustain the Treaty of Paris"]. The chancellor, Metternich, Nesselrode, and Castlereagh saw the necessity for uniting closely and firmly against Talleyrand's interference.

Hardenberg urged again that Austria consent to relinquish Saxony (October 2). Metternich promised this, but still brought forward the refusal of Emperor Francis, which the latter repeated before a number of persons. According to the reports of Herr von Alopeus in Berlin, the King of Saxony is supposed to have paid an imposing sum of money to Talleyrand. His mendacity is known.

The czar declared that if the King of Saxony did not voluntarily relinquish his rights, nothing remained to be done but to treat him according to the rule of the vanquished and to send him to Riga.

In the conference between the ministers of the allied powers it was decided to return Talley-

rand's note to him at a meeting which he will attend to-day, and to insist upon the acceptance of the one placed before him by the allied powers.

Empress Elizabeth informed me in an interview of her gratification at the adverse opinion that I expressed in Bruchsal (in July) on the Grand Duke of Baden, and her desire to advise him on his future conduct. I repeated my anxiety over his wilfulness and procrastination, advised the appointment of a prime minister and the formation of a state constitution, and pictured for her the state of dissolution of Baden, which was in strong contrast to the lawful and orderly situation that she must recall from her youth. The appearance of the King and Queen of Bavaria interrupted this audience.

The agreement of the ministers in the conference between Talleyrand and the allied ministers induced him to withdraw his proposal of October 5, but not the note which he presented, as the ministers had requested. It was decided to refute his claims in a note. Prince Metternich spoke with decided firmness, and Czar Alexander announced his approval to him in the presence of Emperor Francis at a ball given that evening, and assured the latter that he was faithful to the

alliance and daily ready to combat any opposition at the head of his army.

The un-German Montgelas suggested to the Prussian minister in Munich that the princes in Germany be left to stand alone, disunited, as in Italy, and that if a constitution was adopted, it should be entirely with a view of a confederation against foreigners, not affecting the internal affairs of the countries. At the same time he supported the efforts of the Saxons to get their king back.

It seems that Talleyrand's conduct is more a manifestation of his hankering for intrigue and for confusing others, of his arrogance and of his contempt for mankind, than the will of Louis XVIII, who, according to the repeated reports of Pozzo, wishes to preserve peace and unity. Talleyrand's remarks are very presumptuous and biting; until now, however, he has done nothing but create the greatest suspicion and strengthen the determination of the allies to hold together.

Czar Alexander attempted to put an end to the Polish affair. He spoke on this subject to General Knesebeck in a peculiar manner: "Russia's power is full of apprehension for Europe; yet the honor of the nation demands increased territory as a reward for its sacrifices, its efforts,

and its victories. But this will harm no one, for when Russian Poland is united and receives a constitution and its own military, Russian troops will be withdrawn, and Poland thereby will have moderate independence from Russia." He spoke this with feeling that did honor to his heart and to his honorable views,

Talleyrand's conduct hastened an agreement of the powers regarding Poland and Germany and appears to be contrary to the wishes of his king; it seems that he is led to it by his passion for dominating, his inclination to confound others.

October 7.—He [Talleyrand] presented a project for a circular note in which he accepted the one drafted by Castlereagh, with the amendment that all those nations were to be recognized by the Congress who had been in possession of sovereignty and had not yet abdicated.

The question of the admission of Saxony will be debated in the conference on the eighth, and turned down.

October 9.—According to the remarks of the Crown Prince of Würtemberg, it is the firm determination of the King of Würtemberg to act jointly with Bavaria against every attempt to unite Germany, and to agree to an alliance for war purposes only. Wrede is of the same opin-

ion. The King of Würtemberg has been discouraged from turning to France by the declaration of Czar Alexander that he will not permit France to mix in German affairs contrary to the Treaty of Paris, and through the protection which the Duke of Dalberg appears to give the mediatized princes. The crown prince believes that unity and firmness on the part of the allied powers will remove these obstacles, and I advised him to speak with the Czar of Russia on the need of binding Germany closely together, so that southern Germany will not be able to break away from the rest and throw itself wholly into the arms of France.

October 12.—The ministers of the allied powers advise Count Münster to declare Hanover a kingdom, to prevent new demands being made on the ground of participation in the preliminary German committee. He decided to do so, and is sending a circular to the allied powers. A great title for a small and poor country. The first meeting of the German committee will take place on October 14.

Pozzo arrived from Paris on the thirteenth, and confirmed everything that he had previously reported. Increasing stability in the Government; the peaceful attitude of the king; the general desire of the nation to enjoy peace; turbu-



lence in the army; efforts of the factions to keep up the ferment. They hope for the disruption of the Congress and new wars. The king commanded Vandamme [one of Napoleon's famous generals] to leave the Tuileries, and as he took a seat in the anteroom a *huissier* indicated that he would have him taken out by two non-commissioned officers; he then left. Davout has been sent to the country; the marshals demanded that judgment be passed on him in the regular manner. The king replied that he intended to act according to the statutes, but recognized no corps of marshals. The finances are in good condition; the arrears in pay of the army is confirmed; the minister of war paid in the months from June to September inclusive 45,000,000 [francs?] to the minister of war; the number of officers is 35,000, the number of discharged officials is 14,000.

October 13.—Lord Castlereagh yesterday presented a memorandum on the Polish affairs to the czar and had a lively interview; he stuck to his opinion. The articles of the agreement of June 27, 1813, seem to have confused him; he was silent for a time and said: “Je remplirai exactement ce traité. Je donnerai à l’Autriche les salines de Wieliczka” [“I will fulfil this treaty scrupulously. I will give Austria the salt-mines of Wieliczka”]. He adhered to his plan for a

constitution. The czar did not give this memorandum to Nesselrode. Lord Castlereagh gave him a second memorandum in which he proposed a compromise in order to give the Poles certain constitutional advantages.

October 16.—Many believe that the czar wishes only to give the impression of supporting the Poles in their proposals because he made them promises, and raised their hopes; he expected, however, severe and determined opposition from his allies and meant to use this to excuse himself to the Poles if he did not fulfil his promises, the seriousness of which he recognized. This view was expressed by the Duke of Serra Capriola upon his arrival from St. Petersburg; also by Prince Peter Wolkonskij. The czar has given Castlereagh's first memorandum to Prince Czartoryski for reply, and not to Nesselrode; he also discussed the contents of my letter with him. Czartoryski could not hide his ill will toward me when he met me at a concert, and said to Anstetten: "*On attaque l'empereur de toute part; il faut le fortifier et nous défendre*" ["The emperor is being attacked on all sides; it is necessary to protect him and to defend ourselves"].

October 17.—Metternich has at last agreed to our taking possession of Saxony. Hardenberg refused my proposal to send Prince William to

Dresden at once and accepted the plan of sending Minister Reck instead. The czar has not yet accepted the protocol of September.

October 18.—This acceptance came to-day, shortly before the military festival. It was most dazzling, the troops pleasing, the arrangements for the whole excellent; the impression which the whole scene made when viewed from the balcony of the pavilion was imposing and beautiful. The Crown Prince of Würtemberg, who observed the czar, believed that the latter was annoyed by all this; in the bearing of the troops, in the lively participation of the spectators, in the abundance shown everywhere, he found something contrary to his idea of the weakness of Austria, which disturbed his high ideas of invincibility.

I found the czar on October 19 reflective and uncommunicative. Since the fall of Paris, as a matter of fact, his attitude has expressed less friendliness, frankness, and sociability.

I asked him what he had commanded Prince Repnin to do now, as the latter would soon leave Saxony, and whether he would come here. He said, "Yes," and spoke with satisfaction of Repnin's administration of affairs. At my remark that Repnin deserved to be given active work, and that perhaps there was an opportunity in Esthonia, as Prince August of Oldenburg in-

tended to leave, he replied that it was his intention to use Prince Repnin in the interior of Russia, as he had familiarized himself with business methods and arrangements which could to some extent be applied there. I besought him to suggest to the king [Frederick William of Prussia] that he send Prince William to Saxony at once as governor, which he promised to do. After a short pause he said:

"You have written me about Poland; why have you, who show such liberal ideas on every occasion, proposed others so different in this case?"

"It seemed to me, Sire, that it was necessary to modify the principles to be applied in accordance with the nature of the object to which they are to be applied; and I fear that this Poland will be for you nothing but a source of annoyance and opposition. It lacks a third estate, which in all civilized lands is the basis of culture, of manners, and of the riches of a nation. Poland has only a small, ignorant, and turbulent nobility and Jews; and it is this lack of a third estate that handicaps you in your plans of organization in Russia."

"That is true; but in the former Duchy of Warsaw affairs prospered very well."

"Most imperfectly; for Napoleon oppressed them and forced them to go in one direction only."

"I shall try to place them under discipline, and

in addition I have not yet decided upon the method of giving a constitution to these people, who have worked so hard to preserve their nationality."

He then continued, and said that everything was uniting against him. Even Talleyrand was intriguing, but had failed of his object, having stirred up all the allies, the Prussians about Saxony, himself about Poland, and the Austrians about Italy. This, however, had only aroused general suspicion against him. I assured him that certainly none of the allied ministers had intrigued with Talleyrand; to which he agreed, being doubtful only about Metternich, whom he discussed with bitterness. Then he repeated his determination to maintain peace and unity, and dismissed me in the most friendly fashion.

The Crown Prince of Würtemberg discussed German affairs with me. He declared that his father had held a conference on this subject in his presence and was not satisfied with the proposals of Austria and Prussia; he expressed the opinion that it [the German confederation] was a shapeless mass, without cohesion, and that it would please nobody. He recommended more emphasis upon and faithfulness to the basic principles. He was concerned only about Metternich, because of his frivolity and his wrong view that

he could win Bavaria by concessions and through Bavaria could rule southern Germany. He related at the same time that the Poles had proposed that he place himself at their head; he answered them, "*Qu'il n'était point un aventurier illustre, que sa position était très agréable, qu'il aimait l'indépendance et ne voulait point la perdre, pour dépendre d'une femme, de ses voisins et d'une nation turbulente*" ["That he was not in any manner an illustrious adventurer, that his position was most agreeable, that he loved independence, and did not wish to lose it in order to be dependent upon a woman, her neighbors, and a turbulent nation"].

The czar spoke some time ago about his Polish plans with Count Capo d'Istria and told him that he would give the country a constitution and order the Russian Army to retire, and thereby would avoid stirring up the envy of his neighbors. He asked Capo d'Istria for his opinion, since he had opportunity to become acquainted with Poland while the companion of Admiral Tschitschagoff. Even at that time the czar had commanded the admiral [in September, October, and November, 1812] to promise the Poles their freedom and to call upon them to desert the French; but he had hesitated about giving out proclamations because he would cause ill feeling



among his countrymen, the Russians. Capo d'Istria replied that he considered Poland, which lacked a middle class, as incapacitated for freedom, and that the czar would arouse fears of internal upheavals among all his neighbors if he proclaimed it in Poland.

October 20.—Bavaria and Würtemberg gave their views on the plan [for a German confederation] to the conference. They wished no house of princes, no nobility, no internal guaranties by the confederation, no enlargement of the powers of the commander-in-chief during war.

October 21.—Count Münster presented a document opposing the statement of Bavaria and Würtemberg in the spirit of my writing of October 20. I advised Count Keller and Herr von Marshall [representative of the Duke of Nassau and the Prince of Nassau, who had been members of the confederation of the Rhine] not to allow themselves to be led astray, but to hold fast to Austria, Prussia, and Hanover, from whom alone they could expect protection and help.

October 23.—Prince Metternich declared himself in writing against the relinquishment of Saxony to Prussia. He agreed under these conditions: first, a more detailed determination of the boundaries; secondly, that Mayence belong to the south German defense system; third, that the

Moselle be the boundary between the Prussian possessions and those of the other German princes. Mayence belongs to the defense system of all Germany, not to a part of it; if Bavaria wants a strategic military center, it should use Mannheim or Philippsburg. It is above all not in a position to defend the left bank of the Rhine alone against France. Austria is seeking Mayence so energetically because Bavaria makes its acquisition a condition for giving up the Inn district and Salzburg.

A military committee for German military affairs has been formed, composed of the Crown Prince of Würtemberg, Wrede, Radetzky, Knesebeck, and a Hanoverian. The question of Mayence will be considered in this committee. Wrede proposed to postpone it until the relation of Germany to Switzerland and the Netherlands had been decided upon.

The czar called Anstetten on the twentieth and handed him a reply to the memorandum of Lord Castlereagh, drawn up by Czartoryski, which contained profuse marginalia, some of it in his own hand, and commanded him to make a complete document of it. He expressed his displeasure at the disinclination of Nesselrode to treat the Polish plans according to his own view and to support them; he told him [Anstetten] that he did not intend to interfere in German af-

fairs, and became angered when he declared how he had agreed to the demands of others for territory, but how his own modest demands were opposed by every one.

\* Russia has produced 168,000,000 rubles [\$84,000,000] worth of paper money, dated 1812, 1813, 1814, to meet the cost of the war.

October 24.—Interview of the Crown Prince of Würtemberg with the chancellor and myself; he declared he had succeeded in convincing the king (of Würtemberg) that it was to his interest to join Germany and to withdraw support from Bavaria, which sooner or later would oppress him. The king declared himself favorably inclined toward this view, and on October 25 said to his personal physician: "Dear Hardegg, it seems that we dare not object to anything. Soon we will have to apologize for being Würtembergers; but God will help me." Wrede declared to Herr von Linden that it was necessary to unite and act jointly. The natural ally for both sides, however, was France; France would soon rise again.

Czar Alexander had a violent interview with Prince Metternich on Poland; he accused him of being solely opposed to all his plans and that he was being criticized by the local public. Metter-

nich replied that he did not know how to answer the czar, for he combined the qualities of both sovereign and minister.

Czar Alexander declared to many women of local society without reservation his revulsion toward Metternich and his plan to revive Poland. To the old Princess Metternich he said, "*Je méprise tout homme qui ne porte point l'uniforme*" ["I look down on every man who does not wear a uniform"], and to another woman he said, "*Il ne faut point que vous soyez liée avec un scribe*" ["It is not at all necessary that you should be acquainted with a writer"]. He influenced the Duchess of Sagan to break her relations with Prince Metternich completely.

Gentz showed a memorandum to the crown prince in which he set forth that Austria must unite with southern Germany and France to keep intact the balance of power against Russia, as the latter would always involve Prussia and northern Germany in its interests. From this he deduced that Mayence would have to pass into Bavarian hands. The crown prince contradicted him. I informed him of the perniciousness of a system which would destroy the unity of Germany, toward which we were working. Place the southern part of Germany under the influence of France and the northern part under the influence of Russia, and continue an unholy divi-

sion between Prussia and Austria. By means of it France would have new opportunity for carrying out its intentions against Belgium and the left bank of the Rhine.

The King of Würtemberg is confirmed in his apprehensions of Bavaria. He will not make common cause with Bavaria, and therefore wants Mayence. Bavaria therefore stands isolated if Austria adheres firmly to Germany, and if it will not agree to favorable conditions, it can be left entirely outside the confederation.

The seizure of Saxony by Prussia is making a great uproar in Vienna; it is loudly criticized, and no one takes into consideration that it follows from the application of the right of conquest, based on the present European situation. Saxony was conquered in a just war; its fate could be determined, therefore, according to the reasonable verdict of the conquerors. A factor in this decision was the obligation that Prussia agreed to with Russia, in the Treaty of Kalish, to restore it to its condition in 1806. This could not have been fulfilled other than by turning Saxony over to Prussia, for Russia wished to keep the largest part of the Prussian provinces. The German princes had their possessions guaranteed to them by the individual treaties,—which left the markgraves in the hands of Bavaria,—

and the remainder could not well be drawn on for the benefit of Prussia. Prussia had even been moved by England to give up part of its lands for the benefit of Hanover.

October 29 to November 7.—Polish affairs. During the stay of the monarchs in Ofen (Budapest, Hungary) the Czar of Russia tried to win the Emperor of Austria over to his plan. He told him of the difficulties which Metternich made for him in the Polish affair and his wish to ally himself with the emperor in order to prevent all possibility of a war. Emperor Francis assured him that the declarations of his ministers wholly represented his own views; in case war came, he preferred to have it now rather than “*d’être réveillé dans son premier sommeil*” [“to be awakened from his first sleep”].

On the return trip the czar rode in the same carriage with the king. The former tried to convert the latter to his view in the Polish question; the latter listened for a long time, and finally answered nothing except that he hoped the czar would change his views.

Castlereagh had accompanied his memorandum with a note in which he pointed out to the czar how his demands were contrary to the agreements of June 27 to September 5. These demands set forth that, after the restoration of the



kingdom [of Poland] the boundary-line be drawn through Thorn, Kalish, Czenstochowa, and Cracow, comprising the Duchy of Warsaw and the old Russian Polish provinces. The czar caused both memoranda to be answered by Czartoryski and Anstetten, but did not give Castlereagh his answer until after his return to Vienna.

In the meantime Metternich and Hardenberg had agreed to turn over the mediation in this matter to Lord Castlereagh and to give him an idea of how he was to conduct himself at the negotiations. It was decided to offer him (the czar) either the restoration of Poland as it was in 1791, or to insist upon a new and satisfactory division in which Russia would take Thorn and Cracow to the Neva.

Upon the return of the monarchs from Ofen, Metternich demanded that the Polish question be discussed in a council, for the increasing dissatisfaction with his management of affairs by the public in the interior caused apprehension.

The emperor named Metternich, Schwarzenberg, and Stadion for this council, and according to its decision Prussia was asked whether it wished to make common cause with Austria, and also was called upon to explain whether it agreed to the constitution of 1772 or of 1791, and suggested the Vistula as the boundary. Austria in-

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tended to give Prussia the left bank of the Vistula as reparation, and thereby save Saxony.

The czar attempted to restore good relations with Metternich through the Duchess of Sagan, and became restive because of the united action of Austria, Prussia, and England. He attempted to deal with them singly; began with Prussia, arranged a meeting with the king and the chancellor, complained of the difficulties that were placed in the way of his reasonable demands and of the attempts to divide Russia and Prussia. In secret he had proposed to make concessions in the case of Poland if the king would permit the restoration of Saxony; he declared that the boundaries which he demanded were not dangerous, etc.

The king agreed with him for the most part, and the chancellor objected in vain; he forbade him to discuss the matter farther in common with Austria and England. The chancellor was greatly wounded by this weak and incomprehensible conduct of the king, and informed Lord Castlereagh of what had taken place, and sought to prevail on him to withhold his note, which was in the form of a dry refutation, but which, however, he presented on November 6. The conduct of the king [he set forth] aroused great displeasure.

It appears that England wishes to desert

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Prussia only in the Saxon affair. Prussia is accused of deserting the cause of European independence in order to receive Saxony. Austria, France, and England would have to unite the more closely as a counter weight to the preponderance of Russia, because Prussia at present was wholly on that side.

The chancellor attempted to bring Metternich and Castlereagh to more moderate views. He asked me whether it was wise to advocate a war now. I replied in the negative, as Russia had an army of 250,000 Russians and 38,000 Poles, ready to fight, standing between the Vistula and the Warthe, whereas the Prussian and Austrian armies were scattered in Germany, Italy, etc. The Russian army in Holstein threatened northern Germany. All states [I continued] were exhausted; everywhere there was ill will; increased bitterness in Germany and Italy. In France the disaffected people would raise their heads, in Italy they would get help from Murat. Peace was needed in order to calm everything and to bring security. Russia in the meantime would have its Polish affairs to look after; would need to demobilize its armies, and would have trouble to raise them again after several years, because the means by which it now waged war would no longer be at its disposal; namely, increasing its supply of paper money, English

credits, and requisitions. The country [I said] was greatly affected, as it had raised 1,763,000 recruits since 1805.

The czar spoke to me on November 5. I gave him my note of November 4 concerning German affairs, the progress of the conferences, as well as the draft of a confidential note to the Prussian and Austrian ministers. He read it with attention, and suggested that it be presented by Nesselrode. With justice he found it too general and too bitter, and on November 6 told Count Nesselrode that he should abridge the note, make it milder in tone, and present it. I therefore changed it on November 7.

Nesselrode had consulted Metternich and Gentz. The former assured him that the German affairs were making good progress and that he would therefore withhold the note. I urged emphatically that he present it (November 9), which he then did.

At the interview of November 5 the czar began to speak on his own initiative on the Polish affair. He knew that I had spoken critically of his conduct (on November 3) to the Duchess of Oldenburg and said, "*Vous vous êtes aussi rangé du côté de mes ennemis; à quoi je ne m'attendais pas*" ["You also have placed yourself in the ranks of my enemies; I had not expected that"].

I replied that his neighbors had reason to be apprehensive on the subject of his royal title [as King of Poland], his constitution, and the boundaries. He replied with a recital of what he had done for Europe; how he had carried on a dangerous war, risked his life, acquiesced in the enlargement of Austria in Italy, had left Saxony to Prussia. On such unselfish, trusting foundations he had built up the strength of the alliance; now, however, he felt himself the object of mistrust and of envy, and his most reasonable demands were opposed. He said he needed Cracow and Thorn in order to protect his Polish possessions on the left bank of the Vistula. Everything, he said, united against him. England, which had nothing to do with the matter, appeared on the scene; I should use my influence [he said] to lead Hardenberg to deal alone with Russia in this case and not to make common cause with Austria against him. Austria had proposed, he said, to concede everything in Polish affairs if he kept Saxony from Prussia. It was intended to form a coalition against him; he had already observed this in Paris and would have to take corresponding measures.

Through this Polish matter the business of the Congress has become disrupted and weakened, and the seed of envy has been scattered among the nations, visiting its damaging results on all

affairs, bringing about coldness between Prussia and Russia, which hinders determined action in German affairs, and allows Bavaria and Würtemberg to promote their selfish plans. The czar appears in the light of having misused the confidence which his allies gave him in order to postpone the settlement of the Polish question to a time when he had prepared everything to his own advantage and had taken a threatening and determined position. He causes mistrust in Europe, leads the King of Prussia away from the common interests of Europe, and injures his own people by giving Poland rights in precedence [of Russia], thus disrupting the unity of administration.

November 19.—The czar clings to his opinion; he will not even listen to his sister, the Grand Duchess Catharine, and tells her "*que son honneur y était engagé*" ["that his honor is at stake here"]. He allowed Grand Duke Constantine to leave for Warsaw (November 9) with the object of increasing the Polish army to 70,000 men.

The marriage of the Crown Prince of Würtemberg and Grand Duchess Catharine has been decided on; the consent of the empress dowager was received through the agency of the czar. She has sacrificed her alliance with Grand Duke Karl [of Austria] and her establishment in Rus-



sia for the crown prince, who won her favor during a stay in London. The czar had much confidence in her and love for her; it had diminished, however, because of an incident in Russia in 1812. When the French advanced, a passionate bitterness against the czar became manifest; the people attributed the misfortune of the country to him and to the nobility in the governments of Jaroslav, Twer, etc., and demanded of the grand duchess, who was then in Jaroslav, that she place herself at their head and seize the government.

The departure of the King [of Prussia] from the plan agreed on strengthened the czar in his decision, embittered England and Austria and led to new indecision in the case of Saxony. Hardenberg attempted to convince Castlereagh in a memorandum that it was not advisable to begin war at this time. Castlereagh expressed the opinion that Prussia should attempt to mediate with Russia, as the czar was too embittered toward him. Münster also supported this view secretly. Stewart and Pozzo, however, spoke of dividing Europe; on the one hand Russia and Prussia, on the other the remainder of Europe. A similar view was expressed by Metternich to the Crown Prince of Würtemberg on November 11; he told him that Austria would risk a great deal in the game. The latter replied that a

statesman should avoid such risks. Schwarzenberg is against the war and against giving up Mayence to Bavaria.

November 14.—Prince Metternich asked Chancellor Hardenberg in an official note to obtain a definite declaration from Russia about the boundaries which it insisted upon, and the guaranty it would give for keeping peace in the Polish Austrian provinces and in the rest of Europe, if Russia gave a constitution in its part [of Poland]. The document at the same time contains the accusation that Prussia does not favor united action. The chancellor means to have an interview with the czar on this subject.

Prince Wrede tried to influence the chancellor to be satisfied with a part of Saxony, but he refused to enter into a discussion. Count Münster also recommended and supported this idea, but as a means of settlement and not to hinder Prussia's plans of annexation (November 17).

An article in the "Mercury" on October 31 on the situation at the Congress caused an unfavorable impression. Prince Wrede and the Würtemberg delegate criticized it loudly.

The Crown Prince [of Würtemberg] had an interview with the czar on November 16, and the latter discussed the note on Germany's affairs and promised him that he would carry out its requests and also would not give his consent to

the cession of Mayence to Bavaria. The crown prince led the conversation to the situation in general, expressed his anxiety at the tension between the allies, at the danger that grew out of this for Germany, and at the complications for Russia if it became embroiled with all the European powers. England, he declared, would be especially dangerous for Russia.

The czar justified his conduct by speaking of the right he had to the gratitude of Europe, of the alacrity with which he supported the welfare of his allies, of the need of providing safety for his empire by preparing a secure boundary, of the impossibility of repudiating the promises which he had given his subjects in St. Petersburg. He said he knew that Metternich was trying to stir every one up against him and to separate him from Prussia; he had means of conciliating England, such as offers of special trade privileges, etc. When he left the czar he was convinced that the latter would hold fast to his resolution.

The czar was principally concerned about making sure of Prussia; he continued his efforts to feed the mistrust between Prussia and Austria. He told the King of Prussia that Talleyrand had informed him in an interview on November 15 that Prince Metternich had said Austria would make concessions in the Polish matter

if Russia would separate from Prussia. He even authorized the king to publish this fact. Metternich denied it, and this resulted in personal reproaches. Talleyrand's interview was peculiar.

November 18 to 23.—The czar withdrew his confidence from Nesselrode because of his relations with Metternich and Gentz; he put the management of the Polish affair entirely into the hands of Czartoryski, who called on Capo d'Istria for aid, as Anstetten had departed. Capo d'Istria is a man who possesses shrewdness, refinement, moderation, and poise. His mind is cultivated, his character charming, his manner pleasing.

In the interview which he had with the czar he drew attention to the fact that Poland lacked all the elements necessary for a constitution, that his attitude toward his allies was too changeable, that he kept distant from him those who had served him faithfully, and thereby distressed and even embittered them. The czar referred to the reply to Castlereagh, which was written in a more moderate tone.

Czartoryski then had several interviews with Chancellor Hardenberg and later also with me. He requested me to approach the czar; he said that the czar was sensitive to my behavior and to the fact that I kept aloof. I replied: the czar

was to some extent occupied and partly wandering, and without having definite business with him I could not take his time. Nevertheless, I reported to him on the twentieth, and he asked me to visit him that evening.

He had been ailing since the sixteenth with an affection of the foot, and had sustained several attacks of fever, and I found him lying on a sofa, suffering slightly and rather tired. He received me in the most friendly manner, and began to talk about the situation in general. He said that Metternich was trying to confuse everything, but that this also appeared to be the object of the English. Emperor Francis exhibited a friendly attitude, and confided in him. I remarked that I did not think the English desired war, since the burdens on the people were great and demanded alleviation; the points still in dispute seemed to me due more to selfish interests than germane to Russia or to Austria. Cracow, I continued, was important for Russia, but not to the extent that it justified a war in present circumstances. I felt that Russia could do without it, and Prussia probably would come to an understanding regarding Thorn.

He replied, that to evacuate Cracow would be ignoble for him, since he had occupied it. I answered that such an evacuation might be regarded as a proof of his high-mindedness and not

as an indication of weakness, inasmuch as it would be a sacrifice to give the peoples the peace that they so greatly needed while he stood at the head of 400,000 men; the present situation of armament and negotiation could not continue long.

He contradicted me and said that it was customary for the Russian army to be concentrated; because of the wide extent of the empire it could not well be divided and placed apart in regimental cantons. Therefore, in order to conciliate the foreign powers, he had offered to give Poland a constitution and to withdraw the Russian army to Russia. All this, however, was Greek to the Austrians; they could not comprehend it. He wished peace, and hoped to achieve it, and he hoped then to live solely to support and disseminate liberal ideas, which alone made life worth living.

The czar expressed his satisfaction with the friendly attitude of Emperor Francis. I recommended that he give attention to Germany. He promised to do all he could to bring about an orderly situation. When I directed his attention to the procrastination and ill will of his brother-in-law, the Grand Duke of Baden, he commanded me to suggest how he could be brought to terms. He said that he wished Hardenberg would complete his task and thereby bring matters to an end, and agreed when I told him that it was



necessary to settle the questions of the three controversial points, Poland, Saxony, and Mayence, at one time and in one meeting, in order to shorten everything and not give opportunity for new complications. He spoke on this occasion about Saxony; regarded the division of that country as entirely out of place for Saxony, for Prussia, and for Austria, because a minor prince would not protect the boundaries.

Capo d'Istria and Czartoryski visited me separately on the following day (November 21). The discussion was about Poland, Saxony, and Mayence.

The czar called me on November 25. He was gentle and calm, expressed his readiness for a conciliation, and his regret that Austria should continue to make new demands and pretensions. I spoke and pleaded with emphasis for peace; I pointed out that it was necessary not only for the restoration of general prosperity, but also for the restoration of general morality, which had suffered most severely in the prolonged oppression and state of war. He replied how ready he was to contribute to the general peace, and above all that he was firmly determined to support and to advance every effective and salutary plan.

I presented a document concerning the Grand Duchy of Baden and requested him to consider

its contents. He promised this, and said that he would let the chancellor know his decision on the following day through Czartoryski.

There was a meeting on November 27, at which Prince Hardenberg was given the statement of the czar. He was dissatisfied because Cracow had not been turned over to the Austrians, complained of unfairness, and reserved the right to inform Metternich of everything. This was done on the twenty-eighth in a verbal note which was drawn up in the spirit of the draft for the protocol, and in which he insisted on the indivisibility of Saxony, and offered Austria the cession of 130,000 souls at Leibschütz and Ratibor in upper Silesia.

In a casual conversation between Czartoryski, Count Münster, and myself at my home the latter was most determined in his view that a part of Saxony would have to be returned. The indisposition of Prince Metternich and the consultation with Emperor Francis delayed the reply.

Meanwhile Stewart declared that the Polish question would now calm down, but that more emphasis would be placed on the Saxon question. An attempt was made to negotiate in England itself. Instructions based on the contents of my memorandum of December 3 were sent to England, regarding which I found it neces-

sary to write Count Capo d'Istria on December 7.

In the meantime many things happened in the German affair, especially in the case of Mayence and the interior of Baden. I had given the czar a note on the twenty-ninth on the Baden situation, pointing to the negligence, indecision, wilfulness, and mistrust of the grand duke. At the same time I had made suggestions for the forming of the chamber of deputies and the appointment of a cabinet minister with most extensive powers. He promised to help. The empress called me on November 31 and in the presence of her brother [the grand duke] spoke to me about the condition of the country [Baden]. I gave my views on his method of governing freely and without reserve and insisted on the need of the chamber. He finally decided to send the document to Prince Metternich and Hardenberg. The empress gave her suggestions regarding the organization of a ministry, recommended its adoption, and delegated the Duke of Coburg to discuss the matter with him. Although this document had finally been released, he could not make up his mind to call the commission which would make a draft of a representative constitution. It had not yet been issued on December 24, for the procrastinating, mistrustful, undecided man could not bring himself to send a courier. With justice Napoleon

said of him, "*Ce prince est indécrotable*" ["This prince is incorrigible"].

Meanwhile the Austrians observed a deep silence, but began to negotiate secretly. Metternich told Czartoryski in an interview that on the whole satisfaction prevailed over the declaration of Russia regarding Poland; it was necessary, however, to insist that the King of Saxony should retain a part of his country. This would remove the antagonism of France and satisfy public opinion, which had become loud against the removal of the King of Saxony, and also was apprehensive regarding the proximity of Prussia at this point.

Emperor Francis spoke with the Grand Duchess Catharine (December 6) regarding his wish to keep peace, saying that his conscience demanded that he save a part of the country [Saxony] for the King of Saxony; the eyes of all Europe were directed on this. He would like to live in good relations with Prussia, but it was getting dangerous for him. Moreover, he was ready to declare Mayence a fortified place belonging to the confederacy. Prince Hardenberg himself was inclined to give the king something in Saxony. Prince Repnin had informed him that all the Saxons wished their king back.

Both statements were false. Prince Repnin had remarked that after the Battle of Leipsic

every one had turned against the king, who was looked upon as the instigator of the general misfortune. Later these views had become modified; the supporters of the Duke of Weimar had joined those who favored the king when they saw that their expectations were not fulfilled. The dissatisfaction after the Treaty of Paris had helped the unrest, and the royal partizans had become more active. Opinions were divided now; tradesmen and craftsmen favored Prussia, the nobility of the land and the peasantry were on the whole calm, while the Dresden officials favored the king.

The object of Emperor Francis in wishing to restore the King of Saxony to land of his own was disclosed most clearly during his interview with the Duke of Weimar. The latter declared that he considered the division of Saxony as full of consequences from an administrative point of view and because the mental perturbation would continue. "That is well," he replied; "both parts will therefore reunite so much sooner." He wishes, therefore, to keep up discord and disturbance in the country of his ally in order to deprive him of what he acquired with so much shedding of blood.

The envy of Hanover toward Prussia was also disclosed in this Saxon affair. Count Münster long hated and envied Prussia, partly for per-

sonal reasons and partly because of the hostile conduct of Prussia toward Hanover in the year 1806. He therefore proposed to the British and Russian cabinets in the winter of 1812, in a detailed communication, that Russia be enlarged to the Vistula,—that is, by East Prussia,—that Prussia be confined between the Vistula and the Elbe, and that the house of Hanover be given the territory between the Elbe and the Scheldt under the name of the Kingdom of Austrasia; that is to say, the heritage of Prussia, Saxony, Hesse, Orange, Brunswick, and Nassau, and to disown these princely houses by right of conquest. This project was to be carried out by a Swedish-English-Hanoverian army under the Crown Prince of Sweden, and one of the English princes was to be placed on the throne.

This bubble burst of its own weight because of the events of December, 1812, the convention of York, the entry of Prussia, etc. During the war Count Münster recognized the indispensability of Prussia, adopted favorable views, and won the confidence of the chancellor. In this Saxon affair, however, he showed the greatest activity. He fortified the English and the Austrians in their desire for a division of Saxony; he remarked to Colonel Miltiz, when the latter depicted to him the tragic consequences of a division of the country, that this would be immate-



rial; that if Prussia did not recede from its position a protest would be made against annexation, a favorable opportunity would be awaited, and war would be begun, which would result in the downfall of Prussia.

On December 8, Miltiz visited Count Schulenburg at Klosterode and spoke with him regarding the consequences of a partition of Saxony and the dishonor if the king should be given only a small part of his country. He [the count] then remarked that it would be possible to speak of ceding to Prussia only a small part, in any case, lower Lusatia and the district of Zörbig; he would never advise the king to do anything else, as it would be an unworthy and dishonorable transaction. The influences that forced Prussia to give up a small part would also force it to be satisfied with a small part; else war would be begun with Prussia after an interval of time, with the result that Prussia would be destroyed. Hanover, however, would gain influence and recognition by means of its rectitude and its administrative wisdom, whereby it would become the rallying-point for northern Germany. Count Schulenburg therefore wishes to overthrow a state which already exists, which has won a military and political reputation, and possesses a mass of information and the machinery of government, and to substitute for it another which

is known only for its baseness and promises us a generation of obscure princes as regents. What deception! From this and a similar statement that Count Schulenburg made to me it developed that the king will refuse a small allotment.

The Austrian declaration finally appeared on December 10 and was presented on the eleventh. It wished to compensate Prussia in western Germany and to give it only 400,000 souls in Saxony, lower Lusatia, and Thuringia; with regard to Poland it demanded Cracow. Metternich therefore assumed a basis for negotiation entirely opposite to that of October 22. He cloaked it in a mass of phrases of gratitude for Prussia's efforts, the necessity of agreement between Prussia and Austria, etc., so that the complete contrast between these assurances of friendship and the abortive proposition gave a feeling of mystification. Prince Hardenberg showed Prince Czartoryski and me the correspondence since October 4, and turned it over to Czar Alexander. Most peculiar among this correspondence was a billet of November 7, in which the most definite assurance was given of the consent of the czar to the delivery of Saxony [to Prussia].

Czar Alexander wrote the chancellor through Prince Czartoryski that it was for him to decide the interests of Prussia; he would then support

him with all his strength and all his troops. He presented this to me on the evening of December 12. He said that he had put the documents before Emperor Francis, who reproached Prince Metternich most bitterly. From this correspondence it could be seen that the object of Metternich was to separate Russia and Prussia. If it was necessary to accelerate this matter and to deliver an ultimatum, he would support it with all his power; it was necessary to settle this affair among the three nations first without the interference of France and England, then the German affair, and then the English.

I replied with comment on the pernicious and objectionable character of the Austrian proposals and on the need of showing the determination and readiness to adopt extreme measures, and recommended that preparations be made by planning for departure and moving troops; also on the necessity of taking the whole matter out of the hands of Nesselrode, who was blindly subservient to Metternich, and entrusting it to Czartoryski or Rasumowskij, adding Capo d'Istria to them, as the situation was a matter of indifference to him. He asked about Gentz. I told him that he was a man with a dried-up brain and a foul heart; and then asked about Stahrenberg, whom I knew only superficially. I closed with the pro-

posal that he hold a conference with Hardenberg to-day, the thirteenth.

Prince Metternich was put at a disadvantage by the course of events. That same evening he sent Wessenberg to the chancellor to discuss with the councilor of state, Hoffmann, the statistical table that had accompanied his communication of December 10. He pointed out that he had erroneously deducted 1,200,000 souls from Prussia's share. In addition, he himself came early on the thirteenth to the chancellor to prove to him that his communication was not official, but confidential, and that demands for more Saxon and Polish territory might well have been made.

Czartoryski, Capo d'Istria, Humboldt, and I were present at this conference. The former declared the czar would cede the district of Tarnopol with 400,000 souls to Austria, but insisted on the previous conditions affecting Cracow and Thorn. It was therefore decided that Prussia and Russia should make a declaration to Austria, and that Prussia should call on England to help it get the possessions agreed on by treaty. It was decided to meet again on December 14.

Prince Hardenberg gave the czar all the correspondence that had been carried on with Metternich as well as the Austrian note of December 10. The most peculiar document was the Austrian note of October 22, a communication by

Metternich to Castlereagh and a billet of the same, dated November 7, in which he denied having suggested to the czar that he would give way in the Polish contention if the czar would withdraw his support [of Prussia] in the Saxon affair. Metternich visited the czar on December 14 in order to justify himself, and presented him with a memorandum from the chancellor of November —, in which the latter explicitly pointed out the need of avoiding hostile measures against Russia at this time, and presented the reasons why it was wiser to make concessions now and make preparations for the future, so as to be in a position to oppose the action of Russia against Europe. He turned this over with the remark that he possessed other writings of the chancellor of which he could make no use because they were the secrets of a third party.

Czar Alexander placed all the papers before Emperor Francis and declared that he would no longer deal with a man so untrustworthy as Metternich. Emperor Francis is said to have declared that a number of these papers, especially the communication to Lord Castlereagh, were strange to him. He asked for an interview with the Grand Duchess Catharine, which she granted only upon command of her brother. At this he deprecated the conduct of Metternich and declared that the letter to Castlereagh was wholly

unknown to him. The grand duchess informed him of the decision of the czar to deal with Metternich no longer.

Czar Alexander had a number of other talks with the Palatine. He wished to conduct the negotiations with Austria direct with Emperor Francis and decided in a conference held on December 15 with Czartoryski, Capo d'Istria, and me that Prussia should present a memorandum to Austria through him, in which it set forth its demands on Saxony. This memorandum he wanted to take himself and to discuss direct with Emperor Francis. At the same time a plan for a preliminary agreement, signed by both monarchs, was to be prepared; if formal negotiations resulted, Rasumowskij or Stackelberg would be given this task. I recommended the former. This conference was held at 6:30 o'clock in the evening.

At 3 o'clock Capo d'Istria, Czartoryski, and I met for a preliminary conference with Hardenberg. Here Hardenberg read the draft of a note that was to be presented to Russia, in which it was proposed to place the King of Saxony either on the left bank of the Rhine or in upper Lusatia.

At the conference held at seven o'clock between the czar and the chancellor it was agreed that the indivisibility of Saxony was to be insisted upon, and the King of Saxony was to be given a country



on the left bank of the Rhine with from 600,000 to 700,000 souls. The memorandum to be presented to the czar was amended along these lines at a conference on December 16 between Hardenberg, Czartoryski, Capo d'Istria, and me.

On December 17, Czartoryski sent Capo d'Istria the draft of a preliminary treaty containing the provisions that the Duchy of Warsaw and all Polish-Russian provinces be united with the empire of Russia. Capo d'Istria rejected these articles and fought anew against the idea of dividing the Russian empire into two parts, one under a despotic and the other under a constitutional government.

In the meantime the French and the Bavarians attempted to create ill feeling. Wrede called on the King of Würtemberg to join an alliance against Russia and Prussia. The Viennese became more and more excited and more decidedly for war.

Emperor Francis suggested to Czar Alexander that he name a negotiator for the discussion of the question. The czar did not know whether to name Rasumowskij or Stackelberg. Czar Alexander seemed to waver between his wish to keep peace and his desire to do his duty toward his ally and his honor. His situation was all the more painful because he had undertaken to carry on the negotiations with Austria himself.

In a conference on December 19 between the chancellor, Czartoryski, and me the former read a reasonable solution of the Saxon matter; he expressed himself as exceedingly pained by the faithlessness of Metternich, and explained how it was now necessary for Prussia to throw itself entirely into the hands of Russia and await an opportunity for making war.

The whole Saxon question (said the chancellor) was greatly out of place. It was now linked with the Polish question, and as Austria, now supported by England, did not get Cracow and Zamosc, it tried to keep Prussia from the Saxon boundary-line without taking into account that neither Cracow nor Samosc were points of decisive overwhelming importance, and that the diminished and weakened Saxony would not be more dependent on Prussia than it was formerly on the old palatinate. Further, he said, that when Austria broke faith with Prussia a deep feeling of ill will was engendered which would result in a close alliance with Russia and mistrust of Austria.

The czar appointed Counts Rasumowskij and Capo d'Istria to confer on the preliminary articles that had been drawn up, and which were to be the basis for negotiations. At the request of the English a commission was appointed to investigate the statistical table and summaries

which accompanied the various documents. The preliminary articles contained the cession of the salt works of Wieliczka and of Tarnopol to Austria, the transformation of Cracow and Thorn into free cities, the delimitation of the Prussian boundaries, the embodiment of the Duchy of Warsaw in Russia as a united constitutional state, and the unification of Saxony with Prussia. Germany was to become a federative state which, strong and intimately bound together, was to protect the rights and constitutions of the various states and classes of citizens; Mayence was to be made a federal fort. These articles were to form a rallying-point at the negotiations. It seems, besides, that the Austrians were not ready for war; they had received the Prussian note of December 21 from Czar Alexander, who presented it to Emperor Francis. The latter spoke continuously and with great earnestness against the union of Saxony with Prussia.

All of these negotiations proceeded without Nesselrode, who deeply felt his loss of influence. He lost it because of his subservience to Metternich, which often placed him in the position of acting contrary to the views of Czar Alexander or else supporting them only half-heartedly. This was especially the case when he adopted Metternich's ideas of peace in France, acted entirely according to Metternich's views in the

Swiss affairs, disapproved of the Saxon plan, and finally was directly opposed to the Polish plan. The czar had already become distrustful of him in Freiburg. This feeling grew in Chaumont and Troyes, and took a decided turn when the czar's antipathy to Metternich became open here. Nesselrode's mediocrity, ignorance, and ungenerous spirit in views and feelings, his lack of courage in serious situations, did not permit him to remain long on the heights. He had to fall the moment he tried to be something more than the tool of his master, as soon as he achieved a sort of self-sufficiency; he had to fall because he did not create this by his own powers, but was led by a foreign minister who was hated by the czar.

Metternich's frivolity did not lessen despite the crisis in these important affairs. He occupied himself with the arrangements for court fêtes, tableaux, etc., up to the smallest detail, watched the dancing of his daughter while Castlereagh and Humboldt were waiting to confer with him, and rouged the women who were to appear in tableaux. Metternich has common sense, versatility, and graciousness; he lacks depth, learning, industry, and sincerity. He loves entanglements because they keep him busy and because he lacks strength, depth, and seriousness for carrying on transactions in a great and simple manner. He often creates complica-

tions by his frivolity, his aversion for business, and his untruth without wishing to do so. He is cold, and therefore averse to giving men credit for noble feelings. This was the reason why the Austrian Army lacked enthusiasm, which alone leads to self-sacrifice and to perseverance in misfortune. His faults have kept him from attaining and using the great influence and the strong position in the eyes of his master and of his public, which he needs to nullify the weakness and the prejudice of the former, to destroy the numerous secret influences, and to rule the latter with firmness. He has to negotiate with the one and with the other and take a middle course which, for the most part, is disastrous.

Prince Metternich informed Talleyrand officially of the contents of his note of December 10. Talleyrand asked the commands of his king, and received orders to support the Saxon case. He therefore declared in a note of December 19 that France had made no demands at the Congress, as it wished nothing more than to see the dawn of reconstruction over the whole of Europe, to have each well-founded right recognized, and each injustice condemned, so that the Revolution would reach its culmination in this manner. This alone could be the subject of the work of the Congress, and if a true and lasting balance

was to be reached here, no rights could be sacrificed which would have to be granted later. The Congress should not throw all the nations into a heap and then distribute them without a plan. The lands to be distributed were only those without rulers, and the strength of a state was not only physical, but also moral strength. Therefore the King of France had ordered his ambassador to act only according to justice and to have no part in any unjust act.

Of all questions discussed by the Congress, he continued, that of Poland was the most important. The French King wished the restoration to power and independence of this old and courageous people, which was so useful to Europe. As the force of circumstances made the fulfilment of this wish impossible, as only ideas of dividing the country had prevailed, France had felt it necessary to acquiesce.

The question of Saxony, he said, had become the more important because here the principle of justice and balance of power seemed to be affected the most. France could not concede that kings could be judged, and judged by the one who wished and could take their land, that confiscation could be indorsed by the whole of Europe in the nineteenth century, that peoples were to have no rights and were to be divided arbitrarily, that sovereignty is reached by conquest, and that



only the law of nature and not the law of states was observed among European nations. The balance of power would be destroyed by uniting Saxony [with Prussia] because a great attacking power was formed directly opposite Bohemia which would endanger the security of Austria; and secondly because one of the states of Germany would receive a preponderance of power disastrous for the rest. France really loved Prussia and desired its restoration to the boundaries of 1805, and was also ready to insist that Saxony turn over to Prussia whatever land was necessary to fulfil this aim.

While Prince Metternich tried to strengthen his position with France on the one hand, he sought to isolate Prussia on the other and to separate his negotiations with Rasumowskij from those with Hardenberg. In this he did not succeed. The negotiations were intimately bound together both in subject matter and in the simultaneousness of the conferences, and on December 29 the first conference was begun between Rasumowskij, Capo d'Istria, Hardenberg, Humboldt, Metternich, Castlereagh, and Wessenberg. Hardenberg had proposed the addition of Castlereagh in order to prevent his being influenced by Metternich and because of his confidence in Castlereagh's love for peace. He had read Castlereagh's memorandum of December 28, in

which he expressed his satisfaction with the situation and suggested that Talleyrand be called in.

In a preliminary meeting on December 29, however, it was decided to refuse this in consideration of the secret article of the Treaty of Paris, according to which the allies maintained the prerogative of disposing by themselves of the territory that had been set forth regarding the possessions Austria was to receive in Italy and Sardinia, and the Prince of Orange in Belgium and on the Meuse. The Russian and Prussian interests, however, had not been taken into account; the questions of Poland and Saxony had remained untouched and left in such form that it depended on Austria and England to give their consent or to withhold it, and finally to force Russia and Prussia to go to war. The good-natured confidence of the chancellor in Castlereagh and Metternich, the shallowness of Nesselrode and his acquiescence in the will of Metternich, brought things to a state made worse by the political revival of France, and which, no matter how it develops, restores the old antipathy between Austria and Prussia and is most detrimental to the security of Germany.

It is declared that the czar did not wish to take up the Polish situation in Paris, but that he could always have taken up the Saxon question, and

then it would have been easy to prove to him that circumstances were better for him in May than they could be later, because the impression made by events was still lively, and all the common purposes had not yet revived, and the Italian and Belgian affairs had not yet been decided on, and therefore could be used as subjects for negotiation. Finally, he was mobilized and had a strong reserve army on the Vistula, while France was still in a condition of powerlessness and confusion.

The conference of December 29 concluded with preliminary negotiations. Count Rasmowskij opened it. Prince Metternich began a discourse on the different character of the questions to be discussed; declared the Saxon question was a European question, which would have to be decided with the consent of all the great powers and that of the King of Saxony. Prince Hardenberg asked him to state explicitly whether he had orders from his emperor to make the consent of the king essential; in this event he would have to break off any further negotiations for to-day and first get the commands of his master. Prince Metternich fell back upon the consent of the English to this view. Lord Castlereagh, however, declared explicitly that he would support all the reasonable and judicious proposals of Prussia if they appeared to be this to him, but

that he would never consent to let the King of Saxony be arbiter of the question.

The question was then asked Prince Metternich whether he believed Prussia to have the right to demand the restoration of the conditions in 1806, to which he replied in the affirmative. The other question, whether the plan proposed by Prussia would achieve this object, he answered in the negative, and the demand that he draft a new one he refused, inviting the Russian ministers to do so, who declared that they were bound only to support Prussia's just demands. Metternich then asked whether there was a special alliance between Russia and Prussia, which was truthfully denied, and it was explained that there was no treaty but the common one which united all the allies.

Castlereagh and Metternich suggested that the French be invited to take part in the negotiations, to which the other two ambassadors objected on the ground of the secret article of the Treaty of Paris. Metternich requested the removal of the King of Saxony to another locality; this was refused.

The Emperor of Austria instructed Alopeus to deal with the King of Prussia secretly in Berlin; to refuse to accept any fragment of Saxony and, if possible, to get his consent to a removal of the king to the left bank of the Rhine. He

was informed how the King of Saxony was surrounded by two parties, the Saxon, which wished the welfare of its fatherland and objected to any partition, and the court party, which wished to see the king back in Saxony at any price.

Emperor Francis spoke loudly of war, according to the deputy from the nobles, Zobel-Degenfeld:

"The King of Saxony shall have his lands back, else I shall shoot, and I can depend upon the nations in Germany." Zobel replied:

"Yes, if your Majesty places himself at the head."

"Now," the emperor replied, "I can say nothing about Germany."

M. de Talleyrand invited Czartoryski to an interview on December 29. He complained that the conferences were being held with the presence of Castlereagh, but without Talleyrand; the former, he said, had been formally invited, and had shown him the invitation and expressed his astonishment that the French embassy had been ignored. Prince Metternich also had expressed this view, he said. If there was any objection to his person he was ready to depart. Czartoryski replied that the secret article of the Treaty of Paris set forth that the allies should agree on the division of the conquered lands, and then place their decision before France. He replied that

this affected only the conquests actually named in this article, no others, and that the alliance was dissolved by achieving the object of the war. This sentence, however, is false; the alliance against France is dissolved by the peace with France, but the treaties of alliance contain, besides the common war designs, other considerations and agreements between the allies, especially the restoration of Prussia to its condition of 1806, regarding the fulfilment of which negotiations are still in order. This answer may well be given Talleyrand.

On the same day Emperor Francis told Czar Alexander that he believed the three allies should first agree on the plan for the restoration, and then admit Talleyrand to the discussion.

On December 31 there was another conference between the chancellor, Humboldt, Czartoryski, Capo d'Istria and me, at which it was agreed to announce in the next main conference on January 2 how they were prepared to admit Talleyrand when the four allies had come to an agreement on the plan for restoration.

In the meantime the Austrians gathered an army in Bohemia. It was to be commanded by Wrede, who would join it with his Bavarians. One army is to be located at Tetschen, and a French army is to move from the Rhine to the Elbe.



Germany was to suffer anew a civil and French war because of the interests of a supporter of Napoleon and over the question whether it were better to place him on the left bank of the Rhine or to tear Saxony apart and to give him a fragment. What blindness!

January 4.—As Castlereagh and Metternich continued to insist on the admission of France, and refused to present their counter project until that time, and as the former expressed himself most favorably toward Prussia in saying that he would not leave to the King of Saxony the question of what share to give to Prussia, but would support Prussia if the king did not listen to reason, it was decided to acquiesce in the admission of France, provided Castlereagh would make his declaration formally and as a matter of record, which he agreed to do in his interview with the chancellor. In the meantime Pozzo and Nesselrode treated secretly with Metternich, and Talleyrand tried to convince Capo d'Istria that Prussia was not to be trusted.

The report of peace with America started the hope among the Bavarians and the Austrians that England would now give stronger support to their object. When Lord Castlereagh observed this he said that he would continue to work according to the same basic principle as be-

fore and to help bring about the restoration of Prussia according to treaty. Lord Castlereagh visited Czar Alexander on January 6 and spoke in the same tenor. He represented to him that it was dangerous to transfer the King of Saxony to the left bank of the Rhine and thus give France a confederate; he believed that Prussia should receive a large part of Saxony. Everything would be made easier if the czar was inclined to release more from Poland; but the czar refused this, and said the Polish matter was concluded.' He had acquiesced in a great deal, and he had a simple solution for the Saxon question: when the King of Prussia declared himself satisfied, he would be ready to sign the treaty at once; but if not, he was ready to support him in every way.

January 7.—In the conference Count Rasumowskij declared that he was ready to agree to the admittance of Talleyrand if Lord Castlereagh would place his views, frequently expressed, in the minutes, so that a decision on the question of how Prussia was to be satisfied with a part of Saxony might be dependent upon the will of the powers and not on the arbitrariness of the King of Saxony.

Metternich had objections against making such a declaration, although he agreed with its context, but Lord Castlereagh was ready to

give it in the next conference on January 8. Count Rasumowskij thanked Lord Castlereagh with great warmth for his excellent readiness to help bring about unity and peace and for the impartiality of his conduct in this important affair. This put Metternich at a loss, and he asked Count Rasumowskij whether he did not have something agreeable to say to him. The Polish articles were considered, and details of the constitution for the Poles were discussed and prepared for.

The Bavarians now became worried because of their ill-natured behavior. Montgelas criticized the one-sided impetuosity of Field-Marshal Wrede, and the idea about the Palatinate and Mayence was given up. The Grand Duke of Bavaria had not sent the instructions for the diet to Karlsruhe. His laziness was unbounded. They were not sent until January, after my repeated urging.

The czar ordered Pozzo to return to Paris, and said to him that he wished to refuse the marriage of the Grand Duchess Anna and the Duc de Berry, because the difference in religion hindered this. He had small confidence in the Bourbons.

On January 9 the articles on Poland were discussed in the conference. Metternich showed a great deal of bitterness. Most of the Polish arti-

cles were agreed upon, and Lord Castlereagh gave his declaration in the manner decided upon, and Metternich joined this; therefore Talleyrand is to be admitted to the conference on the eleventh. The statistical committee closed its negotiations on the ninth, and will present a report signed by all the members. The Swiss committee also ended its business to-day by finishing its final report and the project of the declaration. Both documents will be drawn up on January 12 in their final form and presented.

On January 12 Prussia presented details of the project for its restoration, and demanded an increase of 600,000 souls over its condition in 1805.

The King of Würtemberg presented a project in which he called on the czar to use his influence to bring about a union of the German princes which was to bring external security only.

On January 9th the czar was invited by Prince Metternich to a ball through Count Ignaz Hardegg. He replied to him: "You are a soldier, and I shall speak frankly with you. Metternich has given me a declaration. If my relations permitted, I would know what I had to do; but now I cannot see him." He and his whole family did not attend.

The negotiations were long interrupted by the

silence of the Austrians. In the meantime the negotiations of the Polish commission continued; this consisted of Barbier and Hudelist, acting for Austria; Anstetten for Russia; and Stägemann, Jordan, and Zerboni for Prussia, and had the Polish affair for its subject.

The silence of the Austrians was due to the fact that they could not agree with the English on the Saxon reparation plan, did not wish to have Torgau and Leipsic fall to Prussia, and made a new proposal—that Russia give them but 200,000 souls from Tarnopol as against 200,000 to Prussia on the latter's boundary-line. Czar Alexander refused this absolutely; he caused this to be done through the palatine (January 20-23), and Emperor Francis also opposed the idea. Lord Castlereagh tried to make him come to reasonable views with regard to Torgau, and at last he agreed that it go to Prussia (January 25), and insisted only on Leipsic. A conference between Austria, England, Russia, France, and Prussia was then set for January 28, at which the Austrian counter-proposal was submitted. England objects to the transfer of the King of Saxony to the left bank of the Rhine, because this would endanger his independence from France.

Russia answered negatively on January 25 on the Würtemberg proposal, and repeated its de-

termination to favor unity and law and order in Germany. Herr von Humboldt had revised his draft for a federal constitution January 20-27, and given it to the chancellor, who communicated it to Count Münster, who is now reading it.

At last Prince Metternich presented his counter-proposal (January 28) and a note in which he described the moderation of Austria and urged a reasonable rounding-out of territory for the King of Saxony. The proposal included 1,200,000 souls and the land on the right bank of the Saal and part of upper Lusatia along the Bohemian boundary. The adherents of the King of Saxony were aroused by the partitioning of their country; they now felt how mistaken they were in their idea that Prussia would be forced to be satisfied with a small fragment of Saxony, and realized the disaster that threatened the remaining part of Saxony. All now united to reiterate that it was better not to divide Saxony; that Austria should have insisted only upon its military boundary, and accused France and England of having deserted the Saxon and Austrian cause. On January 29 even General Koller and the palatine expressed this opinion to the emperor and Grand Duchess Marie.

Lord Wellington arrived February 3, and Castlereagh was called away by the imminent opening of parliament; therefore he hastened to



bring the negotiations to an end, and discussed with the chancellor the locating of the boundaries between Belgium and Germany. On this occasion the boundaries between Nassau and the Duchy of Berg were also discussed.

Schwarzenberg, and through him Emperor Francis, were disturbed over the march of the Prussians from Niederrhein [lower Rhine] to the Elbe. Four regiments of infantry, twelve of cavalry, and twelve batteries marched back. They considered this a warlike act, but Czar Alexander and the king calmed them on this score. The czar also wants to see the end of the matter; so he advised Hardenberg to agree with Castlereagh before he presented his counter-proposal.

Czar Alexander's leaning toward Prussia was somewhat lessened, partly because he is rather changeable and partly because he believed that Prussia would become dependent on England and France by its Rhenish provinces, and therefore a less sure ally for him. Capo d'Istria directed his attention to this, and this view he expressed to the Crown Prince of Würtemberg when he said: "I am through with the negotiations with Prussia, as it took part in the coalition against me; but despite that, I will carry them on to the end."

The czar had considered the conduct of Ba-

varia as highly unreasonable; the King of Bavaria caused a memorandum to be prepared in which he described his dangerous situation.

The negotiations between Castlereagh and the chancellor now began. Leipsic was the principal subject of discussion. The English were disinclined to help Prussia keep it; the czar, to make matters easier, offered to give up Thorn. Prussia complained that all cities of consequence had been kept from its share, such as Görlitz, Bautzen, Weissenfels, Naumburg. After a great deal of pro-and-con talk the final project was evolved. The conferences began anew on February 11, and the points affecting Saxony, Poland, Mayence, the forts of the confederation, etc., were finally decided upon.

Castlereagh and Wellington proposed an article to the czar, according to the terms of which the pacifically inclined powers united to attack in common every maker of war. For this purpose a declaration was drawn up by Gentz, full of bombast and inflation. The czar favored the idea.

In an interview on February 13, Talleyrand attempted to move the czar to make a declaration against Murat. He was ready, but made the condition that France would not be opposed to him in the Swiss affairs. These were to be discussed anew in the committee.

Capo d'Istria had given the czar a memorandum on German affairs on February 9 and had broached the subject of giving the imperial power (the kaiserdom) to Austria. The czar asked him what my views on this subject were. Capo d'Istria replied my opinion was favorable, but that I believed a union with Prussia was necessary, and the czar suggested that he try this. Hardenberg expressed his disapproval in his interview of February 11 and based it on the lack of spirituality of the Austrian dynasty and government. I remarked that this immaturity was temporary; this was a matter of constitutional organization, etc. I put off a closer explanation of the authority in order first to place it before the czar. In his interview of February 12, Metternich also seemed inclined to accept the imperial honor, and promised to hear Count Solms and Plessen on this subject.

On the seventeenth I spoke with the czar on the necessity of reviving the imperial dignity. I placed before him everything included in my memorandum, and he viewed it with interest and declared that he wished first to be sure of the assent of the King of Prussia. I remarked that the chancellor did not seem inclined toward my view, but that General Knesebeck entirely approved.

I asked permission to depart; the czar asked me whether the German affairs allowed me to do

so. I replied that the principal matters had been disposed of; it seemed to me that the Bavarian question and that of the imperial dignity would be decided in a few days.

February 18.—I read my memorandum on the restoration of the imperial office to Rasumowskij and Capo d'Istria to-day. Nesselrode began a discussion with Prince Wrede regarding the viceroy [Eugène de Beauharnais], and Wrede suggested that he be given the seven islands. The senate had commissioned Capo d'Istria to demand the freedom of these islands and Castlereagh favored this.

Wellington began his diplomatic career with an attempt to settle the Swiss affair by offering the Veltlin to Austria.

On February 19, Count Rasumowskij called on Prince Metternich in a note to end the conferences on the territorial affairs that still remain to be adjusted.

Prince Metternich had an interview with Count Solms on the acceptance of the imperial dignity at which he said that for his part he could neither advise for it or against it. In northern Germany [he said] they want the minor princes, but Prussia was disinclined, and Austria would get into entanglements with Prussia on this account. There was, nevertheless, a counterbalance in the Kingdom of the Netherlands. In

southern Germany Bavaria's strength hindered the development of imperial power, and here it appeared there was less a wish for a constitution than in the North. Count Solms replied that this was the case, as in Würtemberg everything was disturbed by the plan for a constitution. In order to get peace it was necessary for the Congress to issue a formal request to the king to delay the introduction of a constitution until the Congress had decided on the general principles.

The Mecklenburg ambassador, Plessen, also had an interview with Wessenberg on the restoration of the imperial dignity, in which the latter declared that he considered it advisable for Austria to accept it; in the meantime the emperor had told Prince von Weilburg he would refuse to accept it.

On the 24th, Prince Hardenberg gave Humboldt's rebuttal to my resolution on the imperial dignity, and declared that as Prussian minister he could not possibly agree to this increase in the Austrian power; this had a tendency to unite with Bavaria and France against Russia, Prussia, and England; by this addition its power would be increased. Hanover, also, would not agree; he would turn every one against him in Berlin if he allowed Austria to seize such influence. I demanded a copy of the statement in order to refute it. He promised to give it as soon as he

returned from the king, to whom he was about to present this draft, and urged me to let the matter drop, as it only gave opportunity for new jealousy between Austria and Prussia.

The idea of appointing Rasumowskij seemed to have been given up by the czar, and it appeared to be his plan to take Nesselrode, Anstetten, and Capo d'Istria to St. Petersburg without naming a minister. It seems that he means to depart about March 15 if the Bavarian territorial question is ended and a number of general principles governing the German constitution are determined by that time. Nesselrode is to remain here.

February 24.—My interview with Lord Wellington began with his remark that it was necessary to regulate German affairs, and as Germany had no unity, the agreement between Prussia and Austria and the disposition of public opinion would have to take its place. Germany was united principally by speech and custom; it was divided by religion and political interest. The proposed federative institution would have to be supported by the two powers and by public opinion. The latter had expressed itself clearly for the legal constitution.

I replied that I considered the German affair in its present condition as out of place. It had been brought there by the system at first fol-



lowed by the Austrians of letting Germany break up into many parts; then the acts of the Rhine confederation had been sanctioned by peace treaties of questionable utility. At present a plan for a federation had been evolved which could not succeed because five directing and subordinate courts divided power in various proportions. It might be possible to remove this evil by the appointment of a head for the federation, as actually the true political interests of Prussia and Austria were not opposed.

He replied that the appointment of such a head was not now possible; something, however, had to be done to fulfil the agreements made by all the nations on the German affair and to allay the feelings of the people. There was suspense everywhere, and a military-republican spirit was appearing, especially in Prussia.

I remarked that in a country where a constitution had existed and where the people were accustomed to law and order it was necessary to restore a similar one and to end arbitrary action. Anarchy [I continued] was repulsive to the German spirit and the German being. If the powers wished to fulfil their agreements, the interrupted conferences on the German affair would have to be renewed, on behalf of which Hardenberg spoke to Prince Metternich.

He replied that he would consider this. Met

ternich had told him of a Prussian plan of 120 articles, which seemed too extensive.

I spoke of the possibility of abridging it. In this case only the principal clauses need be lifted out, and the more detailed developments turned over to a special federal committee. The acceleration of the work of the Congress was greatly to be desired, as the departure of the monarchs was necessary. Most urgent was the removal of the provisional government, and the ending of the Bavarian territorial discussion. The provisional government brought with it the great cost of quartering troops in the occupied countries and great expense for the allied powers. In deciding on the case of Bavaria it was necessary to exercise caution to prevent it from coming in contact with France by possessions on the left bank of the Rhine. The spirit of French politics would always be disastrous for Germany and its neighbors. It was therefore necessary to limit the Bavarian lands to the right bank of the Rhine and contiguous territory.

Lord Wellington remarked that it seemed necessary to place a larger power, ready for war, on the left bank of the Rhine in preference to many small ones, which might be easily demoralized and overturned by France, and asked whether I did not believe that when Austria possessed

Salzburg it could hold Bavaria in its sphere of interest by its preponderance.

I replied that the organization of a greater power on the left bank of the Rhine was useful only in so far as its loyalty could be depended upon, which was not the case of Bavaria. Germany was sufficiently defended against a first attack by France by the line of federal forts and by the strengthening of Belgium and Prussia. Austria had shown itself to be very weak toward Bavaria despite its superior power, and in view of its moral weakness it was necessary to avoid all entanglements in which it might be involved through Bavaria and France.

The czar made himself disagreeable anew without reason when he made the cause of the Empress Marie Louise and Eugène de Beauharnais his own with a great deal of spirit, demanding Parma and Piacenza for the former, and a sovereignty in Italy for the other, despite the fact that Emperor Francis had declared that he declined Parma and Piacenza, and would give his daughter lands in the hereditary states of the crown. The empress had written Czar Alexander and asked for his support. She is a shallow Frenchwoman, who acts as if she has forgotten everything German, and who allows General Neipperg to pay her court.

February 26.—I asked Chancellor Harden-

berg for the memorandum of Humboldt. He sent Humboldt himself to me with a refusal, because he considered the matter [of the imperial crown for Austria] detrimental for Prussia, and hoped that it would be dropped. Otherwise it might become a bone of contention between Prussia and Austria and increase the bitterness between them. I remembered that it was necessary, as the chancellor did not give me the complete reasons for his opposition, that he place them before the czar himself and that he ask an audience for this purpose. In this Humboldt was agreed.

Shortly afterward Plessen arrived and told me that Wessenberg recognized the advantage of the restoration of the imperial dignity and had promised him a more detailed discussion. I therefore considered it necessary (February 27) to urge this matter again to the chancellor in a special letter.

The chancellor sent me the Humboldt memorandum on March 4, a tangled, sophisticated, poorly written document.

In the meantime the Bavarian territorial matters were concluded. Metternich did not reply to the note of Count Rasumowskij regarding the continuation of the conferences, and the latter did not urge an answer in an earnest and forceful manner. He conferred with Wellington, Wrede,

and Nesselrode, who had forced himself back by his perseverance and his familiarity, with the help of Prince Peter Wolkonskij, and who continually tried to end the matter according to the views of Metternich, indifferent to the methods he used, and incapable of correctly valuing this method.

On March 2 the chancellor gave the czar a sketch of the Bavarian demands, which he handed me for examination. I had given him a memorandum of the Grand Duke of Baden on the third, in which the latter presented his arguments against surrendering the Pfalz region to Bavaria. He had wished to give it to the czar, but could get no audience, and therefore gave it to the empress, who sent it to me with the request that I place it before the czar. I convinced him that the interest of Baden was less concerned here than that of Germany, that Bavaria, in receiving Mannheim and Hanau, cut the rest of southern Germany from the northern part, came into touch with France, and was in agreement with both Austria and France, and so could enter into diplomatic relations with both united or with each separately. This was so much the worse because an agreement between Austria, France, and Bavaria against Russia and Prussia could be foreseen and would be made more dangerous by a line drawn between the Main and

the Neckar. The czar convinced himself of this and called the grand duke on March 4, but the latter was in bed with a catarrhal fever and could not come. Capo d'Istria called the attention of the czar to this alliance and to the dependence on England of Prussia, brought about by its provinces on the lower Rhine, and the necessity of building a firm, political system for this country. He declared that at present everything depended upon a solution of the questions at issue and the cultivation of good relations with Prussia.

The czar seemed to have given up the idea of employing Rasumowskij. Nesselrode had forced himself back into favor; the negotiations in the conferences had reopened without the presence of Rasumowskij and Capo d'Istria; therefore very little favorable action was to be expected in the regulation of territorial affairs; it could be foreseen that Bavaria would be most extraordinarily favored. The German Confederation itself would be most incomplete if the idea of not choosing a head for it was persisted in.

The half-way relations that I had [with the czar] could only make me depressed. I had influence without effective direction, and influence on most incapable men, who were to be used as tools for achieving great aims. Lack of con-



centration and depth in one; dullness and the coldness of age in the other; weakness of will, coarseness, and dependence on Metternich in the third; the frivolity of all—these were the reasons why no great, noble, philanthropic idea, completely conceived, could spring to life. I needed only a firm determination to shake off these unfortunate entanglements, and it was advisable to take this step soon, at least before the miserable conduct of the group had fully asserted itself.

March 4.—Nesselrode wanted to talk with Capo d'Istria about the Bavarian affairs, but was greatly surprised to hear that the latter was informed on this subject and that he did not consider them reasonable. "They are the ideas of Baron Stein." He replied that the czar did nothing in German affairs without consulting me. Nesselrode wanted to place the case before the czar to-day—March 5. It was therefore good that the latter was prepared for this. Metternich said to Rasumowskij that he would send Wessenberg to the chancellor to present a counter-project to Bavaria's demands. On March 5, I gave the czar a memorandum on the Bavarian demands for annexation which he gave Count Rasumowskij in place of instructions.

March 7 and 8.—Wessenberg, Grolman, Hoffmann, the chancellor, drafted a new plan for

a discussion between Austria and Bavaria. I had a talk with Lord Wellington about this and spoke of the contents of my memorandum. He remarked that Prince Wrede's demands were preposterous and that he had a right only to insist on the conditions of the peace of Ried; that the danger for Germany would not be great if it was divided through the Rhenish Pfalz, because Bavaria still remained dependent on Austria and Prussia; that it desired a point of support in Hanau. The political behavior of Bavaria before 1805 had been good and friendly toward Austria; Frankfort must remain a free city.

My answer was that the possession of the Rhenish Pfalz and Mannheim would be dangerous for Germany when Prussia and Austria disagreed. No matter how necessary it was to keep this connection between the two powers for their own good and the good of Germany, a misunderstanding was easily possible, and in this case the possession of this line [by Bavaria] would be most detrimental to Germany. Under the Elector Karl Theodore, a prince of the old style, the behavior of Bavaria had been good; the present cabinet was most evilly inclined; Bavaria did not need a point of support on the Main; it was not well located for a military center; only Ingolstadt, Donauwörth, or Nuremberg could serve this purpose.

The report of Napoleon's adventure on March 7 caused general apprehension and brought the parties closer together. It was received by Lord Wellington. He was worried about the bad spirit of the French Army and the knowledge Napoleon might have of this. The lust for war, the tendency to license, the desire to avenge, the feeling of insult, ill will at the loss of their dotations and respect, influenced the army and the people, and an outbreak of this hostile spirit was to be feared. In Italy there is general discontent because of lost nationality and the many mistakes of the Austrian administration. Murat was ready to strike. The Austrian Army was hardly 40,000 men strong. This condition caused general apprehension. The cabinets came closer together, and attempted to dispose of the remaining controversies.

The czar declared loudly that he was ready to maintain the Treaty of Paris at the head of his army. In a talk with Capo d'Istria he said the same thing, and declared he would make his conditions in advance, and would not lay himself open to new difficulties and interference by his allies if public affairs were to be settled. He wanted no enlargement of territory, but needed subsidies to carry on the war.

I told Capo d'Istria that it was necessary to issue a declaration of the eight powers that they

were determined to maintain the Treaty of Paris. By this the French would be warned, and the dangers of a foreign war brought to their attention.

The Empress [of Russia] departed on March 9. She was sad. Her relations with the czar were cold and reserved; she has a touch of timidity in her character and a delicate feeling akin to sensitiveness. There is no doubt that if she had more vivacity, dexterity, and openness she would come close to the czar. Yet he is supposed to place a high value on delicacy, moderation, culture, dignity, resignation, and graciousness. The King of Bavaria may have contributed something to the distance between them by his gossip and tale-bearing.

March 11.—The report of Bonaparte's landing in the neighborhood of Grasse, department of Var, disturbed not a few. The czar had already sent an explanation to his business agent in Switzerland on March 9, in which he expressed his determination to uphold the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris. The commands to stop demobilization of the Prussian Army had been sent out; a military conference was held to-day by Schwarzenberg, Walkonskij, and Knesebeck. All minds were brought closer together by their worry over the future; the French embassy was

greatly satisfied with the declaration of the czar. The King of Bavaria became anxious, and it could be seen that the territorial question would soon be decided.

It was also necessary to accelerate the discussion of the constitution in order to calm the spirits of the inhabitants. I therefore proposed that the essential points be agreed upon hurriedly and published, and that the development of details be left to the federal deputies assembled here. Count Münster held this view; Chancellor Hardenberg, however, who thought only of war, thought the matter would have to be held in abeyance.

In the meantime came the correspondence with the King of Würtemberg, who insisted that he was entitled to introduce a constitution without the coöperation of the German committee and without taking into account the claims of the mediatized princes. A joint communication by Hanover, Prussia, and Austria on this subject was agreed upon.

The recent developments led the czar to offer the position of chancellor of state to Count Rasumowskij on March 9 through Nesselrode; he took the matter under advisement and on the eleventh had not yet decided what to do. He was concerned over the difficulties of the post,

his age, and his anxiety at the unsystematic manner in which the czar conducted affairs.

"Metternich is good and well meaning, but is lazy, vain, and proud," his friend the Countess F— W— told me.

The King of Saxony has refused the proposal of Metternich, Talleyrand, and Wellington (March 9) that he accept the part of Saxony which has been left to him, and has presented a note which he hoped to make the basis for negotiations, but which was refused by the ministers without comment. It is believed that he will eventually acquiesce. It is odd that to overcome the refusal of the king these ministers had to advance the same arguments that Russia and Prussia used against them to substantiate their claims on Saxony.

The act declaring Napoleon an outlaw was issued on March 14; I had already urged it on the eighth, a strange change in fortune. He who declared me outside the law on December 15, 1808, is now placed in a similar and much more dangerous position by a resolution of the great European powers.

Baron von Stein refers to the incident which is responsible for his position in the service of the Russian Czar. Napoleon, alarmed at Stein's plans to



unify Germany, forced his exile. Stein fled to Austria and later to Russia.

Metternich has not yet sent his note to the King of Würtemberg. In the meantime the discontent in Suabia grows. The mediatized princes are protesting formally against the constitution of Würtemberg. Disturbances brought about by the severity of the excise act are breaking out in Baden.

The Grand Duke [of Baden] gave me a communication for the czar on the fourteenth in which he recognized the right of succession of Count von Hochberg; the czar replied, giving his approval.

The upheaval in France is a result of the deep-seated decay of the nation, which, led on by greed and a desire for vengeance, preferred the rule of a tyrant to the mild and lawful government of a reasonable, pious king; which welcomed the former everywhere with joy and gaily prepared for a war of conquest and pillage. It forgets the physical and spiritual oppression under which it had existed before, the arbitrary manner in which its life and property was dealt with, the destruction of its trade, the waste of the lives of its children, and wishes only to attack the neighboring nations anew and to rob and oppress them. The signal for a new struggle has been

given. God will bless the arms of the allies and will punish the wicked nation for its crimes. The French embassy, which has spread confusion and injured so much here; the Bavarian, which helped fan the flames of war, now have to seek the help of Prussia and Russia, after having tried to destroy the first and raise the suspicions of Europe against the second. They declare that the revolution is solely a work of conspiracy in the army, which is forcing the hated tyrant on a nation that is kindly disposed.

Czar Alexander was ready and determined to renew the struggle and gave up his own command over the army, which he should have kept for himself; at least he should have insisted on the removal of ———. Czar Alexander made friends again with Metternich at the request of Emperor Francis. The emperor used the occasion to ask the Russian Czar not to refer again to his aversion for Metternich. The czar gave his promise; said that unforgiveness was contrary to the duty of a Christian, and afterward had a number of conferences with him (March 16-19).

The French people are mutinous, rebellious, as their history teaches us. This comes from their frivolity, vivaciousness, greed, vices that can no longer be held in check by religion and culture.

The present occurrences take on the character of a conspiracy in the army, not a revolution that

comes from the desire of the whole nation, as can be deduced by a comparison of its progress with that of the Revolution of 1789. The Revolution was rapid, general, with a great flaring-up; the present movement appears local, treacherous, and timid. I made this observation to Capo d'Istria, who discussed it in a memorandum that he handed to the czar (March 21 and 22). He was impelled to do this by the draft for a treaty of alliance between England, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, in which the allies joined against the undertaking of Napoleon, and which was rather uncertain on the subject of subsidies. According to his view, subsidies should most certainly be asked of England, and the promise should be obtained from Austria that the Empress Marie Louise and her son relinquish all claims on the imperial dignity.

Prince Eugène de Beauharnais won the protection of the Russian Czar, who gained the consent of Emperor Francis to this at the time when he acceded to the latter's wish that he again become friends with Metternich. Eugène said the proclamation of the allies against Napoleon would cause the whole French nation to rise against them and unite to support Napoleon; there would be uprisings on the left bank of the Rhine, in Poland, and in Saxony.

March 22.—The King of Saxony accepted

the land that had been set aside for him, and made only the reservation that he call various notables first and advise them of the necessity of his acceptance. An evil spirit favoring Napoleon has been observed in Dresden and among the Saxon Army on the left bank of the Rhine.

There is a malignant spirit among the Saxon troops, in Warsaw and to some extent on the lower Rhine. The joy of many at Napoleon's arrival was shown in a most unworthy manner in many instances.

Joseph Bonaparte wrote a most peculiar letter to the Austrian business agent in Switzerland, Herr von Schraut. He told him that it was the wish of the army and the nation to recall Napoleon in order to free them of the unworthy government of the Bourbons, which was a bad dream. In this letter was inclosed a bulletin which announced that Paris and the northern garrisons had been occupied and that a provisional government had been named, consisting of Cambacérès, Davout, Sieyès, and Caulaincourt; Joseph further wrote that he wished to give Herr von Schraut information of the greatest importance for the peace of Europe. This discloses that the conspirators counted with confidence on the success of the adventure of the Generals Lefebvre, Desnouettes, l'Allemand, and Drouet, and that

Joseph Bonaparte was an accomplice and had knowledge of it.

In all probability the downfall of Napoleon may be expected, because their undertakings failed, and because public opinion, especially in the Prussian state, was loudly against the tyrant, which had an effect on the feeling in the army. Furthermore for these reasons: because of the declaration of the powers to concentrate all their strength to fight Napoleon, thus preventing the danger of an invasion of France; because the marshals and foremost generals remained loyal and took effective action; because all authorities and all departments declared themselves against Napoleon; and the king was calm and firm. The courtiers are said to have conducted themselves dishonorably and cowardly. Blacas threw himself at the feet of Louis XVIII and begged him to depart; but the king remained unmoved.

On the twenty-third Herr von Plessen, Count Keller, and Senator Smidt presented to Prince Metternich and Hardenberg the note of March 22 [in which they asked that the basis for the German constitution be agreed on]. They added orally a request for a declaration on the acceptance of the imperial dignity. Prince Metternich assured them explicitly that the Congress was not to adjourn until the foundation for the German constitution had been laid. He said that

Austria could not now accept the imperial dignity because of the opposition of Prussia and Bavaria. Herr von Plessen observed that at the very least a strong, single direction was necessary. Prince Hardenberg gave a similar answer. He added that he was unable to support the proposal of instituting the imperial dignity, because if it was strong, it would be disadvantageous for Prussia, and if weak, it would be useless. A guiding hand, however, was needed. Humboldt, he said, was busy compiling a survey of his plan.

The events in Würtemberg became known here to-day, March 26, and caused the greatest joy among all who were favorably disposed. The firm, lawful, and forceful conduct of this assembly was in strongest contrast to the action of the French. The Count of Artois and MacDonald had the garrison of Lyons drawn up, but they could not force them to cry, "*Vive le roi!*" They cried, "*Vive la France!*" and "*Vive la Maréchal!*" As soon as the troops of Napoleon appeared, every one cried, "*Nous voulons fraterniser!*"; rushed upon them and pulled the marshal from his horse, so that he had to take safety in flight, followed for three miles by Bonaparte's hussars.

A treaty of alliance was signed on March 27 by Austria, Russia, England, and Prussia, by which they agreed to send at least 450,000 men against Napoleon and to fight for the integrity



of the Treaty of Paris of May 31, 1814. The question of subsidies was held in abeyance.

The bitterness in Saxony against the Prussians increased and showed itself in the most incomprehensible manner; at the levying of the central taxes, at the promulgation of the statutes, etc. The former was necessary to take care of demands that grew out of march of the Russians through Saxony.

In view of the thoroughly perverted spirit of the [French] Army, it was necessary to weaken it and to adopt national mobilization as a counter-measure. Count Dupont was active in this direction. As, however, the political rôle was not to be neglected in foreign affairs, as Talleyrand still had a voice in the Saxon situation, and this needed support, Marshal Soult was placed at the head of the army. A conspiracy developed.

Two months before Barras had an interview with Blacas, in which he directed attention to Bonaparte's intrigues and his connections with Murat, and insisted that Bonaparte be arrested, so that he could try to get Murat to abdicate. Blacas paid no attention to this proposal, and Talleyrand also was dazzled by his own arrogance. Pozzo asked him several times (in October and November, 1814) to bring up at the Congress the question of the arrest of Napoleon. He received the reply, "*N'en parlez pas; c'est un*

*homme mort*" ["Do not speak of him; he is a dead man"]. When he was told of the mutinous spirit of the army he replied, "*Le roi peut faire marcher 150,000 hommes et les dissoudre*" ["The king is able to assemble 150,000 men and to scatter them"]. When on March 8 he urged the necessity of going to Presburg to settle the affair with the King of Saxony, Count Rasumowskij remarked that it was highly necessary to determine the attitude of the Congress toward Napoleon and to publish it; he continued in his view and said: "*C'est une affaire majeure, celle de l'acceptation du roi de Saxe. Il faut avant tout la terminer*" ["This affair of the acceptance of the King of Saxony is more important. It is necessary to end it before everything else"]. The declaration, therefore, did not leave until March 14 and had not reached Paris by the twentieth, when it might have been there on the sixteenth; therefore could not be made public when the king left. It was believed in Paris for a long time that the declaration had been withdrawn and that Austria supported Napoleon.

The French ambassador in Turin, Marquis d'Osmond, had also told the ministers in the winter of 1814 about the relations of the Bonapartists with their chief. All reports received by General ——— on April 2 and by other members of the assembly confirmed the report that the

undertaking of Napoleon was carried out against the wishes of the nation, and succeeded only with the support of the greater part of the army; that he found it necessary to negotiate with the Jacobins and to flatter them. This was the reason for the demobilization of the national guard and the freedom of the press.

The baseness of Ney surpassed all bounds. He kissed the king's hand with feeling, wept, obtained 500,000 francs from him with which to pay his debts, as he was going forth to face death for him, and said, "*Je vous amènerai le tigre muselé*" ["I will bring back the tiger to you muzzled"]. When he related this to Napoleon he added, with laughter, "*J'ai intérieurement bien ri du gros cochon*" ["Inwardly I laughed heartily at this big hog"].

Prince Wrede would not accept the division of territory agreed upon by Prussia, Austria, Russia, and England (April 4), and reserved his explanation. The disturbing sense of his own importance of this man worked disadvantageously at the discussions on the German constitution, which he weakened; in the misunderstandings regarding Saxony, which he augmented and embittered; and finally at the settlement of the territorial question, which he held up. No agreement could be reached in two conferences because Bavaria insisted upon retaining the territory which

it held and administered, and this caused further complications. At the same time Murat began hostilities, and everything united to place emphasis upon the disastrous progress of the Congress and to increase the embarrassment of Metternich, brought about by his frivolity and a certain receptivity and good nature. A bad spirit was shown at the Munich court.

April 8.—The departure of King Louis XVIII was so rapid that Jaucourt, the representative of M. de Talleyrand, left behind him [in Paris] papers dealing with the newest developments at the Congress of Vienna, and among others the treaty of alliance of January 4, 1815, between France, Austria, England, and Bavaria aimed against powers which made excessive demands. Bassano turned this treaty over to the Russian agent Butjakin, who gave it to Czar Alexander. This stirred up the czar, who became heated and ill tempered, but declared that, nevertheless, he would oppose Napoleon strenuously and cheerfully. Shortly afterward Talleyrand assured Nesselrode that only unimportant papers had been left behind by Jaucourt; and when Nesselrode appeared to doubt this, he continued: "*Ah, je sais de quoi vous voulez parler—c'est ce traité; il a été fait sans mauvaise intention. Quant à moi, j'ai voulu rompre la quadruple alliance*" ["Ah, I know of what you would speak—

the treaty; it was made without any evil intention. So far as I am concerned, I wished to disrupt the quadruple alliance"]. The dastard!

Napoleon stood between the license of the soldiery and the superior power of the French: the former oppressed and aroused the inhabitants; the latter forced him to take Fouché and Carnot into the ministry, to announce the freedom of the press, and to start work on a new constitution. He lived in suspense and fear, surrounded by his guard.

As it was felt necessary to keep the assembly that had been called for in May in good spirits, it was decided to take Talleyrand's advice and issue a declaration which specifically set forth that the object of the war was the removal of Napoleon, in this manner leaving the question of the restoration of the Bourbons to the judgment of the nation.

According to reports brought by General Waldersdorf, the Danish ambassador, a party was formed in Paris by men discontented with Bourbon rule, composed of constitutionalists, regicides, and Bonapartists, which sought a change in the government in order to seize power and enrich themselves. At their head was Carnot, later Fouché, who gave the government proofs of his adherence for a long time, but later left it. The

postal director Ferrand placed a Bonapartist, La Vallette, at the head of the postal service, and he suppressed all reports dealing with the general unrest. The minister of police asked Bassano for a trustworthy man for his department, and received the latter's friend Mounier. Soult was given a place on the recommendation of an "immigrant," M. de Bruggs, who declared that he would have him watched through a friend who was in the war council.

This party, however, regards Napoleon only as its tool, which it is ready to destroy and probably soon will have to do so, in order to save itself, as the army now has not more than 120,000 men, and lacks arms; for the factories can supply only 15,000 monthly. It appears that St. Montereau was sent to Vienna by this group to get information on affairs here, and on the steps taken by the allies, etc.

In order that his party and its opponents and the opponents of the Bourbons should not be driven to desperation, it was decided to issue the declaration. There was difficulty in finding a place where the integrity of France might be mentioned; Clancarty also criticized it because it did not clearly state that Louis XVIII was to be returned to the throne. It was feared that Czar Alexander might be inclined to change the order of succession to the throne because of his



aversion to the Bourbons and especially to Louis XVIII, and perhaps would favor the Duke of Orleans. All this, however, was based solely on conjecture, on an article in the French newspaper of Frankfort, and similar expressions, and on anxiety over the influence of La Harpe, whose head was full of immature ideas, and whose heart was filled with injured vanity and bitterness.

April 18, 23.—German affairs at last seem to progress. The Humboldt proposal found little approval because of its vacillating language. Herr von Plessen and Herr von Wessenberg have drafted another; and when negotiations were begun with the German nobility regarding the alliance, the Mecklenburg ambassador, Herr von Plessen, renewed his demand for a decision on the basic law. Herr von Humboldt and Count Nesselrode gave him specific assurances.

Czar Alexander insisted on April 23 that I remain here until the wind-up of the German affair. Metternich assured me on April 24 that this would be brought about when I represented to him the necessity for a decision to appease the people and because of the special war measures.

The Bavarian affair was closed on the twenty-fourth, wanting only the consent of Würtemberg, Hesse, Darmstadt, and Baden. The latter two were against giving Bavaria land on the left bank of the Rhine and letting the Bavarian boundary

come so close to Mannheim and Darmstadt. The whole Bavarian settlement was effected in an unfortunate manner. It encircles the whole of southern Germany with Bavarian possessions; it takes the fortress of Salzberg from Austria; it mars the unity and federation of the little states at a moment when they have to raise troops and make all sorts of efforts. It would be better to postpone the whole settlement until after the war. The war itself will bring about readjustments that can be utilized with profit.

The present size of Bavaria is disadvantageous for Germany. It leans heavily upon its neighbors; it strives toward enlargement; the spirit of its government is perverted; and anything may be expected as a result of its ambition and its ill feeling toward Prussia and Austria. Its limitation to the land between the Danube and the Lech is necessary for the internal and external tranquillity of Germany, and it is to be expected that its Government will soon give good cause for such a rectification. It is therefore advisable to leave it out of the German Confederation and not to endanger the political life of this organization by including Bavaria. Its designs do not allow it to submit to the limitations of the federal agreement; this can be concluded, therefore, only by omitting Bavaria and by waiting the turn of events. Herr von Plessen said to Münster that

he believed things could be concluded without Bavaria. Münster was of the opinion that the powers of medium size should protect the smaller ones, and that Bavaria was necessary for this.

The agreement on Poland was finally signed between Austria and Prussia on May 5. The Poles, however, remained disaffected, because the czar did not unite his old provinces with the Duchy of Warsaw under the name of a Kingdom of Poland. There was trouble brewing among them continually, which was increased by the ill feeling of Grand Duke Constantine toward a number of Polish generals. The agreement allowed free intercourse for Polish products in all the Polish provinces; in this manner the tariff of 1811, which cut Russia off, was set aside, which was beneficial for Russia.

The conferences on provisioning in Germany are progressing very slowly on account of the interference of England and Hanover. As the armies moved into Germany and full and immediate payment for the great armies was impossible at the prices set by profiteering, I suggested that the deliveries be made to cover the needs of three months according to reduced prices, which were agreed upon with the princes,—payment to be made partly in cash, partly in notes,—and the division of Germany into three provisioning districts. Negotiations and discussions on this sub-

ject were begun with the princes, which Count Münster refused to join on the ground named in the beginning, and in this he was supported by the English. Gen. Vincent was instructed to confer on this subject with the King of the Netherlands.

May 8.—The discussion of German affairs have finally begun. Prince Metternich had caused Herr von Wessenberg to draw up a draft of an act of federation. The conferences began May 11.

Revolt of the Saxon regiment of the grenadier guards. Infamous results of the intrigues of the unreasoning supporters of the king.

Czar Alexander won the love of the inhabitants by his human kindness and well-intentioned conduct. He was pleased with their good nature, and cordiality, and these impressions will work beneficially in the future. He told Counts Wrba, Zichy, and Auersperg that he hoped to come back to Vienna and that he departed with regret; he viewed Europe as a great family, and as he was the youngest of the rulers, he felt that he would have to visit his friends as often as the general tranquillity allowed him to do so. He visited one of the taverns in the Prater unrecognized by the guests, ordered beer, and tobacco, paid the regular price, and left without being observed.











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